THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

Vol. 8 Autumn · 1939 No. 4

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Published Quarterly for General Circulation by

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THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR is published four times a year, December, March, June and October by the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa. The annual subscription is $2 (Canada, $2.25; foreign, $2.50). Publication office, Federal and Nineteenth Streets, Camden, New Jersey. Editorial office, 12 East 44th Street, New York, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Camden, New Jersey, under the act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America. Copyright 1939, by the United Chapters of Phi Beta Kappa. Volume 8, No. 4.

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AUTUMN · 1939 VOLUME 8 · No. 4

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The American Scholar

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The Challenge of Our Times

HAROLD J. LASKI

NOT even the years before the War of 1914 have imposed so tense a strain upon men's minds as the period since the advent of Hitler to power. The conventions upon which our civilization has been built are challenged at their foundation. The burden of suffering has become so wide and deep that we everywhere encounter the horror of becoming accustomed to horror as part of our normal way of life. We have accustomed ourselves to assume that conflict is inevitable. We embark upon the politics of power with hardly a thought of the way in which habituation transforms means into ends.

The danger of our time is, above all, a failure to see it in its proper perspective. We have given new names to old things and unless we are careful we run the risk of forgetting the claims of reason in our bewilderment at the reemergence of the old in new forms. For, after all, what we are confronted with is tyranny; and the habits of the tyrant are as old as history itself. Our business, when tyranny challenges us, is not to beat our breasts and bewail our fate but rather to understand why the challenge has come. At bottom there is nothing unexpected in its onset. A large part of the 19th century is a warning of its arrival; our error is to have neglected the warning. And the clue to the process in which we are involved is in our hands. The issue is whether, realizing this, we have the courage to follow it to its appointed end.

The clue, I say, is in our hands. The outstanding feature of our time is insecurity. Epochs of this character—witness the Reformation and the French Revolution—have always been unfavorable to reason and tolerance; they have therefore been epochs in which dictatorship has its opportunity. And men always feel insecure when their privileges are challenged. They

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are not prepared to accept the invasion of their wonted routines. They seek to make their private claims universal rights; and those who provide them with the means of enforcing their claims are regarded as their saviors. The limits of men's faith in a reason which disturbs their established expectations are more narrow than we care to admit. Yet such disturbance always comes in an age of economic contraction. Whenever, historically, the economic forces of society cannot contain themselves within the political forms—as, once more, in the Reformation and the French Revolution—we have moved into an epoch of war and revolution. And these have always led to an adjustment of the proportion, the discovery of a new social equilibrium which makes possible the renewal of an epoch of economic expansion. In such an epoch, reason and tolerance resume their empire because we are again able to satisfy the established expectations of men.

Political democracy was successful in the 19th century because it coincided with an age of immense economic expansion. Roughly, its effect was to bring the middle class to power; and the reign of the middle class was accepted because the wealth that its rule made accessible permitted a wide extension of material benefits to the masses. But the middle class won its victory only by alliance with the working class. The price of its victory—a price which in Great Britain it took over a century to exact—was political democracy based upon universal suffrage. The middle class paid that price without undue alarm so long as political democracy did not challenge its economic and social privilege. And this the political democracy did not do so long as economic well-being was continuously extended. As soon as the extension ceased, however, the masses inevitably used the political power conferred upon them to reopen the issues of privilege concealed from view in the heyday of expansion. Exactly as in the three centuries after the Reformation the middle class, in its effort to secure a form of state suited to its needs, had met (and overthrown) the landed aristocracy; so, in our own day, the masses challenge the middle class and

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seek, not the overthrow of political democracy but its extension to those economic and social fields from which its consequences had been excluded after the victory of the middle class had been won. And exactly as the feudal aristocracy thought the claims of the middle class (and therefore of political democracy) inadmissible, so in our own day the middle class regards as inadmissible the claims of the masses to the extension of the democratic idea. It prefers rather to fight for its privileges than to give way, exactly as its predecessor in power preferred to fight. Its enthusiasm for democracy as a form of government wanes as the consequences of democracy make imperative a sharing of privileges with those who have previously been excluded from them. On every hand it is evident that this is the root of the matter. It is apparent in the attitude of business men to social equipment. They welcome it when their economic position is undisturbed by its cost; they fear and resist it whenever it threatens their power to dominate the state. Their attitude is apparent in the different reception which they accorded the dictatorship in the Soviet Union and the dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler. The one, from the outset, was treated with passionate indignation; it altered fundamental rights of property for the benefit of the masses. The others were treated, at their inception at least, with tolerance if not with favor. For, far from disturbing the rights of property, they seemed to make them more secure by striking at the trade unions, the cooperative movement and the socialist parties—the weapons developed by the working class in the 19th century to push forward the frontiers of democracy into those spheres of economic and social life from which it had previously been excluded. It seems that the forms of private property, as these have been evolved in a society dominated by middle-class business men, must not be touched by the normal operations of political democracy. Any effort to change them is regarded as something contrary to the inherent structure of the universe. And if a change in them is part of the immanent logic of democracy, then business men will cooperate in the destruction of democracy as ardently as

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they cooperated in the destruction of feudalism in the centuries between the Reformation and the French Revolution.

All those who speculated seriously about politics at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries knew well what, at bottom, we have got to make up our minds to accept—that equality is of the inner essence of democracy, and that the alternative to equality is the ability in any society to make continuous concessions of material well-being to the masses. This choice was concealed from most Americans until 1932 because the infinite resources of the United States enabled those concessions (above all in comparison with Europe) to be made. As soon as depression made their continuance a threat to the economic privileges of business men, widespread doubt emerged as to the validity of the democratic principle. It is reasonable that this should be even more true of Europe, where opportunity on the American scale has never been known and where social equality has never advanced to the point where, as in the United States, it had served to conceal many of the graver consequences of economic inequality.

The flaw in the 19th century system, Professor Albert Murray has said, was the principle of national sovereignty. There is a sense in which that is a vital truth. But it is even more important to emphasize that the principle of national sovereignty was, in its turn, a necessary consequence of the class-structure of our imperfectly democratic society. For the maldistribution of income in a society dependent on the profit-making motive demanded, in the long run, a system of protective tariffs at home and of imperialism abroad. This meant that war, as a weapon of national policy, was rooted in the economic system by which we lived. And the decline in the power of that economic system to expand intensified both the height of tariffs and the urgency of imperialist adventure. Given the technological background, the strain which the cost of preparation for war imposed upon national economic systems has at each stage of its advance made less possible the conferment of those material concessions which, as I have said,

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the logic of democracy requires. This, in its turn, has two effects. By sharpening social conflict within, it weakens the faith of the middle class in the implications of democratic government; while by intensifying national rivalries, it increases the chances of war and thus compels the governments of states to organize against the advent of armed conflict. And the price of that organization has everywhere been a replacement of solutions of consent by solutions of coercion. Neither in the national or in the international sphere is that replacement compatible with democracy.

The validity of this analysis can, I suggest, be corroborated on every hand—particularly by the recent history of Great Britain. Everything—the abandonment of free trade, the acceptance of the principle of universal military service, the development of a situation in which one-eighth of the total national income (as compared with about one-fortieth before the War of 1914) is devoted to defense preparations, the necessity for organizing an entire society for civilian defense against attack from the air—points to the outline of a society utterly different in its basic pattern from anything the 19th century could have conceived, still less adjudged desirable. A democratic society involves government by discussion and therefore free play for discussion. But the experience even of a pre-war period like that in Great Britain (the classic Rome of free speech) during the past few months reveals a limitation of free discussion, less by outright than by obscure and often obscurantist techniques of control. And these were avowedly only the precursor of a rigorous censorship in wartime. The liberal society of the epoch before 1914 is unthinkable in our age.

From our experience since the War there emerges the simple lesson that the survival of political democracy depends upon substantial agreement between different classes about the objects to which the system of government is to be devoted. When the society is expanding economically there is little difficulty about this agreement. But there is the gravest difficulty in securing it once the society is economically contracting over any consider-

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able space of time. The society then confronts a dilemma: the price of the reforms demanded by the underprivileged is more than the privileged are willing to pay; whereas the methods urged by the privileged as the price of recovery—as Dr. Brüning learned during his period as German Chancellor—drive the underprivileged into a frenzy of discontent with the fruits of political democracy. It is characteristic of such a period of contraction that the cleavage between political parties grows wider and more intense. Seen from this angle the virtual disappearance of the Liberal Party in Great Britain and the breakdown of the Popular Front in France are portents of great importance. It is significant also that the opposition to the New Deal in the United States is not confined to Republicans but so permeates the ranks of the Democratic party as to make the main lines of difference in political outlook those of income rather than of party alignment. In a word, the crisis of capitalist democracy has fulfilled the prophecy made by de Tocqueville after the *annus mirabilis* of 1848. It has brought into the foreground of discussion the central problem of the ownership of the means of production. It has made the central debate of our time the question whether this ownership can be left in private hands without disaster.

Nothing, I think, is gained by saying that this is an issue the people should decide. In a democracy, at least, they can choose their rulers, and the will of the majority will prevail in so far as those rulers, when chosen, carry out their mandate. This, clearly, is excessive simplification. It assumes that the people are, as a whole, interested equally in the result of the political process in a democracy; since the society is in fact unequal this is, of course, not true. It assumes, further, that men are interested in the forms of government for their own sake whereas men are interested in them for what they do rather than for what they are. An American has only to read the evidence given before Senator La Follette's committee on civil liberties to realize that this is the case. When employers engage private armies, armed with most of the lethal weapons of modern war-

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fare, to fight against the principle of unionization, it is at least unlikely that they will easily accept a complete transformation in the basic principles of social organization. Our society is not a unity in which men have an equal and common interest. It is a system of class interests in which, when there is an economic crisis, the well-being of the privileged is purchased and maintained at the expense of the underprivileged. That is the necessary consequence from the capitalist system. The marriage of that system to political democracy is, therefore, a contradiction in terms at the point where the economic system ceases to expand. For the logic of capitalism denies the purpose of democracy. It demands of the underprivileged the subordination of needs, grimly felt, to the requirement of profit. By the use of their voting power the underprivileged naturally seek to prevent this subordination. The privileged then become aware that the enemy is the democratic principle which threatens the economic and social principles whereby they maintain their position. They could, of course, abdicate by cooperating in their own erosion. But history, so far, has given us no example of a class that has preferred abdication to conflict.

That, indeed, is natural enough unless we assume that reason has a complete empire over men's minds. It would be a betrayal of reason itself to make such an assumption. Our ideas are largely the outcome of our interests; no task is more difficult or more complicated than that of transcending them. The history of 300 years has taught the middle class to identify its needs with the common good. It is not likely, except in terms of geological time, to deny that identification. For its own ends it has made the law what it is. Those ends color the whole of the administrative process, the educational system, the instruments of propaganda, even the teaching of the churches. The true faith of our society is, the Soviet Union apart, the religion of private property. Every change in the most minute of its dogmas—witness the abolition of child labor—has been stoutly resisted, and usually resisted with a complete sincerity that the dogma was an essential element of social well-being. The middle class is

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just as accustomed to rule as its predecessor, the feudal aristocracy. It would regard its displacement from privilege as a no less momentous disaster to society. For what I describe as "privilege" it regards as "right." An alternative method for the regulation of ownership seems to it morally wrong and economically mistaken. Because it lives differently it thinks differently from those whom its economic power enables it to control. In a period of crisis, like our own, it thinks so differently that it is unable to speak the same language. Its notions of right and wrong, good and bad, wise and unwise, have an utterly dissimilar content. To give way to the will of a majority would seem to the members of the middle class equivalent to the acceptance of social ruin.

It may be said that this is an unfair view to take of men who hate the dictatorship of Mussolini or of Hitler as sincerely as any of the underprivileged. Now that Mr. Chamberlain, for example, is driven to repel German aggression by force he is said to be fighting for the principle of democracy against the principle of dictatorship. That is, I suggest, an excessive simplification. Mr. Chamberlain does not concern himself with the methods of government in Germany. He has constantly manifested his goodwill to Hitler. What he is fighting is aggression; and he would fight it if its objectives were pursued by the United States no less than when they are pursued by Hitler. The democracy Mr. Chamberlain defends is the capitalist democracy of Great Britain. And it is at least reasonable to argue that in his estimate of its interests, the capitalism is fully as important as the democracy. It is notable that men of his outlook thought quite differently of the Soviet dictatorship and the dictatorships of Germany and Italy until the interests of the latter clashed with those of Great Britain. Chamberlain showed no special interest in the preservation of Spanish democracy. He sacrificed the democracy of Czechoslovakia to Hitler almost with the air of one who had won a triumphant victory. Accident rather than design makes a Conservative Prime Minister in Great Britain (whether Mr. Chamberlain or another) the embodiment of the

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democratic principle. I recognize it is to the interest of the democratic principle that a fascist dictator should be defeated. But I am arguing, first, that the victory of Mr. Chamberlain in such a conflict, being the victory of both capitalism and democracy, would leave unresolved the problem of their future relationship; and, second, that the meaning of that victory can only be assessed as the constitutive principle of the society which emerges from the conflict is determined. On any showing a capitalist democracy is, I think, a better society than a fascist dictatorship; insofar the defeat of the latter would be definite social gain. But capitalist democracies all over the world, not least in the United States, leave uncertain the future of the political form of government. Their victory in the kind of conflict now under way would not insure the survival of the principle of democratic government if there were an internal effort to transform the economic basis of society from the private to the public ownership of the means of production. Nothing in Mr. Chamberlain's record indicates that his enthusiasm for the form of state is so much greater than his zeal for the content enshrined therein that he will insist on respecting the will of the majority in all cases.

There are those, of whom Professor C. H. McIlwain is a distinguished example, who trace the crisis of our time to the breakdown of the rule of law. "The present danger," he has written, "is despotism. It must be prevented, and by legal limitations on government . . . We must preserve and strengthen those bounds beyond which no free government ought ever to go, and make them limits beyond which no government whatever can ever legally go. We must make *ultra vires* all exorbitant acts of government."[1] Few people will disagree with this desire. But Professor McIlwain has not explained why the rule of law, whether in domestic or in international affairs, has broken down. He has not explained how we are to place legal

[1] McIlwain, C. H., *Constitutionalism and the Changing World*, Macmillan Co., New York (and Cambridge University Press), 1939.

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limitations on government. He has not defined those "limits beyond which no government whatever can ever legally go." He has not given us a list of those "exorbitant acts of government" which are to be made *ultra vires* or of the methods by which this end can be achieved.

He has not done so because he refuses to analyze the causes behind the political phenomena he describes. At the back of his mind is the notion of a fundamental law conditioning the validity of all particular acts of law for which a government makes itself responsible. But in any society such a fundamental law is no more than conceptual unless the members of the society agree to regard it as fundamental and, thereby, willingly to accept the imposition of its content upon themselves. The outstanding characteristic of our time is the absence of such an agreement. I have argued here that it is absent because what the middle class regards as fundamental does not so appear to those excluded from the privileges which the middle class enjoys by virtue of its ability to maintain the rules that secure to it those privileges. And the only way to win that agreement is to attain the conditions under which there is a renewal of economic expansion. Germany and Italy do not violate international law for the sake of violating it. They do so because, in an age of economic contraction, they cannot reach the ends they desire within the rules sanctioned by the past traditions of international law. So, similarly, in the municipal sphere. A prosperous Germany would not violate most of the rules we have come to regard as essential to civilized living. But the new Germany is compelled to break them because, granted the ends its rulers desire, the rules are incompatible with their purposes. Until Mr. McIlwain and those who think with him realize that, historically, means and ends cannot be divorced from one another, they will be building a juristic theory of the state without root in the actual conditions we confront.

The same difficulty applies to theories like those of Mr. Walter Lippmann who seeks, in his *Good Society*, a state which is to act as the neutral arbiter between conflicting interests. For

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the state (which in everyday life means its government) is by nature incapable of neutrality unless the interest of its members in the result of its processes is equal. But since, in a capitalist democracy, that interest is, by definition, unequal, the state-power is necessarily biased in its incidence. The impact of that bias is obscured in an age of economic expansion. In such a period men are largely agreed about fundamentals because the general position of all is usually one of continuous improvement. But so soon as contraction supervenes, agreement halts because the result of policy bears so differently upon various classes in society. This becomes evident when major social reforms are embarked on in any period of contraction. If such reforms are reflected in the scheme of taxation, men with privileges to lose become fearful of their position and withdraw their confidence from the proposals of the government. The attitude of Wall Street to the New Deal is one instance of such a withdrawal; that of General Franco and his supporters toward the Spanish Republic is another. The formula of majority rule will not be respected by any class in society if it believes those interests which it regards as fundamental to be threatened, and if it considers itself in a position to fight for them with the prospect of success.

I am not arguing about the rights or wrongs, the wisdom or the unwisdom, of this outlook. I am arguing only that the constitutive principle of a democratic government involves, by its own inherent logic, the idea of a democratic society, above all in the economic realm. It therefore follows that a truly democratic society (which is the necessary consequence of relating democracy in politics to capitalism in economics) can be evaded only so long as capitalist democracy is outstandingly successful in the economic field. Once the constitutive principles of each group in a society are diverse the interests of each will be in contradiction; and the ideologies of men in society will broadly (though only broadly) follow the interests with which they believe themselves to be most closely connected. They will identify those interests with the high name of the common good; and they will fight for the victory of their interests in

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the confident and sincere belief that they are battling for the common good.

The same holds true in the international sphere. The state requires sovereignty so long as men assume that what is to be protected is a matter about which there can, ultimately, be no judgment superior to that of the state; and the state will have no difficulty in assuming that denial of its judgment is a threat to fundamental interests which it must protect. Its power to make the assumption will be immensely strengthened by the relation of the state to the nation in the modern world, for by using the psychological unity of nationhood it can gloss over the real interests it is protecting as a state. In this context British imperialism looks quite different to Germans or Italians from the way it looks to British citizens. An attempt to share the spoils of imperialism seems "national development" to the Germans and Italians while it seems "aggression" to the British. The principle of consent to change in international affairs has no validity so long as the interests of each nation-state in the results of change are as divergent as they are in the present economic configuration of society. The state requires sovereignty to protect those interests it considers (rightly or wrongly) to be fundamental. It deems that interests are fundamental by reason, above all, of their economic consequences to its citizens. These consequences, in their turn, are judged by governments which are bound predominantly to reflect the immanent logic of the relations implicit in the property-system over which they preside. For, at bottom, judgment is the expression of interest; and our emotions of approval and disapproval, and the actions based on these emotions, will follow the interest which the government protects by its constitution. Its fundamentals are what Mr. Justice Holmes called the "can't helps" of its property-relations. Sovereignty in international relations has become the protective armament of what is implied in those relations.

No nation-state in the modern world wants war; and no class in the modern state wants revolution. But both nation-states and classes seek ends which they cannot attain without either war

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or revolution. That is the basic dilemma of our age. We have reached a term in the evolution of our social institutions because we are no longer able, within the framework of existing economic relations, to satisfy the demands we encounter. If we preserve the basis of our present framework, we cannot continue to maintain a democratic principle, whose logic is in contradiction to it. If we maintain the democratic principle then we must adjust the framework of existing economic relationships to the consequences of the democratic principle. Our difficulty is a tragic one in that the dilemma reveals how small is the area of common conceptions of the common good when vested interests are in jeopardy.

This makes pitifully small our power to proceed by consent. And historically, whenever that power is as small as it has recently been, the danger is always great that men without principle will seize the instruments of authority, thus still further reducing our capacity to proceed by consent. Having seized power they seek to maintain it at all costs and therefore subordinate the traditional means of government to ends which, both within and without, they are able to impose only by coercion. So acting, they abridge those only elements in human nature through which reason has an opportunity to exercise its influence. They rule by fear; for they cannot otherwise maintain their rule. Fear is compelled to strike blindly, for it is the supreme enemy of reason. Unprincipled men are thus compelled to attack the basic values of civilization. They provoke challenge because they are unable to live in the atmosphere of rational discussion. When that stage is reached in the history of a culture it has to discover a new basis for property-relationships if it wishes to survive.

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Charles Sanders Peirce, Giant in American Philosophy

JUSTUS BUCHLER

WRITING home from Harvard in the fall of 1861 William James said "In last year's [class] there is a son of Prof. Peirce, whom I suspect to be a very 'smart' fellow with a great deal of character, pretty independent and violent though." The "Prof. Peirce" to whom James referred was Benjamin Peirce, eminent American mathematician; the unusual young man Charles Sanders Peirce, soon to become a lifelong friend and soon to inaugurate what fructified as the most powerful influence in the history of American philosophy. The spectacular facts of Peirce's career have filtered into popular intellectual gossip. Who does not know, by this time, that he was the founder of pragmatism (the doctrine which, to quote the late Giovanni Papini, "had from Peirce its name, from James its fame"); that he wrote voluminously but could not get a single philosophical book published in his lifetime; that he likewise failed to obtain permanent academic status; that as a person he was much as James describes him; and that as a writer he was by turns brilliant, unconventional, caustic and obscure?

The centennial of Peirce's birth is a good time to look back on the philosophical tradition in which he occupies so important a place. Possibly because of its relative youth our historians have been blind to the strength of this tradition. American philosophical maturity dates from the beginning of the gilded age and is symbolized by the establishment in 1867 of William T. Harris's *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. It was to this journal that Peirce in the following year contributed a series of three remarkable articles, certainly the finest piece of philo-

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sophical literature that had yet appeared in the country. Chauncey Wright and Francis Ellingwood Abbot, two men who definitely influenced Peirce and whose reputations were greatest in that period, are today more or less unsung; but they will be reckoned with when thoroughgoing histories of American philosophy are written. Wright, Peirce, Abbot and James, together with others of their circle, were the nucleus from which the major body of thought sprang. Wright, whose influence was largely oral in character, passed from the scene in 1875 at an early age and Abbot lost recognition through the unfortunate hostility of Josiah Royce; but Peirce soon made his powers felt and with the magnanimous James as his medium became a dominant force in the formation of the current that developed Royce, Dewey, Santayana and George H. Mead. It is worth emphasizing that this development was a continuous one, not in the sense that the different philosophers played variations on a single set of ideas but in the sense that mutual influences, whether positive or negative, operated to a high degree. Royce, James and Dewey expressed their indebtedness to Peirce on numerous occasions; and Santayana, who perhaps even before his departure from the country in 1912 did not like to be called an American philosopher, could hardly escape the challenge of 40 years in the American intellectual climate. But if there is a homogeneity that permits us to speak of a tradition there are also striking differences in the philosophical and literary characteristics of its leading members, each of whom represents a distinctive body of opinion. These peculiarities of mind and pen invite many interesting comparisons and one in particular is illuminating. Shortly after James published his *Principles of Psychology* (1891) two anonymous reviews of the book appeared, one in the *Nation* and the other in the *Atlantic Monthly*, the authors Peirce and Santayana respectively. Santayana, still in his twenties, was placid, tactful, finished, his review well-rounded, as all his writings for the next half century were to be. Peirce was incisive, often insulting, reckless of grammatical propriety, unable to stretch his space

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beyond the treatment of one or two crucial points, struggling to draw from his examination as many implications as possible. Santayana was serene, Peirce dishevelled—both were quite extraordinary.

At the time that Peirce wrote his papers for the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* one old intellectual influence was still strong among philosophers in America and elsewhere. It was the influence of Cartesianism. Descartes had often been buried by his successors and politely eulogized as a quaint antique. And no doubt certain fantastic details of his metaphysics were safely dead. But the psychological scheme that he employed, and above all the logic that he prescribed for successful intellectual inquiry, persisted as basic presuppositions even in his severest critics. Man, it was believed, can look in on his own mind and observe his own thoughts precisely as he observes physical objects. In other words the mind can literally behold itself, witness its own processes. Since the mind studies the world of nature the fact that it can directly examine its own thoughts is important. For these thoughts are the outcome of the study and by inspecting them the mind can determine whether or not they constitute valid knowledge. It can see whether they are clear and distinct and if they are at once know that they are true. To say that the mind examines itself in order to ascertain the truth is merely another way of saying that it accepts as the truth whatever it feels clearly convinced of. In its feeling of conviction it cannot be mistaken, for it cannot be misled by a feeling that is direct, simple, intuitive. This introspective method can only be practised by the individual mind. The individual is thus the ultimate judge of what is and what is not the truth.

Peirce revolted against this psychologistic point of view and in attacking it revealed its full intellectual and historical significance. He first pointed out its gross oversimplification: the mind is not something that can be observed in the simple way that we observe a house. He then pointed out the shaky nature of the consequences that follow from it. The individual cannot be the ultimate judge of truth, for if he were, knowledge of the

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truth would be a private possession. If truth were something acquired by the criterion of psychological conviction or satisfaction it could never be communicated: one mind cannot experience the degree of conviction experienced by another. And how can that which is incommunicable be called knowledge? A Walt Whitman, listening to the astronomer, is bewildered by the charts, diagrams and symbols, steals out of the lecture room and looks up in perfect silence at the stars. The mass of theoretical data does not satisfy him; he prefers ineffable contemplation. But from Peirce's point of view this, however satisfying to the individual, is not by itself knowledge; it is dumb feeling, not different in kind from the experience of an invertebrate animal. It is precisely the charts, the symbols, the diagrams that make a system of scientific inquiry possible. Can we imagine a "science" where individual inquirers make discoveries that remain private possessions? Knowledge would never progress. Peirce taught that knowledge is a social product, something non-existent apart from the community. By a magnificent series of analyses he demonstrated that even the thought process of the individual mind is a kind of communication with oneself, a dialogue in which the mind assumes two roles. All communication is by means of symbols—that is to say, by means of language. Consequently all knowledge, if it is to be communicable and public, must be symbolic or linguistic in character. What are the charts and diagrams but a kind of language?

More than any philosopher of modern times Peirce emphasized and revealed the profound moral significance of the scientific method. He firmly believed it the only type of theoretical activity that can be said to end in knowledge. It alone is the method of free public inquiry. Mysticism, arbitrary authority and undisciplined speculation are its enemies. Authoritatively imposed dogma crushes freedom, while mysticism, which claims to dispense wholly with language, destroys cooperative investigation. Opposed to the scientific method are all claims that language, symbols or formulae are not adequate to the understanding of "reality," that they act as screens intervening be-

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tween the mind and the world or as false substitutes for the original. Such claims represent cravings for a seizure of things which is not knowledge at all; they miss the realization of the social, cumulative character of knowledge. Yet it is these anti-scientific methods that arrogate to themselves absolute certainty in their results. Peirce had nothing but contempt for glib pretensions of this sort; he regarded them as far more pernicious than ignorance. A careful study of the manner in which any natural science carries on investigation testifies that absolute certainty can never be attained by it. And since the method used by natural science is the best of methods no other type of inquiry into the nature of things can claim infallibility in its results. Knowledge grows, by leaps, Peirce liked to say, and the investigator who thinks the evidence for any theory or opinion is complete has ceased to be scientific. The scientific spirit is the spirit of self-criticism. Its aim is the highest possible degree of objectivity in inquiry. Accordingly, Peirce would warn, it must remain indifferent to the influence of practical affairs or special ethical attitudes. Those who, contrary to this warning, are most anxious to direct the subject-matter of science in terms of the struggle for social betterment defeat their own ends. Only by preserving its supreme objectivity and its uncompromising critique of evidence can the scientific method emerge as the natural enemy of mass deception, political barbarism and intellectual fraud.

In more ways than one Peirce was a revolutionary, an opponent of entrenched dogma and smug habits of thought, a discoverer of new possibilities in philosophy—yet, paradoxically, a revolutionary without disciples, a man who attracted no more than normal attention in his lifetime and whose work was only gradually assimilated by a small number. The year before the 1868 articles a series in the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* was equally path-breaking. This time there was no revolt against some previous tradition but rather a quiet articulation of new ideas. Peirce introduced the new science of mathematical logic to American thought, began

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to make historic contributions himself, and presented logical concepts which were to serve as the foundation for a science of his own discovery—the study of the nature and variety of the symbols that man can use. This science lays bare the different kinds of language that make up our apparatus in the pursuit of truth. It shows that the language of mathematics is different from the language of natural science; that the function of certain signs (and by "signs" Peirce understood not only verbal signs but such things as maps and weather vanes) is to point to or indicate that which they denote whereas the function of other signs is to picture or diagram; that linguistic conventions play a considerable part in human inquiry. The potentiality of the researches opened up is immense and in our day we are exploring the ground that Peirce broke.

It was largely this critical attention to language and its problems that led Peirce to formulate his pragmatism: the view that all theories, all opinions about fact of any kind, must be capable of being submitted to evidence exactly in the way that scientific theories are. For a long time various philosophers had persisted in the belief that in contradistinction to problems of natural science, which are settled on the basis of evidence secured from an appeal to experience, certain problems concerning the nature of things can be settled by pure reflection. Peirce was convinced, along with those philosophers who have been classed under the label of empiricism, that questions of fact can be settled by experiential investigation alone. But he carried the analysis of the situation further, suggesting that factual problems allegedly not decidable by experience involve some abuse of language. The terms by which they are expressed are excessively vague or are perhaps utterly meaningless. An objective criterion of intelligibility is necessary. Pragmatism supplies a formula for clarifying problems by exposing important linguistic defects and by calling attention to the standards of scientific practise. It maintains that every problem is capable of being solved. To say that a problem is intrinsically insolvable is to say that it is a pseudo-problem, for if it is genuine there must be

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some specifiable way of investigating it, even though the true answer may remain unknown to us for an indefinite time.

This Peircean view is very different from that which most people associate with the name "pragmatism." The pragmatism that has found favor with many American literary groups and with writers on education holds (in a rather confused way) that a theory's "usefulness" or "success" consists in its relevancy to "practical" matters. A problem is regarded as significant if it can influence the actual conduct of those who think about it or offer an answer to it. This forgets what Peirce's view does not —that the conduct of men can be influenced by pseudo-problems too and that a problem which affects men emotionally may be logically unintelligible. Under the influence of James, who derived his pragmatism from Peirce but interpreted it more broadly and loosely, a veritable mob of pragmatists arose in this country and in Europe at the turn of the century, and it is they who are in part responsible for the indefinitely broad extension of the original doctrine. Pragmatism, for which Peirce is most widely known, is among the least understood of his contributions. Professional philosophers often speak of a doctrine which holds that the intellect is inadequate, that the emotions and the will have a legitimate place in inquiry. Nothing can be further than such an "anti-intellectualistic" position from the pragmatism of Peirce, for which the "will to believe" in the absence of evidence one way or another is the poison of research. Peirce conceived his pragmatism to be a doctrine of logic, a rule prescribing the standards that theories must meet if they are to be meaningful answers to problems. Pragmatism was a logic of clarification. For the majority of pragmatists, on the other hand, it was everything else and was turned into a doctrine of ethics, of metaphysics, even of politics. So loose and nebulous did it become that Peirce himself did not escape the influence of the haze, and not until 1905 did he try to shake it off by coining a new name, "pragmaticism," for the old conception.

Back in 1877 and 1878, a decade after his earliest publications, Peirce had written for the *Popular Science Monthly*

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a number of articles one of which, the famous "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," is ordinarily regarded as the original statement of pragmatism. In England the next year G. Stanley Hall wrote that the series "promises to become one of the most important of American contributions to philosophy." No one who reads the two opening essays for the first time can miss the vivid impression of the writer as one of peculiar force and fertility or the equally vivid impression of the writer thinking as he writes. Peirce thought and wrote ceaselessly in a long war of self-elucidation. He was for the most part his own Socrates, the midwife to his own ideas. When one weighs the extent of his philosophical labor it seems hardly credible that he should have contributed to mathematics, geodesy, astronomy, chemistry, photometry, meteorology, psychology, philology and history, and was an authority on wines and universities to boot. But after all, he had embarked on the serious study of his favorite subject, logic, at the ripe age of thirteen.

Although Peirce preferred to regard himself as primarily a logician and student of methods for arriving at truth it was perhaps his more speculative philosophical work that had the greater influence on men like James and Royce. Here too he struck out, among other things, against a powerful tradition dominating the thought of his time—the mechanical philosophy of the late 19th century. In an essay of 1892 he examined "the common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law," and showed that this belief is by no means a necessary presupposition of scientific thinking. Although there is regularity in nature there is no evidence of absolute or complete regularity. That which things have in common, their uniformities of structure and behavior, is due to law; that which is diverse and specific is due to irregularity or chance. Mechanical laws govern the general way in which dice move when thrown, but the fact that a given pair of dice turn up seven on a given throw is specific and unique, the result not of law but of chance or "arbitrary determination." Peirce was for many years connected with the United

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States Coast and Geodetic Survey and had had exhaustive experience in the technique of precise measurement. He knew that if we measure a quantity many times under the same set of conditions the results never turn out exactly the same; and instead of ascribing this fact to errors of observation alone, in the manner of ordinary scientific procedure, he thought it owing to imperfect conformity to law on the part of what is measured. In his theory of absolute chance as a factor in the universe Peirce felt that he explained what the mechanical philosophy could not—the incontestable variety and diversity which the universe everywhere manifests. Seen in this light, life and spontaneity, freedom and novelty are as real attributes of the universe as law.

It is easy to understand why James, who deeply respected every word of Peirce, should have been influenced by such a view. But the influence was not quite as Peirce wished it to be. For James a general conclusion was more important than the details by which it was arrived at. For Peirce a general conclusion meant nothing unless rigidly substantiated by details. James' protest against the "block universe" that excluded spontaneity, life and novelty was inclined to be based, as he would frankly admit, on emotional, religious or ethical grounds. The close reasoning of Peirce's essay of 1892 was to him so many words. Years later, in *A Pluralistic Universe*, he compared Peirce with Bergson on the similarity of their views regarding novelty in the universe. Peirce, though aware of James' partial opaqueness to his manner of thinking, felt wounded and wrote to him in 1909:

> The only thing I have ever striven to do in philosophy has been to analyze sundry concepts with exactitude; and to do this it is necessary to use terms with strict scientific precision. . . . But that being my only claim to consideration, and it being a deeper conviction with me that philosophy is either a science or is balderdash, and that a man who seeks to further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of his science without anxious care to use them with strict accuracy, it is not very grateful to my feelings to be classed along with a

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Bergson who seems to be doing his prettiest to muddle all distinctions. . . .[1]

Peirce did not escape from another 19th-century fashion of thought, evolutionism. But his own conception of cosmic evolution differed from the current Spencerian. He considered the development of the universe to be essentially like the development of the individual animal. The direction of its growth is toward habit-forming, toward the creation of patterns or regularities which are nothing else than the so-called laws of nature. Admittedly the concept that nature has a "tendency" to take on habits is anthropomorphic and involves the view that the universe is in some sense spiritual in character. "Matter" is simply mind become overwhelmed, so to speak, with habit. But just as the development of habits in the individual leaves room for spontaneous action, so does the evolution of the habits or laws of nature. Peirce wrote that in this general idealistic point of view he followed the suggestion of the late 18th- and early 19th-century German philosopher Schelling, and somewhere he characterized his metaphysics as "Schellingism transformed in the light of modern physics. . . ."

If we suddenly raise the question, important for contemporary thought, whether the doctrines of Peirce's metaphysics obey his own pragmatic formula (which aims to discriminate between a theory that amounts to a significant and arguable opinion and one that is no more than a fanciful cluster of words) we meet with a real difficulty. Are these theories capable of being tested by experience? What kinds of fact would we examine in order to obtain evidence for their truth or falsity? Peirce often condemned certain types of metaphysical doctrine as unintelligible and in a statement of later years reminded readers that one of the purposes of his pragmatism was the clarification of metaphysics. He claimed, rather frequently, that his own theories can be observationally tested;

[1] From a letter printed in Ralph Barton Perry's *The Thought and Character of William James*, Boston, 1935.

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yet nowhere did he specifically outline how this could be done. Certainly it is not easy to say just what evidence we should have to look for to decide whether matter is "effete mind" or whether nature has a "tendency" to take on habits. No doubt it is possible so to define "experience" that it can be said to serve as evidence for theories of this kind (or of any other kind for that matter). But pragmatism does not provide for more than one kind of evidence—that invoked by the theories of natural science. The problem of inconsistency in Peirce is serious if we insist on reconciling all the basic aspects of his system. It becomes much less serious if we accept each of these aspects for what it is worth and reject what in the light of philosophic research we may feel it necessary to reject.

To Peirce philosophy was a science and in this he stood strongly opposed to a view that has since been stated by Santayana. Santayana conceives a system of philosophy to be a personal work of art which serves, for the philosopher, to unify the various phases of his experience. Each philosopher employs the set of concepts that he finds best fitted to describe the way in which he knows the world and the moral perspective which he has of it. No controversy ought ever to arise among philosophers, any more than among poets, provided that the self-expression of each is sincere and that each is innocent of false pretensions. Philosophy thus practised can never conflict with science or with the universal knowledge we call common sense, which understands that men describe the same world differently and with different degrees of felicitousness. This individualistic idea of the function of philosophy would plainly have repelled Peirce who regarded the concepts of the philosopher not as devices for self-expression but as instruments contributing to a common intellectual undertaking. Philosophy is one science among others; it has its own abstractions but it cannot set up a rival to the scientific method of cooperative inquiry. Santayana and Peirce interpreted the history of philosophy differently. For Santayana the classical philosophers have contributed, in distinct ways, to the enrichment of human

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experience; for Peirce these philosophers have contributed, each with some value, to the progress of human knowledge. Perhaps both are right and both are wrong. We have come to see the day when certain portions of philosophy are being developed scientifically and we may come some day to feel that certain other portions must always represent expressions of the individual's moral and cognitive experience.

Twenty-five years after Peirce's death our bird's-eye view of American thought reveals clearly enough that his place in its development has been to supply rather than to propagate ideas. It was the forte of James to quicken the enthusiasm of the general intellectual public by translating ideas into an idiom which it could adopt. Peirce lacked the popular sparkle of James. He lacked the coherence and satisfying completeness of Dewey and he had little of Santayana's imaginative insight or elegance of statement. But in originality and catholicity of achievement, in depth of philosophic analysis, in suggestiveness, he stands second to none. The best testimony to the resources of his mind is the fact that James, Royce and Dewey felt his influence even before they succeeded in fully understanding him. Sometimes it is said that he was wilfully obscure, presumably because of his frequent assertions that when mediocre minds inherit ideas they divest them of precision and license superficiality. A closer inspection of Peirce's writings discloses a passionate desire to be understood, and by as many minds as possible. He knew that his ideas were difficult, that complete understanding of them was not for the frivolous intellect. Dewey has called him a philosopher's philosopher. Yet it is doubtful that he will remain that alone. There is an unmistakably refreshing quality in his writing, and no one who discovers him can fail to find him provocative. Probably historians will never allot as much space to him as to James. But theirs will be the fault. Despite a thousand disavowals they will have elevated the humanist at the expense of the scientist; and will have failed to perceive that there are subtler types of influence in the formation of our culture.

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Homemade Literature Under Fascism

ARTHUR LIVINGSTON

THE contemporary dictatorships in Europe have borne with very special severity upon the intellectual classes. Freedom of speech is one of the characteristic manifestations of freedom, and suppressions of freedom usually signalize their advent most conspicuously by the efforts that dictators make, and have to make, to force the intellectual classes into line. Though dictatorships are no new thing in the world and though the majority of men have lived under the harsh rule of the man of violence, our modern dictatorships have certain points of novelty. In the case of Germany and Italy they are thrust upon larger populations and more highly cultivated populations than ever before in history.

For the very reason that dictatorships are so much the rule in history the laws governing the social influence exerted by them are fairly well known. High levels of civilization correspond to the diversity and intensity of human activity. Dictatorships have usually been beneficial when, in one set of circumstances or another, they have been able to liberate new social forces and so intensify and diversify the activity of the social body. They usually prove deleterious when, in order to halt the centrifugal forces that are generated in every highly civilized society, they concentrate and contract the volume of social activity by limiting it to the initiative of the dictating group. One would guess *a priori*, without considering the facts, that the Soviet dictatorship in Russia would result in raising the level of Russian civilization since it has undoubtedly increased the number of active social forces in that country. One would expect a falling off in Germany since that country before the

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World War had attained what must be pretty close to a maximum of varied and intense civilization. In the case of Italy one would expect a check in the rise of the level of civilization since that country is peripheral rather than central in modern European civilization and a dictatorship, if very long protracted, could hardly fail to interfere with those cultural infiltrations from the great countries to the north, and from the new world, upon which Italian civilization had depended for its astoundingly rapid growth during the half century before the War.

These are, evidently, long-period developments, hardly observable in the lifetime of a single generation. This truth is not altogether easy to perceive since the din of fascist propaganda, in the case of Italy, is doing its best to prove that everything in Italy began with the Year 1 of fascism; and newspaper men and even social scientists from abroad daily report measures of the fascist government as though they were something new in the history of Italy whereas actually they are for the most part continuations of efforts often a century old (and not infrequently signalize a drop from levels previously attained).

Here we are trying to examine, with all the disadvantages of a short-term perspective, the influence of Italian fascism upon one facet, and one facet only, of Italian culture—that represented by literary production. The importance of that manifestation of culture is commonly overestimated, especially by literary men. The fact is that high grades of literary merit are often attained by very inferior civilizations, and superior civilizations may fail to produce any enduring literary monuments. Be that as it may, if we consider bulk of literary output irrespective of quality (a very indefinite and subjective factor), the figures seem to show that the fascist period has been a stationary one in Italian cultural activity. Italy today has not yet recovered the intensity of literary production that she had attained in 1914, and with a population larger than that of France she still remains at a level of production some 20 per cent lower.

The figures are thought-provoking. In 1914 Italian copyrights for all sorts of books reached 11,546. In 1920 the figure

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had dropped to 5,723, thus emphasizing the magnitude of the war distraction. The famous "spiritual awakening" attending the rise of fascism, however, must have been more disturbing to cultural production than the equally famous period of "democratic anarchy" between 1918 and 1922, since copyrights, which had been rising in number between 1918 and 1922 (5,402 to 5,743) dropped to 5,472 for 1925. Beginning with 5,515 in 1926 one notes a gradual and progressive revival down to 1935, though the figure for this latter year was under that for 1914 (7,041 for 1929; 10,896 for 1935). The curve for the 1925-35 period roughly parallels the graph for the 15 years before the War when copyrights increased from 5,400 in 1905 to 11,546 in 1914.

Comparing the figures for belles lettres (poetry, fiction, theater, literary criticism) with the figures for total cultural production, one notes that whereas the total production had increased in a proportion of less than 2 to 1 for the 1920-38 period (5.7 to 10), the increase in belles lettres had been in a proportion greater than 2 to 1 (10.8 to 23.7).[1] It would seem, therefore, that contrary to the general impression, Italian culture during the fascist era has become a shade more "literary" than formerly. The Italian literary classes, as one might guess, were less shaken by the War than other groups of writers. It will be interesting to see whether a drop in the curves both for literary and for total cultural production that begins sharply in 1936 (10,346 as against 10,896 for 1935) continues after 1938 (in which it declined to 10,033) and at what rate. Striking for their absence from the Italian curves are traces of influences from the great depression of the '30's and from the boom that was so conspicuous in America during the hectic '20's. Judging from the drop after 1936 it would seem that the gigantic war preparations in which Italy has been engaged for the past ten years were at last beginning to make themselves felt.

[1] 1,082 for 1920; 1,315 for 1925; 1,504 for 1929 and 2,373 for 1934, when the figures for belles lettres passed the 1914 level of 1,703.

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One might guess that the fluctuations one might have expected from the war-boom-depression sequence were attenuated by a progressive socialization and therefore stabilization of Italian life, and by the fact that Italy has turned into cultural patronage and military power the relief costs that the democracies have been turning into national budget deficits. On the other hand, in all the continental countries, the technique of book-publishing and play-producing has been completely modernized since the War. Because no particular trace of this improvement is apparent in the curves (unless the leap of 2,000 between 1929 and 1930 is to be attributed to such energetic men as Mondadori, Bompiani and Longanesi), one may assume that these new techniques have been set over against influences that would normally have depressed or diminished cultural activity.

The manoeuvres of dictators and dictatorships are as a rule spectacular—one has only to think how dramatic in their day were the gestures and feats of Napoleon I, Napoleon III or Mehemet Ali. Dictators pretend to be doing everything and their controlled propagandas unfailingly portray them as miracle workers who mold history at will. This is almost never true. Dictators are merely men who ride like flotsam on the crests of powerful waves of sentiment. The waves pass from under them and leave them refugees begging for alms in London, Paris, St. Helena, the Vittoriale. Governments are powerful social forces but they are merely forces among countless others. They pretend to guide social trends but when their work is done the historian can see that they have caused the trends to fluctuate but slightly.

Italian fascism has had policies toward literature, but it is doubtful that the direct influence of the fascist government on literary production has been at all appreciable. Napoleon in his time said he would have given an Austrian indemnity to a new Corneille could he but have found one. Similarly fascism has proved its inability to get the literature it wants. Fascism has wanted a national literature as opposed to the cosmopolitan trend that has pervaded all European cultures. Ever since 1900

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Italian social and political life has run toward mystical nationalism. Italian letters on the other hand have grown increasingly cosmopolitan and are still imitative, especially of France. Cultures are like water. They flow from high to low levels. Compared with the great countries to the north, Italy still remains low level on the whole. Fascism has wanted a national literature as opposed to the ancient and deep-seated cultures of the provinces and regions. Camillo Pellizzi, a fascist critic, still notes today what Stendhal discovered a century and a half ago: that there is no Italian literature in the national sense. Half at least of Italy's imaginative writing is explicitly concerned with regional types, regional settings, regional problems and ideals. Fascism has wanted and repeatedly "ordered" an optimistic, cheerful literature expressing homely, naive sentiments. A pessimistic cynical naturalism is still about all that the cultivated Italian will consent to regard as art. From a strictly artistic standpoint there have been two significant masterpieces from a pen young enough to be claimed by fascism. They were both by Alberto Moravia and they are both quintessential expressions of hopeless, morbid, ultra-cynical naturalism (*Indifference*, *Wheel of Fortune*).

Political movements, among them movements towards dictatorship, correspond to deep-lying transformations in the social body; and these transformations, which provoke spectacular rearrangements in politics, often manifest themselves in literature and sometimes long in advance of the political upset. Then a twin error of appreciation tends to arise. The earlier manifestations of the movement evidenced in literature are taken as causes of the political revolution and the later literary manifestations are taken as effects. These errors have left such broad traces in the literature devoted to Italian fascism, and they have often been sponsored by such distinguished names, that I venture to consider some of the most interesting aspects of the problem.

In defiance of the Italian parliamentary government d'Annunzio raided Fiume two years before the March on Rome.

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D'Annunzio, the argument now runs, was an exponent of superman-ism. Mussolini, who had also read Nietzsche, was a superman of d'Annuncian type and d'Annunzio must therefore be regarded as the real parent of fascism. The error in the argument lies in setting into a relationship of cause and effect two movements that are, in part only, expressions of the same forces —the forces of nationalism, defeat psychology, unrest among unemployed veterans, anti-parliamentarianism—all working under conditions of a disturbed social equilibrium. The contrasts are significant. D'Annunzio expressed the sensualistic *arrivism* of the urban lower middle classes—wealth, fame, the enjoyments of life. Mussolini's main strength in 1922 came from rural Puritanism: jealousy of the farm boys for the corrupt cities (the same force figured conspicuously in the Russian revolution during the early '20's and later on in nazi Germany).

Croce undoubtedly plays under Italian fascism the role that Victor Hugo played under the authoritarian empire in France during the '50's; yet those who dislike him or his philosophy —such writers as Borgese, for instance, but the list is long— regard Croce as one of the parents of fascism. The error is that cited above. Croce's historical idealism and Mussolini's fascism both express a common sentiment that was very powerful in Italy—the yearning for a warm faith in an age that was becoming more and more sceptical. Mussolini's "nation" or "fascist state" is Croce's "spirit" dressed in a black shirt. But that yearning for warmth of faith, plus perhaps an "actionist" or "activist" element, is all that the two movements have in common. Neo-idealism is sister, not mother, to fascism.

Meantime the case of Papini has been quite generally ignored. His *Life of Christ* and his conversion to Catholicism have obscured his early work. Reread *The Failure* today and it will certainly become apparent that Papini is one of the most authentic revelations of pre-fascist trends. The literature of the '70's, '80's and '90's in Italy emphasized the aspiration for civic ideals, high moral character, intellectual integrity. Papini was the son of a cabinet-maker and, in what we now recognize as

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the true fascist spirit, wanted to find the short cut to wealth, power, women and celebrity. Papini was of course responsive to many of the humanitarian pressures that were so powerful in the first decades of the century. Strip such things aside and one finds vituperation of established gods ("Renan is a fat Jew"), culture as parade with no interest in truth, philosophical dilettantism, pride in self-contradiction and self-reversal, phrase-making, "pure art," futurism, occultism, mystical fadism. Papini was doing with words in 1904 what the fascists were to do with clubs and castor oil in the '20's.

Passing to trends that underlie fascism but which manifest themselves in literature independently of it, I must explain that I regard fascism as a merely Italian phase of a movement responsive to pressures prevalent all over the Western world. This movement may be defined as an upthrust from the lower middle classes (middle-class *arrivism* to use a French term) which has taken the form of communism in Russia, fascism in Italy and nazism in Germany. It is just as widely prevalent in the Western democracies but has not acquired a disruptive intensity great enough to upset our fairly stable democratic equilibrium.

The lower-middle-class upthrust is leaving definite traces on contemporary Italian literature. At this moment slightly less than one-half of the consumption of fiction in Italy is supplied by translations of foreign books and the number has risen in regular rhythm since 1900.[2] Part of this phenomenon—the regular increase, one might guess—must be attributed to cosmopolitan pressures common to the entire Western world. Not so the accelerated increase after 1926. A new, aggressively commercial book-trade in Italy is based to a very large extent on best sellers imported from abroad and more especially from the United States and England (relatively speaking that is; the

[2] The figures are: in 1900, 132 out of a total of 305 novels published; in 1905, 119 out of 351; in 1910, 131 out of 445; in 1914, 142 out of 453; in 1920, 134 out of 413; in 1925, 189 out of 542. After that there was a definite leap: in 1929, 450 out of 915; in 1934, 396 out of 1,041; in 1938, over 400 out of something like 800.

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French novel still remains Italy's main foreign diversion). *Gone with the Wind* has found proportionately as many readers in Italy as in the United States. Elinor Glynn is so much a commonplace in Italy that it is not thought necessary to describe her works as translated.

Among critics hostile to fascism it is the vogue to ascribe this influx of translation to the fact that Italian literature is now so miserable that nobody can read it. Again it is said that only in literature from abroad can one find the breath of freedom lacking in books produced under the club of the dictatorship. For my part I cannot see that Italian literary art today is appreciably inferior to what it had been in the past. If one says that the Italian novel is not what it used to be one can as usual answer that it never was. I imagine that it is a question of cultural levels in the Italian population. The contemporary American or English novel of large circulation, reaching millions of people of as low as grammar-school education, is sentimentally dynamic but culturally naive; and its popularity in Italy must be owing to a new class of readers who know nothing of an Italian literary world that has never envisaged a culture lower than that of the lyceum or an outlook more cheerful than that of a courtroom or a funeral. The members of this rising lower middle class have hopes for themselves. They are hungry for good humor and optimism; and things which the publishers cannot find for them in the cultured Italian tradition they offer them from abroad.

The lower-middle-class spirit of "get-there-ism" presents itself in native dress and as a dominant motive in homemade Italian novels today. I illustrate from Fabrio Tombari's *Vita*:

> I entered the drawing rooms of the princess just as Andor Kalman was lifting his pale fingers from the keyboard whence he had drawn all the wistfulness of a dreamy *adagio* from Bach. . . . [d'Annunzio could have written that.]
>
> "You have lost the best of the evening," said the princess to me graciously. "Your arm, please, for the first dance! I have kept for myself the honor of introducing you to the brighter stars of the Roman firmament." [That would have seemed vulgar even to d'Annunzio.]

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I followed her, my nostrils wide. Those half-naked women, those fragrant shoulders, those translucent gowns, those soft voices, worked on my senses like a whiff from a cow-barn upon a wild bull. . . . [A touch of fascist virility.] I bowed, smiling in inner satisfaction at all this attention, at all this good luck. . . . But I was mistaken. As I looked up I saw nothing but bored indifferent faces, and smiles of commiseration. I heard two or three giggles ill-controlled. . . . Was I unbuttoned in front? [Part of the reaction against bourgeois softness.] I looked down at myself, thinking of the dead man whose dinner-coat I had hired. Then I turned around. But the princess had fled. There she was talking with the ambassador from Germany. . . . I saw two or three lorgnettes and an impudent monocle fastened upon me. How ridiculous I felt! There could be no doubt! All the weird uncouthness of my home village stood incarnate in my person. . . . and I rebelled. [Some day he will be famous enough to make the Hunt Club in Rome.]

Ultimate fame against an early background of poverty and awkwardness—this is the new and characteristic motif in this spontaneous literature of fascism. And it will be found (in Tombari for one) in search of strikingly original plot formations and a style that affects the analytical sentence of the people rather than the classical period of the schools. On this style Mussolini's oratory has had and is still having a direct influence.

I cannot help addressing a word of caution to those critics who, in their laudable eagerness to defend democracy and freedom of thought, slip over into the error of exaggerating the direct and indirect influence of governments upon cultural trends. Time was when, keeping to major glories internationally recognized, Italy could point to Carducci, d'Annunzio and Pascoli, with Fogazzaro in a contested role. The passing of Pascoli and Carducci was largely compensated for by the rise of Croce, and during the '20's Pirandello was surely one of the most interesting figures in the international literary scene. The lack of outstanding Italian eminences today (with the exception of Croce) cannot soundly be attributed to fascism. It must be charged to the failure of the men who are now fifty and sixty and not to the men who are twenty, thirty and forty. The failure, in fact,

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is more definitely chargeable to Papini who turned holy-roller, and perhaps log-roller, just at the time when the crown of literary immortality was within his grasp.

But there is another element in the scene that is harder still for the lover of freedom to adjust to his love of truth. Undoubtedly all that free play of spirited public discussion which was once such an attractive aspect of Italian letters has declined into the sycophantism and loathsome mendacity characteristic of all dictatorships. But the decline in historical scholarship and criticism is not chargeable to fascism. The decline had already set in before the War and grew out of the trend toward metaphysics signalized by the unparalleled success of Croce. The great vitality of contemporary culture in France, England, America, and to a certain extent Scandinavia, depends on a powerful turning of thought—anchored to a rational objective basis—toward the social problem as a whole. In Italy that trend was checked by the persistence of Catholic medievalism, on the one hand, and by an absorption in the barren wastes of neo-idealism on the other.

But we fail to see the forest for the trees if we do not recognize that one area of contemporary Italian thought is of the first importance and exerts a worldwide influence probably disproportionate to its soundness. The great achievement of Italian thinking during the past decade has been its elaboration of the theory of technocratic demagogical nationalism—in other words the theory of fascism. I personally believe that that theory has the speciousness of all Machiavellian systems, but it also has one of their excellences—it hits with absolute clarity on nine-tenths of the truth, leaving the progress of civilization to depend on the tenth that it misses. At any rate the theory of fascism, at least in its international bearings, has shown its superiority to every theory of a degenerate liberalism that persists in ignoring the role of force in human societies, and that in the face of the foe paralyzes the defensive and offensive vigor of the democracies by its insistence on materialistic and even financial conceptions of peace, security, comfort and happiness.

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The Education of Teachers

EDWIN R. EMBREE

IN AMERICAN education two strangely contradictory facts stand out: (1) The preparation of teachers is the most important task of professional education, (2) the teachers college is the poorest of all the departments of higher education.

In the first place teachers colleges are poor in money. The sums that go into them are pitiful compared with the millions so generously supplied to many other professional departments. Medical education for example, recently the darling among university departments, has during the past third of a century received funds beyond any previous dreams of the academic world. From a single fortune, that of Mr. Rockefeller, $200,000,000 have gone into medical education and research during the four decades of this century. At such universities as Chicago, Rochester, Johns Hopkins, Washington, Vanderbilt and Tulane medical schools have received in various recent periods more than all other departments put together.

The largest and richest school of education—Teachers College, Columbia—has only $7,000,000 of general endowment, a fund that is small compared with the capital of any of a dozen medical centers or compared with the $35,000,000 endowment of one of the engineering schools—the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The School of Education of the University of Chicago, one of the greatest influences throughout the Mississippi Valley, struggled for years with no endowment whatever and with little support from the general university treasury save for upkeep of buildings. The income of this nationally important school was dependent upon student fees; the livelihood of its professors depended in large part upon their outside lectures and surveys and their textbook royalties. Even today the endow-

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ment for education at Chicago is less than $1,000,000 as compared with an endowment of $17,000,000 for medicine. Yale University last year spent $1,100,000 on its medical department, $385,000 on law, $273,000 on engineering, $253,000 on theology and only $68,000 on its department of education. The George Peabody College for Teachers, the greatest single influence in the education of teachers throughout the whole southern region, has an endowment of $5,000,000—only about a third of the $14,000,000 endowment of the Vanderbilt Medical School across the street. Yet Peabody last year enrolled a total of 2,700 students, many of whom are the men and women who will set educational standards throughout the whole South, whereas the Vanderbilt Medical School taught but 200 students.

None of this is intended as criticism of the support given to other professional schools which as a matter of fact need even larger funds for adequate development. I simply wish to point out that education is far behind other professional departments in the financial support it receives.

Teachers colleges are poor also in the thought and planning that have gone into their development. They have been the stepchildren of the Alma Mater. Looked down upon by the more ancient and honorable departments, the school of education has had little of the constructive attention that has been devoted so helpfully to the other professional departments and to the graduate school and the undergraduate college. Moreover, it must sadly be admitted, teachers colleges are poor in the brains and distinction of their faculties and in the abilities of their students. With a few brilliant exceptions the distinguished scholars and teachers of America are found everywhere but in the departments of education. The ten-year study of education in Pennsylvania, recently made by the Carnegie Foundation, revealed that on the basis of standard tests the abilities and the achievement of students going into teachers colleges are below the average either for other professional departments or for college students generally.

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Yet, in a democracy such as America, teaching is the most important of all professions. For one thing it is the largest in number. Today one million people in this country are actively engaged in teaching—more than the members of all the other learned professions put together. But the importance of teaching is far above the mere matter of numbers. Teachers more than anyone else determine not only the learning but the lives of coming generations. It is important to cure our bodily ills and prevent sickness. The modern world needs the food which scientific agriculture is providing and the buildings and engines which the engineers devise and construct. Organized society rests on law and requires judges and lawyers. But important as these things are they do not compare in significance with the nurture of our future citizens. The influence of priests and preachers was once perhaps the dominant force in shaping the character of the people. But for many years this influence has been waning in America and the world generally. Since the teacher has absorbed some of the functions previously fulfilled by preachers, and has even had to take over a substantial part of the tasks formerly assumed by parents, the future of society rests to an increasing extent on the teaching profession. With the development of the nursery school and the graduate schools our teachers take responsibility for many of our children from the age of two to the age of twenty-five, a total of nearly 30,000,000 of them a year.

Since the teaching profession is so important the best intelligence of the nation should go into its preparation and no sums should be too great for the support of its education. Only recently has the significance of the education of teachers dawned on the American mind. Fortunately it is now dawning, surely if still slowly.

The rebuilding of the teachers college will require the best brains of the nation and a great deal of patient labor. There will be much trial and error before the desired end is reached. Without presuming to describe the perfect teachers college of the future I want to outline five essential features:

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1. Rigorous selection of students.
2. Sound general education as the base on which to build the professional studies.
3. Understanding of the arts and sciences underlying the professions: psychology, child growth and development, technique of teaching, the social structure of which the school is a part.
4. A wisely planned interplay of theory and practise, learning and experience.
5. Continued study and experiment to increase knowledge and understanding in the field.

1. The careful selection of students is essential in any profession which takes itself seriously. The high standing of medicine and engineering today is in no small part due to the severe requirements for admission to those professional departments. Even state universities are excluding from their professional schools all but a small group of highly qualified applicants.

Fortunately we in America are now in a position to consider quality rather than quantity in education. During recent decades we have been engaged in a mad race simply to turn out enough teachers of any sort to meet the demands of mounting school enrolments which, during the first three decades of this century, increased by half a million pupils a year. But the crest of the enrolment wave has now been reached. While attendance in the higher branches will probably grow for a number of years, the elementary school has passed its peak. Instead of pouring out an ever-increasing stream of new instructors, therefore, the problem now is solely to improve quality. Teachers colleges are consequently justified in ruthlessly rejecting unqualified candidates. This selection of prospective teachers must of course take into account not only intellect but aptitude and general qualities of personality.

Teachers colleges must cease to be open dumping grounds for the dull and stupid; they must adopt standards that will exclude such students as are clearly unfit for the high profession of teaching. Brains are the first requisite. But intellectuality is not the sole criterion. The nurture and guidance of young children require patience, sympathy and insights of a sort quite

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different from those needed for research in a chemical laboratory or for theorizing about mathematical abstractions. There is in fact some evidence that highly intellectual persons actually fail as teachers of young children where persons much lower in sheer scholarship are successful. Aptitude tests and other means of judging personal qualities and interests will have to be used a great deal more than at present if students are to be wisely chosen.

2. A sound general education forms the proper base for any professional course and this is especially true of teaching. As a general rule it would seem inadvisable for professional specialization to start before the end of what is now being called the general college or the junior college—that is, before the completion of high school and the freshman and sophomore years of college. Since this preliminary education should be general the liberal arts colleges can continue to render fine service in the preparation of teachers. The basic education (whether it be the full four-year course or the two years of the junior college) may well be received at colleges of liberal arts. The longer and more thorough the general education in arts and science, the better prepared the prospective teacher will be for his professional work and for his career.

3. No general college can pretend to provide the professional training simply by adding a course or two in education, any more than it can meet the requirements in medicine or engineering simply by a few general courses in those subjects. It is the distinctive task of professional schools to provide thorough education in the subject matter of the given profession. Amazing as it may seem there is still debate in high university circles as to the propriety of this procedure in teachers colleges. Many academicians say that all the teacher needs is a mastery of some academic subject: mathematics, chemistry, history, logic. They completely overlook the fact that the task of the school teacher is not merely to pump certain quantities of a subject into the helpless pupil but is also to lead out the abilities and interests of the child. Of the two it is much more important

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that the teacher understand the child with his complex needs and responses than that he know, however accurately, some fragment of the field of academic knowledge.

There is a great difference between the skills required by the teacher and guide of young children and by the instructor in a university department. And as a matter of fact higher education has recognized the need for a certain kind of professional training for college and university teachers. The graduate school of education is chiefly a professional college for the preparation of teachers in the higher branches and its Ph.D. is today almost as standard a prerequisite for a university professorship in education as a degree in medicine or engineering is for admission to those professions. It will be well for each group if the preparation of both school and college teachers can include more common ground—by an extension of the general education of the school teacher and by the addition of some knowledge of teaching methods and the learning process to the preparation of the college or university instructor.

The chief task of the school is very different from that of the college or graduate department. The job at the beginning is not to cram knowledge into the child but to provide a proper setting in which his personality may develop, to find ways to stimulate his interest, to help him get started in the most effective way on the road of learning. The problem at the secondary level is to keep open the avenues of healthy growth and learning in the midst of the distractions and confusions of adolescence. The task of the college and university is to provide more intensive scholarship. But even here the real goal is the development of the personality of the student, especially the stimulation of his ability to think and thus to make use of his learning. Our universities would be more influential if their professors had a fuller understanding of the forces of personality and society.

While the tendency has been to emphasize and glorify the higher reaches of our educational system, the first few years of schooling are the most important. Even with America's huge college enrolments only a small fraction of our young people

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get more than a high school education; half of our total youth never go beyond elementary school and for these the first years are basic. If a child learns how to learn and gets a grasp of the tools of knowledge in the first five grades, he *can* care for the rest of his education. If his interest is blunted and his basic mental processes are left murky and confused he can never become an educated man no matter how many higher institutions he attends.

Unfortunately the subjects basic to education are less well developed than the subjects basic to other professions. Psychology, child growth, the learning processes and the corresponding appropriate teaching techniques, mental health as it relates to teachers as well as to the children under their care, the social structure in which the school exists and its influence on the child and his development—all these are not yet well understood. Furthermore the available information in these fields has not been formulated in books and courses with anything like the success attained, for example, in the basic courses in physiology and pathology or in mathematics and physics. The distinctive task confronting the profession of education is the formulation of social and psychological knowledge into courses adapted to professional students. This will be a tough task; most of the present courses in educational psychology, educational methods, and teaching techniques are sloppy and superficial. But it must be undertaken.

In transforming teachers colleges into institutions of learning, emphasis must be shifted from courses and credits to serious and continuous study. In all American education, learning is too often broken up into little fragments and passed out to the student in small packages. Teachers colleges, which in the past have been the greatest sinners, should lead the way back from the adding machine of courses and credits to sound and thorough education.

4. In any successful education there must be continuous interchange between theory and practise, learning and experience. There are, it is true, a few educators who still hold out for book

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learning alone. There is a more vociferous group at the other extreme—the activity school, the advocates of learning-by-doing, and the vocationalists—who seem to believe that the only thing needed is free activity by the pupil, or that any instruction or guidance should be "practical" or concrete, never abstract. Each school of thought represents one facet of the truth. But sound education comes by a combination of the two.

Fortunately guided experience is easily arranged for pupil teachers and is being increasingly utilized in all good departments of education. It should include not only practise teaching *under supervision but also acquaintance with the kind of* personal and social problems which the teacher is to meet, for such direct experience is of the greatest value to the student. Under competent supervising professors the actual problems of the field may be effectively used to explain and illustrate the general principles of the profession. Practise teaching and field experience are at the moment probably the most useful of the purely professional aspects of the teachers college. Guided experience is a salient feature of good professional preparation in other fields. It has been worked out with special success in medical teaching (through much student work in hospital wards and similar professional services). The future teacher should have a like chance to know the social conditions with which he is to work. Field experience, moreover, is an excellent way in which to teach the various types of education called for by special regions and conditions. Our failure to provide appropriate types of learning and experience has been especially conspicuous in rural education. In spite of recent urban and industrial growth, over half the public school pupils throughout America (three-fourths of the pupils of the southern and southwestern states) are in rural schools—that is, schools in the open country and in villages and towns of less than 2,500 people. Yet we have built our public school system to fit city conditions and have grossly neglected the natural educational facilities which the countryside possesses and the satisfaction which country life may give. If we are to maintain a decent rural cul-

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ture we must see to it that the special needs of country children and country life are met by the rural school.

5. In any first-rate institution the teaching of already-known truth goes constantly hand in hand with efforts to advance wisdom. Continued research is one of the most stimulating functions of any university department; it keeps the professors growing and it gives the student an inspiring sense of being himself a part of the creative process. So much needs to be done in the field of education that research is an even more pressing need in teachers colleges than elsewhere. Although the fundamental research will naturally be carried on in university departments of education, the local and state teachers colleges should be alert to new ideas and fresh materials.

The problems and methods of research in a teachers college naturally differ from those in other institutions. The task of the educational student is not simply to advance knowledge in some academic subject—mathematics, history, science—but to find ever more effective ways of imparting this knowledge to children. And constantly students in education must try to extend the knowledge both of teaching methods and of the great fields of psychology and sociology and their bearing on the child and his education.

To accomplish all this professors must be freed from too heavy schedules of classes; authorities must recognize that study, conferences with students and visits to the field are often of more educational value—to students as well as teachers—than any fixed routine of lessons in the classroom. If the teacher is not to lapse into rote instruction—the curse of education the world over—he should carry on his study in an institution which is itself not routinized but is infused rather with the constant effort to find new truth and fresh methods.

Since the success of democracy depends on an intelligent citizenry the preparation of the teachers of our young people is a task of the greatest significance. To a degree not yet recognized the future of America will be determined by the strength and wisdom of our institutions for the education of teachers.

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Thoreau in Search of a Public

HENRY SEIDEL CANBY

HOW did—how does—a young man unknown to the public and determined to write only his best make himself into a man of letters? The history of one such young man, Henry David Thoreau, is illuminating. One could not, however, make oneself into a self-supporting man of letters in the 30's and 40's, for there was no such profession in the America of that day. A literary journalist might make a bare living as Poe found to his cost; a novelist whose talent could overcome the handicap of pirated English books had a fighting chance. Cooper won; Hawthorne, thanks to political assistance, came through though not on his books. But a poet and Transcendentalist, such as the young Thoreau, with an undeveloped gift for nature writing—where was his possible sustenance? To become a writer was in Thoreau's mind; his verses prove it, his Journal proves it. Even as early as 1838 he was criticizing his own style for being "Carlyleish." But he can scarcely have hoped to make publication his substitute for school teaching or any other work that brought a steady income.

There is a too common belief that a young writer's first great struggle is the decision whether to write for money or for fame. Nonsense!—his first struggle is to find something to say and his second to discover some way of publishing it. The question of money seldom arises in the early stages. Having found something to say his problem is to break into print, paid or unpaid. Hence the two conditioning factors for writing anywhere, any time, are the quality of the imagination and the nature of the market. Later comes the fork of the road—one way toward

This article, slightly enlarged, forms part of a chapter of Canby's *Thoreau* (Houghton Mifflin Company, New York City, October 1939).

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the competent and salable, the other toward the excellent and possibly unsalable. The completely successful man of letters is not he who writes for nothing but rather the man who learns how to do what he wants—and how to make readers pay for it. The predestined commercial writer is seldom a frustrated man of letters. His success in cash returns is due to a different set of qualities. Every author writes for money, for money represents an audience and no creative mind writes for itself alone. The question is, how high a price will he pay for the money he gets. That became Thoreau's problem; but at first his concern was with what he had to say and to whom and how he could say it. When this was solved the question of how he was to get paid enough to allow him to go on writing followed and in solving that in his own original fashion he broke out of obscurity into fame.

But there is no real comparison between the beginning of Thoreau's career as a writer and Poe's or Longfellow's, because his idea of what at age 22 he would have called the poet's job was entirely different from theirs. "The poem" he said "is drawn out from under the feet of the poet, his whole weight has rested on this ground." This idea came from *Nature* and from his conversations with Emerson. By 1840 there is plenty of evidence that he knew what he was trying to do, even though vague as to how to accomplish it:

> March 21. . . . There is this moment proposed to me every kind of life that men lead anywhere, or that imagination can paint. . . . Our limbs, indeed, have room enough, but it is our souls that rust in a corner. Let us migrate interiorly without intermission.
>
> March 30. Pray, what things interest me at present? A long, soaking rain, the drops trickling down the stubble, while I lay drenched on a last year's bed of wild oats, by the side of some bare hill, ruminating. These things are of moment.
>
> June 16. . . . Would it not be a luxury to stand up to one's chin in some retired swamp for a whole summer's day, scenting the sweet-fern and bilberry blows, and lulled by the minstrelsy of gnats and mosquitoes?
>
> June 21. . . . I never feel that I am inspired unless my body is also. It too spurns a tame and commonplace life.

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June 26. The best poetry has never been written, for when it might have been, the poet forgot it, and when it was too late remembered it; or when it might have been, the poet remembered it, and when it was too late forgot it. . . .

There was no indolence in the purpose which lies behind these sentences. In that admirable preface to the first number of *The Dial* in July of 1840 Emerson set down what he must often have said to Henry Thoreau. There was a revolution, he said, under way in New England. A new spirit was abroad among many who did not know each other's faces or names. It was in every form a protest against convention and a search for principles and existed like an oak or a river because it must. As for literature, there is somewhat in all life untranslatable into language. He who keeps his eyes on that will write better than the others and think less of his writing and of all writing. What is great usually slips through our fingers. We wish not to multiply books but to report life.

Here is Thoreau's direction for a writing career—to report life and first of all his own life. "I told Henry Thoreau that his freedom is in the form, but he does not disclose new matter" Emerson said of him the next year. "I am very familiar with all his thoughts—they are my own quite originally drest." Not altogether true then, or later, this is surely true of the Thoreau of the quotations above. He was reporting his life as Emerson advised him to do. And he continued to report life; indeed in *Walden* he describes himself as a reporter. It is certain that he never sharply differentiated his profession of authorship from his basic job of unveiling his life in order to understand himself and his environment. Far more than with most authors, writing was a report rendered to his friends and possible readers of what he had learned about life. And since he was a very busy man, with a tremendous task cut out for himself, he got little time for making these reports into merchantable books. Emerson's advice he took with a difference and came to think more and more of writing, but less and less of publication, except as a means of supporting himself while his reporting went on. In-

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deed, if I should coin an epithet for Henry Thoreau it would not be the "poet-naturalist" of Channing (the poet, who was to become Thoreau's constant walking companion) but rather a reporter of spiritual and physical reality.

His first task was to get something to report. Yet not one man in a million has ever written out his commentary on experience (which is a good working definition of the basis of literature) without the hope of publication. With the act of composition comes the speculation as to who will read and how. If cash return is in question, the market, or if communication is what is sought, the possible audience, is the inevitable concern of the articulate man. Until 1840 Thoreau could have seen only one. There were no magazines in America which would publish aphorisms like those above, from a youth. But there was the Lyceum. In so far as Henry was not recording his own studies and self-development he was getting ready to become, like Emerson, a lecturer. It was his only outlet.

The Lyceum idea, introduced into New England a short time before, had spread with extraordinary rapidity among these people hungry for uplift. It was admirably adapted to a country made up of small, self-respecting communities, where a passionate faith in education had absorbed the energies released when the New England mind turned from perfectibility for the next world to intellectual progress in this one.

The system was simple. A group of citizens hired a hall (often the vestry room of the church) or the town hall, invited lecturers from outside, filled up, if they were able, the gaps from their own local talent and issued a prospectus asking for subscriptions. By this means a community of 2000 people like Concord could hear, if it wished, what its committee regarded as the best thought available, and conversely if there were local thinkers they could be guaranteed an audience. The local speakers donated their services; the imported talent was paid from $5 up to $25, rarely more. When Thoreau himself was curator of the Concord Lyceum in 1843-1844 he carried through the season with an expenditure of only $100, for which sum he

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provided for his townsmen such talent as Emerson, Theodore Parker, Horace Greeley, George Bancroft and others now less famous. Emerson got nothing, Parker got $3, and a Mr. Giles $10.

Emerson, in his time, was by profession a Lyceum lecturer and there can be no question that a literary career for the young Thoreau meant first of all lecturing. It was for lecturing that his early Journal prepared, and indeed he lectured in Concord his first year out of college and most of the years afterward. In Concord he was not paid but his place in the well-known series there soon got him invitations elsewhere. Throughout his life it was as a lecturer that he usually described himself. He was a bad lecturer—never successful except with individuals, the kind of lecturer who keeps his nose in his manuscript and drives the words at his audience. But until the year of his death he never found a dependable annual outlet with a cash return for what he wrote except through lecturing.

Like Mark Twain, like Emerson, Thoreau was a writer formed by the practise of appealing directly to an audience. At first his idea of a lecture was a Harvard essay. But after the brilliant idea of reporting his search for reality in himself and in nature had flashed from Emerson he began to store up in his Journal, as in a munitions dump, sentences and paragraphs charged with his own peculiar thought and imagination. These were to be discharged at his audiences, like strips of cartridges, as soon as he could provide a machine gun. But he was no Emerson, of the grave, eloquent voice, the noble presence. His projectiles hit like duds. It was only in print that they began to explode.

The lecture, regarded as a literary form, had a definite appeal to a mind like Henry Thoreau's which it is a little hard for us to understand. Why did he keep at it after demonstrated failure? Surely not for the little cash it brought in since he could readily make more by surveying or in the graphite shop. It appealed both to him and to Emerson because the lecture was a direct contact between the intuitive personality and his audience. It was

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the ideal method (when successful) for transmitting the intuitions of Transcendentalism.

Emerson had faith in the written word and the skill which managed it, and Thoreau as soon as opportunities offered came to his opinion, but Alcott distrusted all rhetoric, all skills of style and expressiveness, believing in a kind of induced electricity between speaker and hearer. There was a great deal of truth in his contentions. The Concord shoemaker who so deeply admired Emerson was accustomed to say that he understood very little but came away uplifted. Thoreau could not uplift with the spoken word and perhaps that is the reason why of the three he became the best writer in prose. The clue to his oft-expressed "meanness" in these early years is perhaps to be found in his sense of failure in communication, even as a lecturer. He had the stuff in his Journal but he could not get it out. As he said again and again, he had to work for Admetus because he could not sell himself as Apollo. Audiences sought uplift and did not get it from his radical perversities; or they wished to be amused, in which he obliged them only when he read them the accounts of his journeys in the woods or Cape Cod or of his life at Walden Pond.

Nearly everything Thoreau wrote was originally conceived as a lecture. *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* is a thin thread of narrative tying together a bundle of commentaries of which several had actually been used as lectures. *Walden* is a series of lectures upon the experiment of living alone at Walden and on what happened there. Much of it was given first as separate lectures. The *Excursions* are lectures. So are "Civil Disobedience" and "Life Without Principle." *Cape Cod* and *The Maine Woods* and *A Yankee in Canada* are lectures, worked up a bit afterward. Strange that a form in which he was not successful should have determined the nature of his literary output. Not strange, however, if one remembers that the lecture revised for print keeps the freedom of direct, personal address, with an air of casual utterance, while at the same time the author has had to write as well as he can since his audience is

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now unknown. In 1837 Henry was an apprentice in the profession of Lyceum lecturing, where there were many brilliant stars that have long ceased to shine. He submitted to the discipline of print; they did not, or if they did were unable to carry over into written style the color and flavor of their spoken words.

A lecture unpublished dies with the memory of the hearers. Print lasts. In breaking into print Thoreau was extremely lucky. The so-called Transcendental Club had wished for an organ to express their ideas of the "newness" upsurging in New England. *The Dial*, a literary-philosophical-critical-religious quarterly, founded in 1840 and first edited by Margaret Fuller, was the result. Emerson was its chief sponsor. He had been drawn into one of the very few institutions to which he ever lent his name by his strong desire to establish a medium of publication in which new minds, like Thoreau's, like Ellery Channing's, like Margaret Fuller's, could find a place to publish and to establish their influence in print. He wanted them there and was content to let "our Journal share the impulses of the time, it cannot now prescribe its own course." It was to have, as Margaret Fuller said, perfect freedom to publish the "newness" of youth. When Carlyle complained that the contributors were "soaring after ideas" Emerson answered: "It is yet a fact for literary history, that all the bright boys and girls in New England . . . take the world so. . . . The boys . . . do not wish to go into trade. . . . They are all religious, but hate the churches; they reject all the ways of living of other men, but have none to offer in their stead." This is perfect of Thoreau, except that by 1842 a way of living was already forming in his mind. *The Dial*, Emerson wrote to Carlyle only eight days after the meeting of the Symposium when the magazine was planned, "will give you a better knowledge of our young people than any you have had!" By young people he meant first of all Thoreau. "My Henry Thoreau" he wrote in his Journal "will be a great poet for such a company, and one of these days for all companies."

That Thoreau published so little in the magazine until

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Emerson began to edit it himself in the spring of 1842 was due to the vigilant editorship of Margaret Fuller. She regarded Henry as a somewhat "bare hill" still unwarmed by the breezes of spring, which was not true; but also as an unformed writer, given to incoherences, exaggerations and diffusion, which was perfectly true. She rejected kindly but firmly the formal lecture-essays he tried to pass off on her. When Emerson took charge Thoreau had better luck and got 15 contributions into volume III, not counting his selections from the *Sayings* of Confucius, the *Laws* of Menu, and the *Romaunt of the Rose*. Here were some of his best poems, like "The Inward Morning," translations from the classics and his "Natural History of Massachusetts" which revealed for the first time the charm of his nature description, while showing to the informed reader that his knowledge of natural history was still extremely sketchy. When, with the April number of 1844, *The Dial* gave up its struggle to live upon a handful of subscriptions Henry was definitely an author; he had broken into print.

For *The Dial*, local as it was, with constant references to the taste and opinion of Boston and never read perhaps by more than 500 to 1000 readers, was yet the kind of magazine that made young writers known. It was amateurish, it was too "eclectic and miscellaneous" as Emerson said of it retrospectively in his memoir of Margaret Fuller; "each of its readers and writers valued only a small portion of it." It was far stronger in criticism than in what is usually called creative writing. Yet in spite of what Emerson called the too "bookish" source of the agitation of these writers who "found the air in America getting a little close and stagnant" there was a self-reliance, an optimism, a passionate interest in the soul and mind of America which made these numbers, for all their New England provincialism, the first upstanding and confident exponents of an American mind. Of course it was not the all-American mind; it was the Boston and Concord mind. Nevertheless it was home-grown, if nurtured in European ideas, and it was confident. Thoreau had gone beyond his lecture audience. Carlyle was

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reading *The Dial* in England. The Boston papers, picking Alcott's Orphic sayings partly because in the first number he alone signed his contribution, were abusing the Transcendentalists for (as Thoreau's Aunt Maria said in a letter) cracking the brains of sensible men. A new writer got the sense of having broken through to communication at last even if there was a kick rather than a plaudit at the end.

Now came the problem of subsistence. When *The Dial* was launched Henry was a school teacher with an adequate job and income. It was not important that his accepted contributions were unpaid. By '41 his school had ended and a project for buying the Hollowell Farm where he could keep himself alive while writing and lecturing had been defeated by the obstinacy of a farmer's wife who would not sign a deed when the payment, except for $10, was to be on credit. Emerson came to the rescue. While experimenting with the theory that dabbling in the soil would put health in his body and roots to his thoughts he had overworked himself and found, like many another, that manual and intellectual labor seldom mix well. Also he was off lecturing for weeks or months at a time and wanted a friend, caretaker, handyman about the house and a helpmate for "our too pensive, careful and melancholy wife." So Thoreau came to the Emersons' on April 26, 1841 to stay, wrote Emerson to Carlyle, "for a twelvemonth." He lived there two years.

But there was no monetary compensation and, though Thoreau earned a little outside, after two years the need of ready cash became imperative. By February 16 of 1843 he was writing to Emerson that he was "meditating some other method of paying debts than by lectures and writing—which will only do to talk about. If anything of that 'other' sort should come to your ears in New York, will you remember it for me?" Emerson remembered and thought over the problem. By this time it was obvious that *The Dial* was not destined for even the least of commercial successes. It had never paid its contributors, it would never be able to pay its contributors. Furthermore the poet whom Emerson had taken into his household,

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and who in September of 1841 had been "in the mid-sea of verses" and "full of noble madness," was by February of '43 writing to his friend and master: "As for poetry, I have not remembered to write any for some time; it has quite slipped my mind. . . . You see it takes a good many words to supply the place of one deed." He was in debt, his poetry was drying up, he had to find a new way of solving the problem of sustenance.

What Emerson said and did can be deduced with reasonable certainty from what followed in the next six months. He got for Henry not a job so much as an opportunity. He arranged with his brother William, the business man of the family who lived on Staten Island, to take on the young poet, who had broken into one magazine and might break into others which were more remunerative, as a tutor for his son Haven. William Emerson, "very gentlemanly, very amenable, very clear-headed, but a mere business man," as Margaret Fuller described him, does not figure in this story. Henry might as well have been living on the moon for all the note he took of the family with whom he spent six months. And with reason, for though he was conscientious in his tutoring it is clear that Emerson had sent him to the neighborhood of New York with the idea that this was his chance to find markets for his prose if not his poetry. In January, as a hopeful preliminary, Hawthorne, who was drawn to Thoreau from the first, had him to tea at the Old Manse to meet O'Sullivan, editor of *The Democratic Review* of New York, who "made a point of asking me to write for his Review, which I shall be glad to do."

On May 1 he was off, supplied with introductions by Emerson both to his youthful admirers in New York, Tappan, Waldo and other places and to men of influence like Brisbane (who bored Thoreau with his Fourierism), Henry James (who fascinated him) and Horace Greeley, editor of *The Tribune*. An illness which, as so often, weakened Thoreau in February had passed but bronchitis caught him on Staten Island and was followed by a period of physical lassitude—a spot on the lung,

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one supposes. Nevertheless his abundant letters from this only period when he lived away from Concord were full of his main purpose. "I am sure that you are under sacred protection" wrote the optimistic Emerson. "You must not count much upon what I can do or learn in New York. I feel a good way off here" Thoreau replied; but as soon as his chest was clear he set about his projects earnestly, spending what William Emerson gave him upon bus trips uptown and a new pair of pantaloons for $2.25.

Ellery Channing, the poet, had been saying to Emerson that Henry should not see Concord again for 10 years, should grind up 50 Concords in his mill. That was Emerson's idea also. This boy must break through into a less provincial (and more remunerative) world. And Thoreau did take a few steps in this direction. O'Sullivan bought a little essay—a very dull and perfunctory one—called "The Landlord" for his *Democratic Review* and ordered a review of an extraordinary book by a German called Etzler which, after some haggling, he published. "What with Alcott and Lane and Hawthorne, too, you look strong enough to take New York by storm" Henry wrote to Emerson on May 23, still confident that Concord might conquer New York. But as might be expected Henry was less cocky with his family: "As for money matters"—this was June 8—"I have not set my traps yet, but I am getting my bait ready." Yet he produced little, even in his Journal, in these months. "In writing, conversation should be folded many times thick" he wrote to Emerson. The folding was difficult.

His time was not wasted, for his personal contacts were rich. He made a lifelong friend of Horace Greeley and sent home word portraits of the notables he met which show far more power than anything in his *Dial* prose. But as a contributor he was not succeeding and so he told his mother:

. Castleton, Tuesday, August 29, 1843.

Dear Mother,— . . . I may yet accomplish something in the literary way; indeed, I should have done so before now but for the slowness and poverty of the "Reviews" themselves. I have tried sundry methods

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of earning money in the city, of late, but without success: have rambled into every bookseller's or publisher's house, and discussed their affairs with them. Some propose to me to do what an honest man cannot. [Had someone, as Greeley did later, asked him to do an "intimate" portrait of Emerson at home?] Among others I conversed with the Harpers—to see if they might not find me useful to them; but they say that they are making $50,000 annually, and their motto is to let well alone. I find that I talk with these poor men as if I were over head and ears in business, and a few thousands were no consideration with me. . . . But it is a very valuable experience, and the best introduction I could have.

He tried to sell subscriptions to *The Agriculturist* but got nothing out of it except a trip to the Croton Reservoir. Although he was to earn a certain sum by winter he admitted to Emerson in a September letter "Literature comes to a poor market here; and even the little that I write is more than will sell." He had tried six magazines—only *The Ladies' Companion* paid its contributors. "My bait will not tempt the rats—they are too well fed" he wrote his mother on October 1, although he was holding together remarkably well as regards the "outward linen and woolen man; no holes more than I brought away." As for *The Ladies' Companion*, "I could not write anything companionable." He read in the library, watched the crowds, found more to hate than to love in the city. He thought of a teaching job but the pay was poor even there.

How familiar this is to anyone who has been young and hopeful in literature, or older and in a publisher's or an editor's chair. Youth, scornful one moment, depressed and mean in spirit the next, going the rounds, with only its promises to sell, bluffing a little, pretending to have bluffed more—finding doors closing quickly, kind words but no jobs, perfunctory interest but no acceptances, a market which proves to be only a business for those who edit and print and sell, a welcome only for those who can write something "companionable"—but for an original mind not yet master of itself, nothing so profitable even as lecturing.

Haven could not have much enjoyed his tutor, sick of body,

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sick for home, who "loitered" through the neighboring fields, as in Concord, took his fill of such ocean as he could see from Staten Island, while the inner conviction grew that not in 20 lifetimes could he grind up one Concord in his mill. Concord was his destination; there was no sustenance for him in New York. His expedition into the outer un-Transcendental world had failed. The philosophers at home might talk too much about their spiritual reality but the reality which had a price in New York was out of his reach, and of his desire. He was homesick.

And so by Thanksgiving of 1843 he went back to Concord with a lecture on Ossian for the Lyceum, determined to live *his* life. He had learned what a more worldly man than Emerson could have told him in the beginning—that a poet, a critic, a Transcendentalist and a man insisting on his own way might get an entrée but could never make a living from New York magazines. The problem, indeed, was to reconcile the active, which was so strong with him, the contemplative and the creative, without paying too much in dependence or privation for the experience. Teaching was ended, lecturing was a reed, magazine writing for pay promised only an occasional contribution—and that for the writing which contained least of himself. The answer was to find a way of living one's whole life so cheaply that there would be time and energy left over to learn how to record it in print.

This, then, was the real result of Emerson's attempt to foist him upon the greater world. The greater world had no need of him and he in his turn found that for him the greater world was Concord. And so, having been an author without pay, and having learned how to place an occasional manuscript with insufficient pay, he came home to take up from a new angle his problem of how to live and how to stay alive while living. He had learned that in order to do what he wanted in writing he would have to publish himself. And this inevitably led him to Walden Pond.

I must repeat the significant economic fact of the last para-

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graph. With these New England Transcendentals, even with the practically-minded Thoreau, it is very difficult to remember that in the midst of their spiritual efflorescences they were subject to the same law of the necessity of food and shelter and loose change in the pockets as any Poor Richard or Deacon Brown. More subject, in the case of Henry, who credited or debited his mother with one half a cent on any item lent or borrowed and who proudly wrote to his class secretary protesting that no one was to consider him a subject for charity—on the contrary he was ready to give charity himself. And here he was back again, just where he had been in 1841 only with no *Dial* to write for, yet more ambitious, more able, more determined to work for Admetus as little as possible, disillusioned as to the possible rewards of literary labor but determined to write and to eat and to clothe himself and to have books and friends and leisure at his own cost. But how? It has been the problem of every creative, original mind since the days of the Greeks and probably since tools gave some freedom to the mind of man.

Thoreau's solution is what every would-be man of letters who is not a predestined best-seller must find for himself—a means of living while one writes, which is something quite different from writing for a living. The first result was *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers.* And from the solution itself, carried into a philosophy far wider than the writer's problem, he made his masterpiece, *Walden.*

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Dictatorship and Democracy in the 19th Century

E. WILSON LYON

PROFESSOR HUIZINGA has defined history as an "intellectual form by which each generation renders to itself an account of its past." This makes history, as Mark Pattison said, one of the most ephemeral forms of literature. Each generation tends to rewrite its past in terms of its own interests and its own capacity for analysis. In the light of our recent experiences in international relations it is high time to rewrite the history of Europe since 1789.

What is the account of the past century and a half which has served for our generation? It is an interpretation drawn from the French and industrial revolutions and its key words are individual liberty, democracy, nationalism and industrialism. The triumph of the first three, particularly, in 1918 led us to look upon the 19th century as a process that contributed quite naturally to the major lines of the settlement at the conclusion of the World War. While other forces have been recognized they have been treated as tangents to the main line of European development. But any single interpretation of its history would be an over-simplification of the life of so varied a continent. Just as there are at least three Europes today, the western democracies, the fascist dictatorships and communist Russia, so were there divergent forces in the past. Historians of Europe have all too frequently created an artificial unity by generalizing from data valid only for Great Britain, France and the lesser countries of the West where democracy made its greatest advances and where nationalism arose long ago.

This paper, originally the Phi Beta Kappa address for 1939 at Colgate University, has been revised for publication.

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Let us first see how much democracy there was in the past century. An examination of four great powers will suffice. England, the traditional home of freedom, comes to mind at once. But if we define democracy as the rule of the people as represented by universal manhood suffrage, England could not possibly belong in this category until 1884. In 1832 only 656,000 people in a population of 13,800,000 voted. Less than half the adult males were eligible to vote in 1867. France, the birthplace of continental liberty and today a much more democratic country than England, presents an even worse record—an electorate of 100,000 out of a population of nearly 30,000,000 in 1830, a figure which increased to about 300,000 by 1848. Not until the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870 did France become a democracy in any real sense. Italy has been called "liberal" so long by British historians, who saw in her a copy of their own government, that it is difficult to realize only 600,000 Italians were eligible to vote in 1882 and that universal manhood suffrage was not adopted until 1912. Germany adopted universal suffrage for the Empire in 1871 but until the fall of the Hohenzollerns, Prussia, the dominant state, retained a rigid class system of voting in her own elections. Even more significant, the Imperial Constitution held the Chancellor and the Ministry responsible to the Kaiser rather than the Reichstag and thereby deprived the people's representatives of all but a negative voice in the determination of national policy.

I do not ask that we jump from an inadequate liberal interpretation of European history to an equally invalid totalitarian conception. I do suggest that we reexamine the 19th and early 20th centuries in the light of a world that is, at least in part, not what the liberal historians hoped it would be. If we do this we shall have to modify our views about the progress of democracy and the desirability of nationalism as a basis for the political organization of much of Europe. Five periods, or institutions, will serve to illustrate how European history should be rewritten: the dictatorships of the two Napoleons in

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France, the Congress of Vienna, the Hapsburg Monarchy, the years 1848-71 and the peace treaties of 1919-21.

The dictatorships of the two Napoleons have been explained away as abnormal interludes in the triumph of liberalism and democracy. While this has been true in the history of France, these dictatorships have much more than academic interest for us today. Napoleon I opened the century with the proclamation of a dictatorship, made it absolute in 1804 and maintained an absolute dictatorship until the collapse of his gigantic Empire in 1814. His nephew, Napoleon III, now sometimes called the first fascist, ruled dictatorially from December, 1851 to the spring of 1870. Each Napoleon destroyed a republic by a *coup d'état* and each posed, after the manner of Mussolini and Hitler, as a man who had rescued society from radicalism. The menace was Jacobinism in 1799, socialism in 1851 and communism in our time. Paradoxically enough, in a century whose history has been written by liberal historians, little good has been said of the republics that the Bonapartes overthrew. The Directory, of 1795-99, represented the final stage of the First French Republic, inaugurated after the deposition of Louis XVI. It has been the least-studied phase of the French Revolution. The Second Republic, which lasted from 1848 to 1851 and which had a constitution that included certain elements from its American predecessor, has received even less attention than the Directory. Why? Is it not because the propaganda of the successful dictators so damned the régimes they destroyed that posterity (even historians) has taken the Bonaparte version at something like face value? Whatever the nature of these republics they are of inherent interest to our generation. They are examples of the kind of government that produces dictatorship and they have something in common with the late German Republic and with Italy before Mussolini.

The Napoleonic dictatorships interest us because of the devices and techniques they employed. Their plebiscites, their muzzling of the press, their secret police and their suppression of individual rights have not been studied as fully as their wars

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and foreign policy. Napoleon III's career is unusually important, for it furnishes something so far unique in modern European history—a dictator forced by public opinion to turn his régime into a free government. Just a few weeks before the Franco-Prussian War the nation, already enjoying universal manhood suffrage, was given responsible parliamentary government and became Europe's most democratic great power.

The collapse of both Bonaparte régimes merits more attention. Both fell after great European wars, but not so much because of those wars as we have thought. In essence both were destroyed by the failure of the French people to support them in a crisis. It was the unwillingness of the nation to enlist in his armies in 1814, and the defection of an important political group in Paris, that defeated the Corsican. A nation which had called for a *levée en masse* and a war to the end in support of the Jacobin Republic of 1793, apathetically watched the Prussians and Russians invade their capital after a weak resistance. The same people who dethroned Napoleon III fought the Prussians so stubbornly in 1870 that even Bismarck was worried about the outcome of the war.

For a century the settlement of Europe effected by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 has been indicted because it ignored democracy and nationalism; and many of the ills of the first half of the 19th century have been laid at the door of the diplomats who drew the treaty. Does it seem so bad to a generation that knows Versailles, which one historian has described as "a higher standard of failure"? The Congress of Vienna was not unjust in its treatment of France, and it kept far more distinct than did we at Versailles the theory that the quarrel was with the ruler of the country rather than with the nation itself. France was not dismembered, the indemnity was slight and the occupation brief—all this despite the fact that the Congress had been unusually exasperated by Napoleon's return from Elba. Within three years France, once again a Bourbon monarchy, was admitted to the Quadruple Alliance and thereafter played the role of a great power which was her due. It

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is interesting to hypothesize what might have happened had the Allies dealt similarly with Germany after 1918.

One must also take exception to the common criticism of the failure of the Congress to give consideration to the principles of democracy and nationalism, for in 1815 neither was desirable for much of Europe. "Liberalism"—that is the rule of the upper middle class—the abolition of privilege and the guarantee of civil liberties would have been feasible at that time but democracy was out of the question. National union was not yet possible in Germany and Italy, and our own experience has taught us that nationalism is not a rational basis for the political organization of the Danube Valley.

It is time for a reconsideration of the role of the Hapsburg Empire in Central Europe. It has been traditional to condemn it for its denial of democracy and nationalism and to class most of its leaders as hopeless reactionaries. Of late there has been a more favorable attitude toward it, but much remains to be undone if we are to give justice. Throughout the 19th century the Hapsburg monarchy was on the defensive against the concepts of democracy and nationalism. Much of the political and diplomatic history of the time can be explained in relation to Austria. In defense of the old order she fought one mighty revolution in 1848, a war against France and Sardinia in 1859, a war against Prussia in 1866 and the World War. The French Revolution had offered a new basis for political organization —the nation. Austria stood for entirely different concepts—loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to the Roman Catholic Church and cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism. There was logic in her method, for nationalism meant her dissolution.

Now that the World War has destroyed the romantic society of old Vienna it becomes increasingly apparent that nationalism is not a solution of the problems of the Danubian region. In past ages the Hapsburg monarchy stood as the defender of Christendom against Islam. In the modern world its services were economic and it furnished a large free-trade area for a natural geographic unity. The division of the territory

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into several mutually antagonistic states at the end of the War bred tariff wars and an unnecessary multiplication of industry. The consequent depression which has haunted this area is a partial explanation of the economic ills of contemporary Europe.

We should also revise our judgments of the relationships of the Hapsburgs to the alien peoples they ruled. Their treatment of their subjects fell far short of ideal justice, but relatively it looks a good deal better than the historians have described it. The Hapsburgs were more tolerant than the rival German or Russian Empires in the 19th century and much more so than their successors in Central Europe. The Croat in Yugoslavia, the Ukrainian in Poland, the Jew in Rumania has good reason to regret the passing of the Hapsburgs. So now has the Czech who fared well under that Empire but did so much to destroy it, only to set up a miniature multi-national state with all the problems of the old monarchy. Ironically enough Czechoslovakia disappeared for the same reasons as Austria-Hungary: nationality, foreign imperialism and betrayal from within.

This generation is so accustomed to shock in international affairs it needs to be reminded that Germany's annexation of Austria was of unusual historical importance. It is extremely rare for a great power to disappear from the map. In fact the partition of Poland at the end of the 18th century is the only other comparable example in modern history. But in dealing with Austria one has a sense of finality; one does not foresee its resurrection. In the most absolute sense its past is history.

The era 1848-71 has been presented primarily as an age of national unification, but I should like to consider it as a period of transition from peaceful to militant nationalism. Here I do not wish to reverse the traditional interpretation, but I want to go further and examine these years as the seedtime of ideas which led to the most ruthless aspect of our civilization. In this era we see the heightening of those modern forces which express themselves in imperialism and disregard for international law.

1848 was a year of revolutions on behalf of liberalism and

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nationality in Germany, the Austrian Empire and Italy. Their failure caused men to lose faith in liberalism but not in nationalism. An age of realism followed, and the years to 1871 may be so described. The first half of the 19th century had been an age of philosophy, but interest in philosophy fell off with the disillusionment that followed the failure of the revolutions. Philosophy lectures, once crowded in the German universities, were hardly attended at all. The new god was science and his religion was materialism. Men sought *real* things, not those of the spirit.[1] A fundamental change also came over nationalism. As advocated by the German Liberals and by Mazzini in Italy it was a doctrine of unity at home and peace abroad. Once Europe was united on this basis, they believed, wars would cease and all men would live as brothers. Wars since 1815 had been within states—that is they had been revolutions—and the small armies of the day had been maintained by the conservative governments primarily for the preservation of peace at home. Once the nation had been organized on a liberal basis, men like Mazzini thought, the need for these armies would disappear. The new nationalism achieved its triumph with Cavour and Bismarck, who attained their ends by unprincipled means. They united their countries by war and unscrupulous diplomacy and they made war pay. Within a few years Europe was reorganized, its old equilibrium destroyed. Then came conscription for universal military service, the system of alliances and imperialism—the background of 1914.

I now come to the fifth and last of my suggested revisions —our interpretation of the world settlement of 1919-21. This period was democracy's golden hour; for the moment liberal ideas were triumphant throughout Europe, except in Russia. It was also the triumph of nationalism, and an attempt was made to draw the map in accordance with its tenets. One can cite exceptions, of course, as in the case of Czechoslovakia or the Southern Tyrol, but the map was more honestly drawn

[1] I am greatly indebted to the remarkable volume by Robert C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-71* (Harper and Brothers, 1935) which presents a reinterpretation of this period in European history.

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than is believed today. A large part of the work was done by specialists and for the most part the diplomats merely ratified the work of their commissions.

The fallacy in our thinking lies in the now common assumption that this settlement along democratic and nationalistic lines was the fruition of a program initiated at the beginning of the War—in other words, that the New Europe was a logical development of the old. This is far from true. In 1914 neither side intended to promote democracy or to alter the map so radically. The Allies made concessions to democracy and to nationalism to keep their own people in line and to win the support of neutrals. The championship of democracy and nationalism in Eastern Europe was incidental to the great struggle, and perhaps caused largely by our own intervention.

Democracy was gaining ground but it would have taken a number of years to prepare the way for its success. In the summer of 1914 the Rumanian statesman, Take Jonescue, was talking to the queen, Carmen Sylva, in the royal palace at Sinaia.[2] She asked him what he thought the results of the then opening war would be and she received an answer of unusual insight. He replied that there would be a cascade of thrones and that Europe would move to the left politically; also that the United States would come to the political and spiritual leadership of the world 50 years ahead of the time when these would be normally her due. But Europe was not ready for democracy and we rejected the world leadership which the War and our president had given us.

I suggest that the historian of the future will see something more than the tragedy of democracy and a foolish nationalism in the settlement made in the suburbs of Paris. The Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon were Germany's opportunity. They were a step in her unification and also an invitation to continental imperialism.[3] The Treaty of Versailles re-

[2] Hazen, Charles Downer, *Europe Since 1815*, Henry Holt, 1928, p. 5.

[3] I should like to acknowledge my debt to Hans Kohn's remarks at the 1938 meeting of the American Historical Association.

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moved the non-Germans from the Reich. Gone were the French of Lorraine, the Danes and the Poles, all sources of weakness in the Hohenzollern Empire. Territorially there was not much injustice in the treaty; even the Corridor had once been Polish and its return to the new Poland had historical as well as economic justification. It was of reparations, the control of their rivers, the occupation of their soil, the continuance of the blockade even after the Armistice that the Germans could legitimately complain. The dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire was Germany's opportunity. A series of small states faced her to the east and southeast, none of them strong enough to protect itself without aid from the great powers. The situation was comparable to that which France enjoyed in the 17th and 18th centuries and which accounted for her conquests in the Netherlands and along the Rhine. Except along the Pyrenees, Louis XIV and the French Revolutionaries were faced by no great powers bordering on their country. Let us compare the map after 1919 with that of 1914, when all of Central Europe was divided between the three great Empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Today Russia has been forced back to the East, less a Western European power than at any time since the 18th century. In the place of Austria-Hungary three states, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, appeared and territory was added to four others, Italy, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. All Germany needed was time—time to recover from the ravages of war, time for the conscience of her victors to feel guilty, time to reassert her position as a great power. Since Germany had not been more drastically dismembered by the peace conference, that time was certain to come if there was no preventive war of the type Marshal Pilsudski is said to have urged on France in 1933. For years Austria's ultimate union with Germany had been a foregone conclusion; it was a logical step in the unification of the German people and would have taken place even without Hitler.

The peace settlement, however, with its destruction of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, did seem to end im-

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perialism on the continent of Europe forever. This appeared to be true even in the first years of the nazi régime, when Hitler's purpose seemed no more than the union of all the German people. Now that he has substituted *Lebensraum* for *ein Volk, ein Reich* as the political basis of the nazi state we are again confronted with the spectacle of a strong nation forcibly acquiring control of neighboring aliens. If we are to learn anything from modern history, such a government cannot long endure in Europe. Although at present democracy is a spent force in Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism is more potent than ever. The future of this region is not a choice between an empire and sovereign national states, but between the latter and some union or league in which the members would give up some of their sovereignty in the common good. Unless the nations can adopt some such program of united action the continent is doomed to international anarchy.

The tragedy of our day lies in the fact that two of the favorite children of the 19th century, nationalism and democracy, proved incompatible. Once nationalism becomes militant it leads to war, and war destroys democracy for both victor and vanquished. In our complex technical world even the most democratic countries must surrender their liberties in order to face the enemy. One could ask for no better illustration than the abdication of the French Parliament before Premier Daladier's request for decree powers several months before the outbreak of the current conflict.

This discussion proposes historical revisions for five periods or institutions and indicates there has been a general overemphasis on the role of democracy in the 19th century. We should go further and attempt a reinterpretation of modern European history.[4] More than we realize we have explained the past 150 years in terms of the 18th century, and have drawn heavily upon the political concepts of the French *philosophes* for an interpretation of Europe, and of their contemporary,

[4] I should like to express my appreciation of the remarks of Carlton J. H. Hayes at the last meeting of the American Historical Association.

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Thomas Jefferson, for an interpretation of the United States. Writers of the present generation, however, have realized the inadequacies of the *philosophes* as guides to an industrial society. Moreover, few current historical works have failed to take into account Marx's theory of the class struggle and his economic interpretation of history. Yet in our thinking about a revolution against capitalism and democracy we had always envisaged it from the left and we were astounded when Benito Mussolini suddenly emerged leading a revolution from the right. Historians as well as the general public were unprepared for the Age of Dictators which developed in Central and Eastern Europe after 1922. The phenomenon, or aberration as it was considered in Western Europe and the United States, was explained away as merely an aftermath of the World War. But this is a shortsighted view, as historians, of all people, should realize. Conditions that make for a Mussolini or a Hitler do not spring up overnight, or without previous preparation, from a catastrophe even as epoch-making as the War. To point my argument, where would either Hitler or Mussolini be without the power of the telephone, the radio and the airplane? Each can say with Napoleon, "I am the Revolution," but this time it has been a revolution made more by machines than by ideas. In all its material accomplishments the 19th century was characterized by increasing speed and size. Inevitably this led to concentration of political power, just as it had already led toward centralized economic control. Every development of the new age in communication accentuated nationalism. Mussolini and Hitler are logical products of history in Italy and Germany, rather than freak leaders tossed up by the seas of a World War. Should we not reexamine our past in the hope of explaining more clearly the antecedents of these and their fellow dictators? Unless we make the attempt we are not likely to arrive at an interpretation of European history since 1789 that will be tenable in 1939.

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The Photography of Illusion

Pictures in Three Dimensions

JOHN T. RULE

IN ONE of his most penetrating exaggerations Oswald Spengler states that for Western man there is only one dimension—distance away from the eye. This is but one of his many ways of insisting that the desire to reach into an infinity of space is the symbol of our culture. He claims, in effect, that the greatness of every Western work of art is in proportion to its success in satisfying this yearning.

Whether or not this is a gross exaggeration it does contain an impressive kernel of truth. In any painting, in any photograph, the greater the illusion of depth the more intense the effect on the observer. The praise implied when we say a painting has depth, and the use of depth as a synonym for profundity, are indicative of this truth. The power of the Gothic cathedral and of the American skyscraper springs from their thrust into space, their enormous and effortless reach away from the eye. In painting, the development of perspective and the use of increasing blueness and decreasing detail with distance did not grow out of any desire to imitate reality more closely but out of an instinctive appreciation of the esthetic power of depth. Certainly we shall not go far astray if we accept the cautious conclusion that the perception of depth satisfies some inherent craving in the human spirit. It follows that, in any visual field whatever, a presentation containing depth will have a much more powerful appeal than a flat presentation of the same material.

In the case of three-dimensional photography the appeal of depth is very definitely operative. There is hardly a human being who does not get a definite and immediate sense of pleas-

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ure from viewing stereographs, as three-dimensional pictures are called. The novelty of the experience is only a minor cause of this fascination, for it continues long after the experience has become familiar. The stereograph instantaneously and effortlessly produces an effect which painters have strained to achieve by a thousand different means throughout the history of art. In photography as soon as an individual becomes accustomed to this quality a two-dimensional picture becomes a very pale and unsatisfactory substitute.

Curiously enough we are dealing with an unusual paradox, for physically speaking, or rather physiologically speaking, there is no such thing as the visual perception of depth. Perception of distance away from the eye can be nothing more than a mental interpretation, performed by the brain, of the disparate evidence of two flat pictures obtained by the two eyes. Fortunately the interpretation may be completely in error. I say fortunately because the process of fooling the brain forms the basis of all three-dimensional photography.

Glance with the left eye only through a glass window at a landscape. It is perfectly conceivable that a master painter could reproduce on the surface of the glass an exact duplicate of the outside world. The painting would, of course, include those factors from which the eye has learned by experience to infer depth—perspective and increasing blueness and decreasing detail with distance.

The substitution of the picture for the landscape would not in any way alter the image received on the retina. The only physical change would be a change in the shape of the crystalline lens of the eye as it refocussed on the shorter distance to the picture. If a single eye has any direct ability to judge depth it must therefore result from a correct interpretation by the brain of the change in muscular tension which alters the shape of the lens. It is easy to demonstrate experimentally that the brain either does not make such an interpretation at all or that it is so minor a factor in depth judgment that it is rejected in favor of purely experiential evidence—perspective, known

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size of objects compared with apparent size and the like (that is, all the factors which would be present in our plane painting). Consequently the vision of a single eye must be strictly two-dimensional. Any judgment of the distance to a picture or to an object based upon such vision is an inference drawn from experience and is capable of being completely in error if experience is violated.

The above process can of course be repeated for the other eye to obtain a second picture for that eye. It should be noted that the two pictures will not be identical. The right eye sees more of the right side of space objects and the left eye more of the left side. A post in the foreground of a scene obscures different portions of the background for the two eyes. Our two plane pictures must of course record these variations.

One major difference between the space scene and the two pictures presents itself. In viewing the scene, each eye receives only the image registered from its position. If we had our two paintings on the glass each eye would normally see both paintings. Consequently we must devise some method which will enable each eye to see only that picture which is intended for it. Having done this we have reproduced by means of flat pictures two retinal images which in no way differ from those received from the space scene itself. There will then be nothing to enable the brain to tell the difference, and it will therefore interpret the two images in its habitual manner as a true depth scene.

I do not need to go further into the theory of depth judgment—a subject extremely controversial and little understood. All that I need say, and in fact all that can be said with any degree of confidence, is that such judgment is an instantaneous summation on the part of the brain of all the evidence of depth it receives from the two images registered on the retinas. It is therefore only necessary for us to reproduce these images.

In accomplishing this in practise, the proper pictures may be obtained by placing camera lenses and making exposures at the points where the eyes should be. After that the pictures

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must be properly presented—that is, placed at the distance from the eyes that makes them subtend the same angle as the original scene. They must also be properly separated. The degree of separation can be determined from the separation necessary between the two views of any point to make the lines of sight from the eyes through these views intersect at the proper distance in space. Finally, the pictures must be mutually exclusive to the two eyes. This physical factor has to date dictated that some device, either a stereoscope or spectacles of one sort or another or mirrors, be placed directly before the eyes. With some such device, however, we have fulfilled all the conditions necessary to deceive the eyes completely into interpreting two flat pictures as a solid scene.

The problem of avoiding some device at the eyes is the *bête noir* of three-dimensional photography. The chance of solving this problem appears on the surface to be practically nonexistent. The only theoretically correct solution was worked out by Dr. H. E. Ives in conjunction with the Bell Telephone Laboratories—it was estimated that fairly good results could be obtained if fifty cameras were used in taking the pictures and fifty projectors in showing them. This procedure seemed impractical except on a very small scale and the telephone company quite wisely abandoned the project. The search goes on, however. The press frequently carries a story of some new invention but somehow none of these has ever materialized. Two were announced in 1938. One merely claimed to give an illusion of roundness to the edges of objects. The other I have had no time to investigate. The statements of the inventor, however, as quoted by the press contained nothing which raised in me the slightest hope that a way out of the impasse had been found. The problem is intensely interesting. I prove to myself almost daily that no practical solution on a large scale is possible, yet I find myself returning to it again and again, reweighing every possibility, investigating a thousand outlandish and bizarre suggestions. I know a loophole can't be found but I also have enough faith in the inventiveness of the human

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mind to be fairly certain that it will be. For the present at least we must assume that we are going to use some eye device.

For convenience stereoscopic photography may be divided into two types: the observation of still pictures by a single individual and the observation of projected pictures by a group of simultaneous observers.

In the early days, still stereographs were extremely popular. Our grandparents almost invariably had a hand stereoscope together with a set of pictures, generally a trip around the world. As cameras became less expensive the desire to own a stereoscope and a set of stereographs was superseded by the desire to take personal pictures with one's own camera. But for several reasons the stereoscopic camera was not popularized as was the single lens camera. For one thing, pictures taken with such a camera cannot be larger than about two and a half inches in width. Since in the early days of photography this was very small, stereoscopic photography lay dormant for many years and is only recently becoming popular again. But the cost (somewhat less than twice that of a single lens camera) was the initial difficulty in the way of a universal approval of the stereoscopic camera. The public, however, has the habit of buying expensive equipment if it really desires it. Create the desire for a stereoscopic camera and the camera fan will buy it.

There are other obstacles: time must be taken to view each picture individually. Most people have the very bad habit of the photograph album which may be skimmed through in a very few minutes. The casual individual likes to flip the pages of his album merely as a stimulus to his memory. But if a picture is a good one it merits better treatment. A single stereograph occupies the entire field of vision and forces the observer to greater attention than he is accustomed to give photographs.

Moreover only one person may view the stereograph at a given time unless it is projected. Though he may be thoroughly enjoying himself, such a method of looking at pictures reduces the pleasant conversation which usually accompanies a trip

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through the photograph album in the parlor. When humorous details are pointed out for common laughter the laughs come in succession and not simultaneously and therefore much of the infectiousness of laughter is destroyed. All of these are merely temporary difficulties pending the establishment of proper stereographic habits—and they will certainly come once the superiority of stereographs is recognized and the desire for them created.

The problems of projection and simultaneous viewing may be considered the problems of three-dimensional movies. The only such movies yet shown publicly have been those using red and green spectacles. These are known as anaglyphs. Instead of being black and white the two necessary pictures are respectively red and white and green and white. To the eye covered by the green lens the red and white picture appears black and green, since the red light fails to penetrate the lens and the white light gets through as green. To this same eye the green and white picture appears entirely green and consequently ceases to exist as a picture. The reverse is true for the other eye. Consequently the two pictures are rendered mutually exclusive to the two eyes. The green and red areas fuse and are interpreted as white because of the complementary effect of the colors. This system has a number of defects. Since green and red are used to produce a black-and-white picture, colored movies are ruled out. Furthermore a dark object in the foreground placed against a white background obscures different areas of the background. Consequently the white area which is visible to only one eye continues to appear the color of the lens before that eye. The fused image of the object is therefore fringed by red on one side and green on the other. Finally, this kind of stereoscopic movie imposes an eye strain which frequently causes a very severe headache if the pictures are watched much longer than 15 or 20 minutes. This hazard of course completely rules out the general use of the anaglyph.

The newest and by far the best projection system involves

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the use of polaroid, a material which polarizes light. The light projecting one picture is polarized vertically while that of the other is polarized horizontally. A pair of ordinary spectacles with similarly polarizing lenses is worn. The eye with the vertically polarizing lens sees only the vertically polarized pictures and vice versa. The difficulties in this method center around the problem of obtaining a light source sufficiently powerful to overcome the great reduction of intensity produced by polarization. High-powered lights produce such high temperatures that the cooling of projectors becomes a problem. This is a difficulty, however, which is rapidly being conquered, and the method presents no other major obstacle. Very excellent three-dimensional movies have already been made with it and I have very little doubt that this is the method that will ultimately be used. In facing the problem of three-dimensional movies, then, the motion picture industry must first of all consider the matter of spectacles. Either the theaters must furnish each individual with the necessary device or they must expect the public to own it. I believe it will be impossible for a theater to re-use the same spectacles continually. The cost of such glasses must be reduced to a nominal sum, say ten cents. A movie-goer may then own his own and if he forgets to bring them he may purchase a new pair at the box office for a dime. Such a price is not beyond the possibilities of mass production.

Many other systems for the showing of three-dimensional movies are possible. A half dozen different methods of using mirrors have been suggested. But they are cumbersome approaches to the problem because mirrors are rather fragile and easily dimmed. Reflecting surfaces, it seems to me, stand little show of surviving in this field.

The next considerations are those of initial expense. Theaters will need two single projectors or a double projector plus screens that will not depolarize light. Changes in theater shape will also be desirable. There is only one theoretically correct position from which to view a stereograph. Any movie viewed from too far to one side makes the characters appear extremely

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thin. The same effect, greatly exaggerated, or rather, more forcibly brought to the observer's notice, will be produced by three-dimensional movies. Furthermore to an observer in the back of the house the depth will be exaggerated whereas to one in the front row the depth will be foreshortened. Though existing theaters will unquestionably continue to be used the new ones will probably be rather long and narrow since the distortions from the side are much more annoying than those from front to back. The added costs also extend into the studio. Many of the devices now employed to reduce expenses will have to be scrapped. Obviously, for instance, painted or photographic backdrops must be abandoned, for the lack of depth will immediately be apparent. The use of projection screens, a very common device, will become enormously complicated. The very common picture, for example, of people riding on a bus or in a taxi, with the street scenes moving past, is now filmed by holding the people still while the action on the street is projected on a screen behind them. In three-dimensional movies, the movie on the projection screen will also have to be three-dimensional, properly polarized, adjusted to the proper depth to fit the required scene and of sufficient intensity to appear real. This will all be so difficult and expensive that for a while at any rate such scenes will have to be abandoned. For the same reason the extensive film libraries of general scenes, such as those of war or crowds, which are now inserted to heighten a desired effect will have to be entirely rebuilt.

It is impossible to estimate how great the increased expense to a single production will be or how far the industry will be willing to go in extra disbursements. Certainly the cheaper pictures, the third-rate western and the short-subject films, will be under a severe handicap financially. In view of all this I believe the conversion of the industry to the three-dimensional will not be an overnight affair but will come about gradually, starting with the "super-production" in the theaters in large cities and working down to the cheaper films.

(It is interesting to speculate what effect three-dimensional

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pictures will have on the present crop of stars. Many an actress who is two-dimensionally photogenic may find herself three-dimensionally quite unacceptable, and vice versa. Probably a normally beautiful girl will appear just as beautiful in the new movies, and her public will not run the risk of being disappointed on seeing her in person as they now are.)

It is apparent that all the real difficulties hinge on costs. But as with every other scientific advance, these expenses will diminish as production goes up and as inventive minds set about reducing them. I know of no scientific development of similar importance to the public that has been abandoned because of cost. I do not venture to guess when all this will come about but the strides made in recent years and the availability of polarizing lenses have certainly brought the date rather close. And it is exciting to realize that this is the last great step to be taken in the complete visual reproduction of reality.

In the early stages of the new movies the more spectacular effects will be emphasized. Moving objects which can be made to approach within a few inches of the observer will leap from the screen and audiences will scream and duck from them. Shots of autos or tanks apparently running over the cameraman can be made terrifyingly effective. The observer, forgetting that he is watching a picture, will be certain that he is in imminent danger of death. Other effects are possible. By altering the distance between the lenses of the camera and by utilizing the proper relationships of focal lengths the depth of a picture can be greatly exaggerated. In this way, and without changing the speed of the camera, objects can be made to recede at apparently very high speeds. Such increased depth should lend added effectiveness to scenic views.

It also gives an opportunity for a curious alteration of a normal scene, for a gradual increase of the distance between the two lenses of the camera while pictures are being taken makes objects shrink in size and increase in depth. A building taken from above can thus be made to grow from a two-story structure into one of incredible height. Unquestionably many

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other amusing tricks will be developed to lend excitement. After the fundamental advantages of such movies have impressed themselves upon the public, however, and the art has been thoroughly established, many of the tricks will disappear or will be used only for their dramatic effect.

Some mention should be made of the technical potentialities of stereoscopy. Beginning with the World War, stereoscopic photography in aerial mapping has been persistently developed. Two pictures taken from different points over the same terrain provide a very accurate method for the determination of distances. A map of an area, complete with elevations and contours, can be made simply by taking a series of air views, returning to a central office and carrying out the necessary calculations. Elaborate machines have been devised for such work and in mapping wilderness areas this method is now used almost exclusively. In one day an airplane can take enough pictures to map an inaccessible area that it would have taken a surveying party many months to have covered (if the party could ever have reached it). In times of war stereoscopic photography is extremely valuable. The uses of stereoscopy in range-finding have not been thoroughly developed. However, the trick of exaggerating depth has been employed to discover camouflaged machine gun nests and small protrusions from the ground level undetectable by the naked eye. In recent years, in addition, the stereoscopic X-ray has been used to find out the depth of internal objects, and we are only now exploring the rich field of stereoscopic drawings.

Though I believe three-dimensional photography has a great future entirely independent of any artistic considerations whatever, its scope as an art medium is well worth discussing. I consider the stereograph inherently superior to the single photograph in artistic range. The painter scornfully views the photographer as a technician, not a creative artist. The photographer thinks himself as creative as the painter. Yet curi-

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ously enough the average "creative" photographer is inclined to be as scornful of stereographs as the painter is of photographs, and for the same reasons. Each artist considers the freedom of his own medium necessary to complete artistic expression. The painter feels that his power to alter the appearance of real objects in space gives him a freedom from exact reproduction that is essential if he is to express himself completely. I recently had occasion to show some natural color stereographs, breathtaking in their fidelity, to a highly intelligent artist. His reaction was intense. "This is the negation of all art" was his instantaneous comment. This is, of course, a perfectly normal and legitimate point of view. Such stereographs are the negation of art in the sense that they eliminate the sort of liberty of choice that the painter is accustomed to exercise. Consequently they destroy what he considers his opportunity to be creative. It is interesting, however, that this attitude has come to its fullest expression only since the inception of photography.

The photographer does not object to being forced to photograph real objects in space. For any loss of selectivity he substitutes his comparative freedom in choice of views and his ability to introduce distortions of perspective and to control his emphasis of material in printing. This, he claims, makes of photography a truly creative medium. Now the stereoscopic photographer has less liberty of choice than the two-dimensional photographer. He cannot successfully tamper with his product in the printing process, for the problem of keeping the two halves of a stereograph in adjustment is too difficult to permit of alterations in technique. On the other hand he considers his ability to alter his depth effects by the skillful handling of focal lengths and lens separations a powerful creative tool not available in any other field.

Both the painter and the ordinary photographer are seeking liberation from restriction in the medium in which they are working as they understand that medium. But restrictions of form are of the very essence of esthetic effect. The more rig-

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idly limited the form of an art the greater its possibilities, for the tensions and restraints imposed tend to heighten the esthetic power of the result. The sonnet, for example, is capable of reaching the greatest poetic heights because it is one of the most restricted of poetic forms. The talking picture was objected to because it limited the art of pantomime. But the movies are a much more powerful, though a different, art since sound was introduced. Similarly the introduction of a third dimension into photography adds restrictions and consequently tightens the form. The resultant art will not be the same art as plane photography but it should be an enhanced one because of this greater restriction and because of the added tremendous appeal of depth.

It is worth noting wherein it will be a different art. The selection of material will not be the same because the best point from which to photograph a particular scene is not the same for the two fields. We shall lose the myriad ways of altering flat photographs for esthetic effect, but we shall gain in the handling of depth effects; and as the new art develops, exhaustive attention will be directed to this phase of stereoscopy and many unanticipated possibilities will certainly be revealed.

Stereoscopy as a whole has been gathering momentum in recent years. In the last two years more advance has been made, more articles have been written and more people have become interested than in all the years since 1900. The increase in the number of scientists at work on stereoscopic problems means that these will be solved at an increasingly rapid rate. Many of us will probably see the day when flat photography will be considered out of date.

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The Future of Intellectual Freedom

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL

DESPITE Sinclair Lewis' novel, despite the Scopes trial and the anti-evolution legislation of some of our states, despite Mayor Hague, despite the strutting of the Bund and the boring from within of communist influences in the proletariat, it is difficult for us to take very seriously the supposition that our fundamental American liberties, and especially the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are in any immediate danger. Let us hope that this optimism may be proved well founded in fact; but in the meantime let us dwell in no fool's paradise oblivious to the inevitable implications of certain kinds of circumstance.

Fundamental changes may come with extraordinary swiftness in human affairs. As seen from the vantage ground of long historical perspective no doubt most important shifts in human attitudes and practices can be shown to have an ancient lineage and possibly a slow growth. But such growth, as is often the case with chemical phenomena, is characterized by certain critical points at which from the point of view of the men directly concerned in them the changes are quick, often violent and to a surprising extent quite unforeseen.

It is thus difficult for me, who as a young man knew at first hand the great German universities as the homes of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*, to understand how the German people whose pride in these institutions was justly profound and has so continued to be until within a few years, should be willing to see them transformed and debased into propaganda factories

An address delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Alumni and Alumnae Associations of New York City, March 1939.

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where truth must pay tribute to political expediency, where thought must follow a pattern prescribed by the police. Inevitably a large number of free, self-respecting souls have found it impossible to work under such conditions and have accordingly resigned their professorial chairs. Others, equally unable to conform, have been thrown out by the government. But this kind of thing assuredly did not happen because men first said to themselves: "Freedom of thought is intrinsically pernicious; let us destroy it." No, the policy comes out of far more practical considerations.

The whole psychology of thinking concerns one of the most complicated and perplexing parts of our human capacities. From time immemorial the question of the freedom of the will has been a recurrent issue of philosophical controversy. Obviously the issue involves the deeper issue of the control of thought, for conduct—however individually independent—which does not emanate from thinking does not involve a freedom in which rational persons cherish any great interest or concern. The automatic functions of the digestive tract, for example, are in a sense independent of outside coercion; they are distinctly individualistic. But so long as they proceed normally they bear only a remote and secondary relation to thinking and in our present context they have little or no significant bearing. Practically what we are here concerned with is the extent to which systematic, organized pressure from without can suppress certain types of thought-trains and promote others. Particularly important is the question whether by prolonged regimentation the ability to discern truth itself may be warped or destroyed.

Clearly if one attempted to control the thinking of others by mere edict, whether affirmative or negative, one would not get far. If the ruler of the state says you must believe that all Jews are inferior to all Teutonic non-Jews and you must not think any contrary thoughts, the result will depend largely upon the degree of your ignorance and upon your emotional attitude. If you have been exploited by Jews and if you know very little

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about racial history and racial qualities you may accept the instruction willingly and even with enthusiasm; but if you are familiar with the historical and ethnological facts, even though you may entertain emotional prejudice against the Jew, you cannot intellectually accept the order as anything but a piece of political eccentricity based upon gross distortion of fact. If your mind is wont to concern itself with problems germane to this general issue the order will not inhibit your thinking at all so long as it remains merely an edict.

But if severe penalties are attached to any violation of the order, whether the violation be real or merely apparent, then the intelligent citizen will find his thinking increasingly immersed in an emotional cloud of dread and anxiety and he will study every means to guard his speech and his other forms of conduct from indicating his views. If by any unhappy chance he has been a scholar working in the fields of anthropology and ethnology he may find himself obliged to abandon his profession, confronted as he will be with a constant and distressing dilemma between permitting the free play of his intelligence upon the material of his specialty on the one hand and the danger, on the other, if he does so, of humiliating and brutal punishment.

Little by little under such a procedure, creating first timidity, then dread and fear, dictatorial governments, even though they cannot literally interfere with the train of thought of the individual, may succeed in producing an emotional terror which will drive underground all expressions of views hostile to the ideology of the ruling order or make it impossible for men who wish to think freely in these forbidden fields to live within the country. The unspeakable brutalities we hear of in the German concentration camps are calculated not only to paralyze freedom of thinking; they are also quite as likely to end in the complete destruction of the minds of the victims. Mussolini's castor oil treatment for intellectual and political heterodoxy appears a mild and gentle method of suasion compared with the barbarisms reported from Hitler's camps. Even Stalin's purges

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appear to have been hardly more barbarous. By indirection therefore the practical results attainable by a brutal state that cannot tolerate freedom of thought may much resemble those which would arise were it possible actually to intrude directly upon the individual's stream of thinking. The dictator-controlled states naturally follow precisely this method, for it is upon the advocacy of particular doctrines that they place their interdict. The penalties attached to disobedience are so severe that only the recklessly bold—of whom there are never too many—dare allow their minds to be busied with these tabooed subjects. How long these paralyses of thinking will endure after the dictators have passed, as they always do, no one can predict.

I have also met among some scholarly Germans in recent years the familiar human capacity to rationalize an indefensible situation or practise until it appeared to be quite legitimate. Such rationalization generally follows the ancient pattern of justifying an evil as something acceptable because it avoids a much greater evil. How far this attitude may ultimately poison the very ability to think straight it is difficult to say but it surely cannot fail to exercise some disastrous influence. Under such conditions the search for truth as an imperative logical and ethical concept tends to crumble into mere opportunistic compliance with prevalent social and political criteria.

So much momentarily for the mere ability to exercise a coercive influence upon the thinking of previously free individuals. Strictly speaking, ideas as such can be displaced or mastered only by other ideas which are truer, more inclusive, more coherent and systematically consistent, more dynamic, or, as Hume would have said, livelier. But ideas which become attached to profound emotions, like terror, may—so far at least as concerns the individual thinker—be inhibited for a long time and in effect be practically destroyed. What lies behind this effort of totalitarian states to control thought and to what limits does it extend?

It is not difficult to understand why a dictator would wish the most complete control over the teaching of the philosophy

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of the type of government by which he rules and more specifically over the interpretation of the circumstances by which he came into power. But such is the relativity of knowledge, whereby each subject of thought is ultimately connected with every other, and such is the disruptive power of thought, that he cannot risk in any field the activity of minds which are not steeped in the sacrosanct ideology he embodies. Only in a democracy is dissident opinion heartily encouraged—and not always then, as we should know who have lived under the Stars and Stripes for the last seven years. No, if you are set, for example, to control by dictatorial methods the entire economic order of the country you will find your efforts blocked and frustrated at a hundred points unless you also control the social pattern of life. You cannot control this social pattern unless you exercise something like complete jurisdiction over the courts and over the teacher of religion, and you can hardly get anywhere with any of these procedures unless you also control secular education—that is unless you can control thinking and its expression in critical speech and obstructive conduct.

One might suppose that subjects like higher mathematics, advanced physics and chemistry, to mention only these three, were so far removed from political implications that their doctrines could be left to develop freely for themselves. But not only do the totalitarian states quite naturally wish to determine the specific purposes to which these disciplines are directed; they also feel insecure and uneasy unless the men conducting them are known to be ardent supporters of the ruling régime. It thus comes about that no spot is to be found within the realm of scholarship and research where the repressive writ of the dictator does not run—and indeed must of necessity run if his sway is to be assured.

We have in recent years seen something strongly suggestive of these same principles at work in the United States. Dissent from governmental measures proposed to relieve our economic necessities has frequently been branded as purely selfish and unpatriotic and many kinds of pressure have been brought to

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bear to force the dissentients into line. Thus far, however, the penalties attached to heresy have not been sufficiently severe materially to repress the play of critical thinking. It is said that the critics have been likely to find the income tax officials disagreeably attentive; and other well-known methods of making silence seem golden, or active support very profitable, have allegedly been indulged. Other administrations have been accused of employing similar methods and in any case have presumably acted with equally good conscience.

We must always remember that intellectual freedom on any large and generous scale is a relatively new thing in the world and, when allowed its head, it has always upset matters. Thought is inevitably a potential danger for the established order. Unrestrained freedom of thought has almost invariably been discouraged in traditional religion. The orthodox tenets of the faith, whatever they may be, are to be accepted as handed down by the authorities. In the Christian tradition Protestantism split off from the Church of Rome on this issue, only to find itself a little later involved in a new set of dogmatic doctrines of its own; and the process has gone steadily forward through the creation of many separate denominations and sects. Other religions have passed through similar experiences. The universal fact is that only temporarily and here and there can thought be held completely in leash—which is by no means tantamount to asserting that all such free-ranging thought has been exercised intelligently and effectively. Much of it has been the fruit of ill-disciplined and emotionally unbalanced minds. Fortunately, perhaps, few people do much consecutive constructive thinking and those who do are not always gifted enough to make their thought valuable for others. Most persons run along on a rather humdrum habit schedule which calls for thinking of only the most modest dimensions. Nevertheless it is important that they should enjoy the unimpaired right to exercise such capacities for thought as they possess.

Certainly in the political and social sphere and in that of practical ethics as reflected in the mores of the group, both in

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Western Europe and in the United States, although a man might *think* as freely as he would he gave utterance to seriously heterodox thoughts only at appreciable peril. Poets and novelists have enjoyed a degree of license for the most part denied to men in other walks of life—and especially to teachers and priests. In countries ruled over by kings and emperors it has generally been found extremely bad for the health even to suggest the uselessness of royalty. There have been millions of human beings living under conditions of essential peonage and serfdom, to say nothing of outright slavery, who could not protest, or even allow thought to dwell unduly upon protest, without danger of brutal punishment and death. In the matter of sex relationships, where respectable theory and actual practice have often been widely at variance, a challenge to the accepted mores (no matter how honestly and sanely conceived) has often resulted in social ostracism and political suicide if nothing worse. Abundant other instances will suggest themselves. I have dwelt briefly on these merely to stress the point that widespread freedom of thinking directed to fundamental social, ethical, religious and political issues has been the rare exception in the world, not the rule, and that what the totalitarian states are now doing, each in its own way, is simply a reversion to a general earlier practice, albeit accomplished by methods that for sheer barbaric cruelty have no parallel in any other chapter of history known to us. I have said nothing of art, but dictators have generally been quite as sensitive to the trends in this phase of human expression as in others.

As to the future we can only learn from the past and not too certainly even there, for we never know how essentially similar the conditions of today are to those of centuries gone. Moreover unlimited variability seems to be the rule in the biological realm. But if nazism and fascism—to say nothing of communism for the moment—should come completely to control the world we might well enter upon a new dark ages of indefinite duration. If the breeding of the big blond beast of the north and his brunette companion of the Mediterranean basin

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is to be the controlling object of civilization, with war accepted and glorified as the great consummation of national existence, war made increasingly possible and even probable by constantly pushing up the birth rate, then the spiritual objectives of human culture and civilization as we have known them in the past are at an end. Humanity dedicates itself forthwith to the insanity of mass suicide. The twilight of intelligence is indeed at hand with the darkness of barbarism just ahead.

The dinosaur passed on because his cerebrum was not a good enough organ to let him adjust to the changing environment with which he found himself confronted. Our civilization may crumble because we have not learned in time how to deal with certain profound neuroses that affect the cerebral cortex, find expression in social and moral abnormalities, stem perhaps from faulty functioning in some of the ductless glands and almost certainly involve those basic ganglia of the brain which apparently bear so intimate a relation to our emotional life.

It is a tragic irony of the situation in which we find ourselves that to no small extent it is attributable to precisely the free exercise of intelligence which we are so solicitous to preserve, but unhappily it has been an ill-balanced activity. The mechanics of an industrialized technological epoch arising from the products of free thought have thus far been too much for intelligence to master in their social, economic and political consequences. The other side of the picture must naturally not be forgotten, for physical and biological science has also ameliorated the conditions of life in innumerable ways, has added to comfort and convenience, has conquered many terrible diseases and permitted longer life to thousands. But while all this has been in progress there has been no parallel activity of creative intelligence adequate to permit civilization to adjust rationally, gradually and humanely to these new conditions of life, themselves so largely the outcome of liberty of thought. Nor has there been any corresponding development of moral sensibility and obligation. Rather have we often witnessed in this respect a deterioration to the conditions of primitive man—indeed to

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conditions which are lower than these and essentially demoniac, for they have at times put into the hands of moral lunatics powers which derive from the highest intelligence.

There is of course nothing new in these observations. We have always known that unless increases of liberty and power are accompanied by increased spiritual and moral self-control they must issue in disaster. There seems small reason to suppose that our generation should be immune to this general principle. Only by scotching the disease before it has further run its course, only by the mobilization of free intelligence and high moral idealism is there solid hope for salvaging those elements in our culture, freedom of thinking among them, upon which we place so high a value.

All this may sound a lot of tosh to many hard-headed folk and I hope that it may prove to be just this. But one can hardly survey the wreck of the Roman Empire and the eclipse for centuries of the larger part of what was finest in Greece and Rome without realizing that the most powerful empires and the civilizations on which they rested have come and gone, many of them essentially lost to history. Why should we be so smug, so self-complacent as to suppose that under no circumstances could we suffer a like fate? The Goths and the Vandals must have had their Hitlers and their Mussolinis. They destroyed libraries, massacred their foes, gloried in pagan rites, doubtless had their racial ideologies—in short, were equipped with all the stigmata which are in evidence in Hitlerism and fascism, and the greatest empire previously known to history fell before them.

We have been attempting under the limitations of a constitutional republic to fight our way out of one of the world's most terrible and enduring depressions, a depression which was apparently precipitated in no small measure by the aftermath of the Great War but one which has taken endless toll of human suffering and human life and has involved practically every nation in the world. If men become desperate we know they will resort to desperate measures. The air is full of hints about how under totalitarian states unemployment disappears. It is no mere

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nightmare fantasy to suppose things might become so bad that men would turn to the experiment of a collectivist state as offering the only remaining hope. If they do then freedom as we have known it is at an end, for as I have already pointed out and as history, I think, abundantly demonstrates, you cannot stop short of complete control of all the individuals in the community if you would successfully conduct a totalitarian state.

It is easy, in defining freedom of thought, to create a wholly illusory ideal of the degree of independence which our thinking reflects even under the most favorable social and political conditions. What we properly object to in the procedure of the dictator-controlled states is the effort to create politically managed robots, to put blinders and hobbles on the search for truth, to compel slavish adherence to specific doctrines—no matter how completely they disregard established fact or what violence they do to the integrity of intelligence and the sanctity of conscience. And we are abundantly justified in our relentless animosity toward this type of thing. But we must not overlook the degree to which we are all subjected to bias, to prejudice and to propaganda, originating in a wide variety of ways and against which no one has yet devised any complete protection. The ablest and most intellectually independent of us set out on our thinking from premises which may have been thoroughly examined and approved but which are far more likely to be unrecognized, to be meshed-in with strong emotional attitudes reflecting social environment and tradition and to be accordingly accepted quite uncritically. It is not that our thinking is not free in the practical sense in which we are so concerned to defend it, but that it is never wholly free in the absolute logical sense that it has in it no element of undiscerned partiality.

While brute coercion of thought and conduct is insufferable and while democratic forms of government seem best designed to assure freedom from this curse, thought itself by its very nature as the product of a growing mind living in a social order is inevitably and incessantly subjected to the pressure of suggestion from without, sometimes more vigorously, sometimes less.

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A part of this intruding suggestion may be founded on false and pernicious grounds but some portion of it is almost certain to leave traces in the individual's mind which will eventually modify his conduct, whether pro or con. This circumstance is all part and parcel of the correlative issue, the freedom of the will, to which reference was earlier made; and as I have emphasized, the only manner in which outside control can be employed with substantial success is at the point of overt conduct where the dictatorial state can, if it will, produce complete subserviency.

The lesson for folk like us is to stop our feeble bleating about the menace to intellectual freedom and give our active and aggressive support to policies and measures which will spare us its loss. And intelligence has no more challenging task than the determination of the line which must be followed to achieve this end. The freedom of thinking which we desire and in which most of us repose a somewhat pathetic faith will not be gained or preserved by mere wishful thinking; it must be constantly won anew and by unflagging effort, directed not alone against political coercion but also against every subtle intellectual influence which tends to distort or misrepresent truth. No more than civil liberty is intellectual liberty to be gained save by incessant and courageous struggle. The weakling has no place in this fight.

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Modern Protestantism: Neither Modern nor Protestant

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

RECENT religious thinking makes it evident that contemporary efforts to effect a reconciliation between Protestantism and "the modern mind" have been less than successful. These efforts have dealt with superficial elements both in Protestantism and in the modern mind. They have consisted mainly in selecting those aspects of both which seemed to be mutually consistent, without sufficient regard for the patterns of thought and feeling to which they severally belonged. The result has been a Protestantism which was neither sufficiently Protestant nor sincerely modern.

Soon after the authority of the Roman church was repudiated by the Protestants of the 16th century the latter, left with Scripture and conscience or "inner light" as their chief guides to true religion, split up into numerous sects. Especially in 17th-century England, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Anabaptists and others filled the land with sound and fury and displeased the respectable into indifference to any and every form of popular Christianity. In the meanwhile cultivated moderns, like Lord Herbert of Cherbury, were discovering that virtue is not the exclusive possession of any given sect. For these religion consisted essentially in the practise of virtue and in the minimum of belief necessary for virtuous living—that is, it consisted in belief in a just God and in future rewards and punishments. Thus Protestantism was taught virtue as its sum and substance and toleration as one of its essential virtues. Since much of virtue varies with the society in which it flourishes "reason" or "common sense" was accepted as the primary source of a good or virtuous life. Honesty, thrift, industry and the like became

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the supreme Protestant virtues, with belief required in so far as it encouraged and nourished them.

Confronted with "the Newtonian World-Machine," Protestantism had a more difficult time. The moral universe of the 17th century turned out to be a vast mechanism in which every action was a reaction and all things existed in a box without top, bottom or sides. Human freedom and responsibility became a problem. Belief in immortality, however, persisted as necessary for the moral life. In the midst of such perplexities the confusions characteristic of modern Protestantism arose. Some believed in God but not in freedom or immortality; some in the first two but not in the last; some in the last two but not in the first; some disbelieved in all three. The great bishop of Durham, Joseph Butler, argued for the probability of all three and therefore of the Christian "mediatorial system." Soon afterward Kant established the extreme improbability of "God, freedom, and immortality" in the moral or noumenal world. The sum and substance of the cogitations of men like Baruch de Spinoza, David Hume and Immanuel Kant was that we live in a world which is mechanical rather than moral; in which virtue and happiness concern man and not "nature"; in which, owing to complete chains of causes and effects, freedom is impossible; and in which immortality remains without the benefit of scientific evidence.

Since the rise of historical science and of the historical and literary criticism of the Bible eliminated the Book as the "infallible word of God," when the Bible and science disagreed the modern man believed science and not the Bible. Men were learning to take from the Bible and the Christian tradition whatever suited their humane and enlightened hearts and to discard the rest as superfluous. Then came "evolution" and the modern mind was a step farther removed from the "faith of our fathers."

Such "acids of modernity" produced a temper of ultimate hopelessness. The modern man was forced to regard his existence as an accident in a vast and meaningless process which

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leads to nothing. He was given three score and ten years in an eternity of time and he set himself "to live for the present and to forget the future." His best weapon against his situation became thoughtlessness, with a minimum of search for meaning in his life and actions. He became very busy with details. Now he was a scientist with his mind absorbed in "stars and atoms"; a humanitarian reformer loaded with palliatives for evils produced by criminal disregard for human beings attached to tireless machinery. His soul atrophied within him while his heart swung between callousness and sentimentalism. At the same time injustice and cruelty assumed monstrous proportions in our midst and produced the chaos of our day before which contemporary man stands impotent and helpless.

Modern Protestantism has been no cure for the disease destroying the vitality of the modern man. Confronted with disbelief and disillusionment our religious thinkers have been far more ready to combat atheism than to understand it. Instead of sympathy and a genuine sharing of the despair of the modern man they have offered him, or rather themselves, inconclusive arguments and verbal apologies for religion. Our apologist-theologians have produced a vast and dismal body of literature, talking themselves into half-hearted acquiescence in distorted reinterpretations of the Christian faith. They have been busy trying to show that modern science allows belief in some sort of God, personal or impersonal, almighty or just mighty enough, caring or indifferent. There are a hundred variations of the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God, none of which an honest layman can regard as convincing. Then there are the moral arguments from the realities of the moral life, such as conscience, duty, idealism, etc., which seem to justify belief in a moral Governor who either cannot or will not govern this world well. There are also the arguments from "religious experience," all based on the questionable proposition that certain feelings are induced by an objective Being who may be called God.

The naturalist's despair in a vast universe in which he is but

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a speck is countered with the argument that quality and not quantity counts. His sorrow at the evil and suffering in the world is met with a comforting belief in evolution and progress. His complaints about the selfishness and viciousness of men, his genuine shock at the disparity between facts and ideals, are branded as cynicism and pessimism and he is exhorted to "have faith in man." His often unconscious but potent hopelessness with regard to his own confusion and futile efforts, the profound sense of the meaninglessness of his life which lies at the source of his ultimate moral indifference and makes him the victim of every temptation to live at the expense of other life—these are countered with observations to the effect that ideals are real and permanent, that the race is all but immortal and that there is some probability of an eternal life (which may be personal or impersonal, timeless or eternal, ideal or real).

Numerous sermons on the love of God and His many kindnesses to us are preached with the obvious notion that something often said is something believed. Sermons on the desirableness of faith and love in general (hope is not popular) are to be heard often. There are frequent rehearsals of the excellence of the several virtues of honesty, loyalty, purity, courage and the rest. There are also sermons, sometimes painful but seldom intolerable, in which preachers soothe their own consciences by reminding the people of the personal and social sins in our midst. And a great deal is still being said about the things our fathers believed which we may disbelieve without hurt to our religion and morality—yea with considerable advantage to our grace and happiness. Such theology and preaching are really palliatives. Bad argument and harangue are insufficient inducement to action. Hence your honest layman conducts his business of living without the benefit of the church or its teaching.

This disconnection between Protestantism and the laity is an open secret. That the clergy know it is obvious, because while they comfort themselves in every possible way they never cease to bewail the lukewarm religiosity of the people. The leaders among the clergy are in earnest search of means to revive reli-

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gion in our midst. Many of these are commendable and superficially effective. Much enthusiasm has been aroused by reforms in worship; we are learning order and decency in the churches. The sorrows of the day have spurred our ministers to greater effort in the performance of their pastoral duties. Some of our clergy have even gone beyond the desires of their congregations and have "meddled" in economic and social affairs which affect the interest of many a moneyed "pillar of the church." It does not yet appear that these modern Amoses have had an appreciable influence in our economic and political life. Yet we would not be without the moral earnestness they have injected into many a church and its congregation. But the layman is unimpressed because none of the above-mentioned enthusiasms of the clergy go to the heart of the matter: the layman's own sense of the futility of his life and works.

Within the last ten years some Protestant thinkers in this country have begun to preach a "new orthodoxy." Inspired by the evils of the day and by the recent German "Crisis Theology" they have revolted against the common "faith-in-man" theology and have denounced evolutionism, meliorism, progressivism and all optimism which has presented mankind as on a triumphant march toward a world of peace and brotherhood. They have rediscovered man the sinner (never quite forgotten by the "business man")—the man whose virtue never displaces his self-interest. Our theologians are once more awakened to "the realities of life," of which the most prevailing and powerful belong to the category of sin, "man's inhumanity to man."

Such is the foundation of the "new" orthodoxy. The several writers who have built upon it have taken fragments of old Protestantism and have reared unfinished structures which look somewhat like "reformation theology." A few have placed some "Catholic" bricks upon the façade of their handiwork. The plans of these buildings are quite simple. Man is a sinner unable to establish justice in the world and to live a life of peace and happiness. He needs to believe in the reality of an objective Being who will and can compel him to do justly. He must be-

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lieve in God the Creator and Ruler of the universe, God who will reward goodness and punish evil-doing, God who is almighty and just. The sufferings of the day are presented by these men as the consequence of divine justice operating through human sin. We recognize ourselves as evil-doers who have "violated the moral law of the universe." The conceptions of the way out of these our troubles are several. Some are clinging bravely, even if desperately, to "faith in man," in his reason and good will. Others, heard more eagerly at present, preach a just God who nevertheless forgives a repentant sinner. Still others, fewer in numbers but influential in the Protestant thought of today, discourage the expectation of much justice and righteousness in this world and speak of the "kingdom of God" as "transcendent" and related to our world as eternity to time.

In such a setting the significance of Jesus is altered. He becomes the unattainable moral ideal who proclaimed a transcendent "kingdom of God" and lived a life of moral perfection which is and must remain a source of embarrassment to all who would follow him. Hence Jesus reappears as divine in so far as, by word and deed, he proclaimed the transcendent love and righteousness which bring us to our knees and make us repentant sinners. His cross is the symbol of the standing crucifixion of love and justice in this world. Here, once again, there emerge differences of opinion that depend on the rationalism of the several writers. One is content to regard Jesus as a symbol of the transcendent moral ideal. Another is convinced that "the moral influence" of Jesus results in genuinely "Christian living." A third holds to a less comprehensible but perhaps more profound and true conception of "the atonement"—that the death of Christ made it possible for God to forgive sins without violating His justice: that Christ in some real sense suffered and died in the place of the sinner.

This theology is obviously inspired by a realistic attitude toward contemporary events. It is indeed time to qualify the optimism and complacency of "liberal theology": to recognize that goodness in this world is difficult and perfection seems im-

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possible; to desist from obscuring the connections between sin and suffering through a persistent and vicious superstition of God patterned after a stupidly indulgent father; to see Jesus again as one who promised forgiveness to the repentant sinner. All this and more in the "new orthodoxy" represents a revival of moral and intellectual seriousness in our midst.

But so far it has been academic and not popular. It neither originated from the people nor does it have much influence upon them. In fact, and this is the rock upon which it will be broken to pieces, it shows little comprehension of the popular mind and certainly little sympathy for it. Our religious leaders assume that the war is between "liberalism" and "the new orthodoxy." But the layman's adherence to the "liberal theology" against which the "new orthodoxy" is levelled was never a very serious matter. The anti-liberal polemics of the "new orthodoxy," focussed upon the rediscovery of evil and suffering in our midst, may cause temporary humiliation or fear. And yet the "new orthodoxy" spoils the people's Sundays without affecting their Mondays. Ultimately it is as irrelevant as liberalism, which at least made the people happy on the Lord's Day. For neither flattery nor threat touches the root of the modern man's difficulty—his godlessness. Neither the "love of God" nor the "justice of God" means much to the contemporary atheist whose life and deeds have no eternal significance.

The "new orthodoxy" is at bottom disillusioned liberalism. It is far more interested in man, in his sin and his folly, than in God. Its impassioned discourses are inspired by the same man-centered theology which was and is characteristic of liberalism. Therefore it may be more realistic but it is not more palatable to the modern man who, whatever his faults, cannot regard himself as the center of the universe. He does not and cannot believe that distributive justice is the ultimate law of life. The "new orthodoxy" is a new version of an old legalism which no longer deserves careful rebuttal. That was done by the author of the Book of Job some 400 years before Christ. What we need today is a genuinely theocentric religion whereby human

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life may acquire a new significance, not by distorting facts but by accepting them. Man is not "the last end for which God created the world." God is prior even to our sinfulness. The modern man knows he is not as good as he might be. What he really needs to know is God. He *is* afraid of the consequences of his evil doings. What he really needs is to love God, which is the essence and necessary condition of righteousness or the service of God. The "new orthodoxy" is a frightened liberalism and the modern man will take it no more seriously than he did its complacent stepmother.

It is evident that neither modernism nor the new orthodoxy can be religions for the modern man. The prevailing religion of our time remains one of despair in this life of senseless mixture of good and evil. Such a religion is a reasonable reaction to our world. It is the mark of an increased moral sensitivity that finds it hard to reconcile the thousand-headed evil in this world with any conception of a good and mighty God. When some less imaginative "religious" soul explains evil and suffering away by pointing out their frequent benefits to himself and others, when another finds comfort in general propositions like "evil is caused by human sin," "evil is necessary for moral development" the contemporary man remains unconvinced.

And yet, if the problem of evil remains so does the problem of good. The same sensitivity and imagination confront us with both evil and good in human lives. Besides, good is not merely human. The sun rises upon the good and the evil and rain descends upon the just and the unjust. The succession of the seasons, the fruits of the "good earth," all these make life, the first good, full of good and joy. The clemencies of nature must ever disturb the monotony of despair and produce gratitude beside disaffection.

Furthermore it is the inalienable right of man, and even his inescapable duty, to live in a "realm of ends" pointing beyond itself toward an undiscerned yet necessary end which shall be the fulfillment of life and not its negation. Such is the natural operation of a properly human vitality. This manifests itself

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dialectically in two forms: the love of self and the love of God. The first is the affirmation of the worth of life in the concrete. The second is the affirmation that my life and another's derive their worth from that which is both in our world and beyond it; it is the urge to have a part in that which is eternally and ultimately worth while. The word "God" signifies negatively the fact that my life and that of the race are incomplete and marked for frustration: positively it signifies the notion that the meaning and fulfillment of life are to be sought in the reality which circumscribes it at any given moment. It denotes a being by whom and through whom this life—with all its apparent waste of motion in thought, feeling and act—becomes intelligible. It expresses the related faith that the good and evil we do find their proper places in that eternal being which is both the origin and the end of time and all things in it. It is the symbol of the link between time and eternity without which memory and the imagination present life as made up of fragments of good and evil. So long as man's mind is teased by the problem of "process and reality," so long as he refuses to accept a limited good as unlimited, he will turn his mind to that "perfect Being" which is presupposed in all search for meaning.

The multitudes of man (exceptions may be non-existent), laboring under a disability which used to be known as "original sin," are given to idolatry. They are bent on treating a fragment as though it were the whole, the deficient as though it were perfect, the immediate and temporary as though it were ultimate and eternal. Moved by a necessity in the inward parts of man they bestow absolute love upon kin or friends or city or political party or nation; upon one of the arts or a branch of learning or an aspect of commerce or industry. In our day such idolatry has found dramatic expressions in supreme devotion to "blood and soil," "the dictatorship of the proletariat," "the British Empire," "the American Way" and "Mare Nostrum." It has filled our land with fanatics who will worship anything from capitalism to communism, from education to murder as the solution to the day's problems. In whatever form, it pro-

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duces confusion of mind and feeling and opens the way to all the sins which plague us and our generation.

Our first duty, in terms of thought, is to recognize an idol when we see one. I believe the irreligion of the modern man, his severe skepticism when confronted with plausible religion, is a necessary antidote to human folly, which under the guise of religion, patriotism or common sense threatens to undo the little good the race has accomplished. The sense of the vanity of all things in the contemporary mind is a somber but wholesome corrective to the perennial idolatry of man. Those who do not "believe in God" are at least spared the folly of claiming divine authority for means and ends which some men are always trying to impose upon others. Since they have no direct communication with God they have some chance of being critical of the "holy causes" which seldom fail to do violence to the souls and bodies of men. Since they are atheists they have little reason to make idols of their ideals and principles and to set them up for common worship. They may even have the courage to laugh at idols created by others—to refuse to persecute and kill in their behalf.

Such resistance to idolatry has certain implications which cannot be neglected without weakening it. The very conception of an idol forces upon us the idea of "the living God." To say "This is a partial good" is logically inseparable from saying "There is a perfect and all-inclusive good which transcends my world and all the things in it." When we criticize the part in the light of that which is larger we cannot stop short of criticizing *any* part, because we have shown ourselves aware of a whole which transcends it. There is no protection against idolatry except in the worship of God who is over all and above all. A man who would see the order and connection of all things as they *really* are needs to have his mind turned beyond all things as well as to any thing in the world. Thus a reorientation of the modern mind toward God is an intellectual and practical necessity. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind" is the permanent commandment given to all those who would cultivate the wis-

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dom and justice needed in our day. Such love of God is the final basis for that sense of humor which is essential as an antidote to the pride which has long been recognized as the root of all sin; it is also the foundation of all true love of the neighbor which is rooted in our "common humanity," our common pilgrimage in this world, our common plight and our common, if disavowed, hope that we belong to the Eternal.

Medieval ecclesiasticism in practise identified the will and the work of God with the will and the work of the Church. The clerical hierarchy controlled the operation of the power of God through an elaborate system of sacraments and sacramentals. It functioned as the indispensable channel for the work of the Holy Spirit in remitting sins and preparing men for the life to come. All the careful distinctions made by theologians did not prevent the identification of God with an institution controlled by men and exposed to all the weaknesses of the sons of Adam. Thus idolatry flourished and sin and oppression with it.

The Protestant Reformation was the republication of the "otherness" of God, of His sovereignty and freedom from human control. Luther's *sola gratia* was a redeclaration of the fact that all men fall short of the righteousness demanded by God and that they stand in need of divine forgiveness which is granted freely and not as a reward of virtue. Thus Luther struck at the foundations of the idolatry of self-righteousness and made it impossible for a true Protestant to identify his virtue and his way of life with the commandment of God. God became again recognized as one who alone is wise and righteous, who alone can forgive sins and therewith raise the dead. *Sola fide* meant that God is God alone; that all others are creatures who receive rather than possess life and righteousness. Calvin's principles of "the sovereignty of God" and "the honor of God" injected into Protestantism a "willingness to be damned to the glory of God" which, in spite of its harsh tone, established the right of God to be the ultimate object of human devotion and service. The "justification by faith" of Lutheranism tended to make Christianity primarily a religion aimed at deliverance

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from "sin, the devil, the world, and death." The "sovereignty of God" of Calvinism established the proper balance in Protestantism by an austere regard for the "honor of God" which is prior to human destiny, somewhat as the world is prior to the individual man. The much-maligned doctrine of predestination in the theology of Calvin was the ultimate renunciation of that idolatry, hidden in the idea of merit, whereby any human accomplishment is regarded as worthy of our unqualified trust and devotion.

The traditional and sufficient safeguard against idolatry in Protestantism is the Bible, which is first and foremost the declaration of the Kingship of God and His righteousness. In the Old Testament man stands before God, inquiring into the meaning of history, into the foundations of the good life, into the future in the light of the past and the present. Its historians celebrate the goodness and the patience of God, its lawgivers set down justice and mercy as the will of God concerning human relations, its prophets interpret the times in terms of this will and its poets alternate between praise and penitence before God. Such perennial concern with God made the Hebrews the supreme critics of the human heart and their Book the permanent inspiration of those who would "do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with their God." In the New Testament we have the continuation of the great themes of the Old—with this difference: The goodness and the will of God are presented as revealed in Jesus of Nazareth whose Spirit works among Christians toward their deliverance into the Kingdom of God. Once again man stands before God, recognizing that he is neither righteous nor eternal. The Christian considers the love of God and receives the hope that beyond the failures and failure of this life lie the meaning of life and its fulfilment in God. Thus the essential message of the Bible, God the Creator of the ends of the earth, the hope of man and the only proper object of his undivided love and service, is the Gospel (good tidings) which the modern man needs, and can and must receive.

Any effective religion contains two elements: one universal

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and the other particular. The universal in American Protestantism is bound up with the Bible and the Protestant Reformation. The particular in it is bound up with the particular history and culture of the American people. In this land of Calvinists and Puritans, Methodists and pioneers, Baptists and conscientious objectors, Quakers and Unitarians and reformers, religion has always meant "a way of life." The doctrines of divine sovereignty and human depravity, of the reign of Christ and the Kingdom of God, of regeneration and the inner light—all these have been matters of practise rather than speculation. They have meant such things as the Holy Commonwealth of the early settlers in New England, industry and sobriety among pioneers, humane treatment of slaves and abolitionism among Unitarians and Quakers, repeated effort towards equalitarianism and mutual service in a dozen communities in New York, New England and elsewhere. And lately they have meant the rise of the Social Gospel (the attempt to apply Biblical religion to contemporary economic and political situations), which has injected much vitality and seriousness into American Protestantism.

In recent years we have benefited greatly from religious influences from Europe. The Catholic movement in the English Church has taught us much about beauty and dignity in worship; it has aroused our interest in the historical study of Christianity; it has stimulated a new "Church consciousness." But it loses much of its power in the American environment because Protestantism in this country knows little and cares less about the Elizabethan Settlement, the Anglican Divines or even the Oxford Movement. The "Crisis Theology" associated with the names of Barth and Brunner has been more exciting and potent even though glibly and repeatedly repudiated. Barth, at once a modern skeptic and a passionate Christian, shocked many a British and American thinker into a new concern with the foundations of Protestant Christianity, with the Biblical message and the Reformation theology. Brunner raised a strong arm and pounded with great effect against the weak spots in the loose structure of "liberalism"—its evolutionary optimism

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and its product, complacent superstition concerning "human nature." That the "Crisis Theology" was a blessing sent upon American theology and preaching can hardly be questioned. But also, it could not be Americanized without losing much of its initial power. It has been primarily a cathartic and stimulant.

Our European neighbors have so often criticized us and smiled at us for our "activism," "moralism," "meliorism" that we have become self-conscious and have tried to act the theologian or the mystic at the expense of our spontaneous concern with "practical Christianity." We deserved criticism and we are grateful for it. American Protestantism needs to learn to be practical without being activistic, ethical without being moralistic, purposeful without being melioristic. It needs to seek the Kingdom of God, aware that even now God is seated upon His throne; it needs to "follow Jesus," knowing that it is far behind Him; it needs to remain deeply concerned with "social sin" without forgetting that all sin is committed against God and that all righteousness is from Him.

The danger in American Protestantism has been the substitution of "practical idealism" for "the service of God." Therefore our idealism has lacked the rationality necessary for intelligent action. We have repeatedly fallen into the trap of identifying some immediate purpose with the will of God. Thus we have repeatedly reverted to idolatry and our purposes have come to naught. We need to recognize each limited and immediate end as a partial good which may require revision or even abandonment. In the "service of God" criticism is an integral part of the pursuit of a given good; humility and tolerance are essential to regard for the good of others. Without criticism "doing good" becomes a form of imposition and therefore evil. All human purposes, all human ideals and all activity to "make this a better world to live in" must be exposed to the most honest and searching criticism. It is only a mind which knows how to say "Thy will be done" that also knows how to serve God and man without dishonoring the former and abusing the latter. The will to love or honor or serve God is the only ultimate

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protection against the hatred of those we would love and disservice of those we would serve. Daily life is the proper sphere for "the practise of religion." The personal, economic, political, social problems of the day are all religious problems. To see one's life in its proper setting in the life of society is a feat requiring the most rigorous discipline of the heart and mind—but without such vision we are in danger of perpetrating brutal oppression, social and economic chaos, destructive conflict with our neighbors, within and without the land.

American Protestantism must remain a practical religion or cease to live. The ideal of the Holy Commonwealth must continue a vital force amongst us. Virile Protestantism in America has never been able to separate religion from "social righteousness." Hence we cannot help seeing all problems of conscience as religious problems, we scorn faith which does not produce good work, we are bored with any theology but the practical, and we abominate the hypocrisy of any spirituality which turns men's hearts away from duty rather than to it.

Protestantism in America will have to become a genuine religion for the contemporary man, who is laboring under a sense of the ultimate worthlessness of human life and accomplishment in this our world. Life must again be placed in its proper setting in God the Eternal. This is a rational as well as a practical necessity. Second, we have to rediscover the essentials of Protestantism. Everything from "the freedom of conscience" to capitalism has been identified with the heart of Protestant religion. According to the Bible and the Reformation theology, and in the words of Jonathan Edwards, God is the last end of creation; to wait upon God, to honor God, to serve God, to love God is the proper and ultimate duty of man. Third, the worship of God the Other in our midst cannot be separated from an unwavering regard for the good of our "neighbor." The service of God is the final negation of "selfishness" and the binding reason for concern with justice among men. In America, at least, men will learn to love God as they exercise love to neighbor.

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In the Workshop

Uncle Sam: Author, Printer, Bookseller

Paul Bixler

The average citizen who receives a pamphlet on baby care from his congressman is rarely aware of the vast reservoir which has been tapped in his benefit. In a recent year the federal government, according to lists of the Government Printing Office, issued approximately 18,000 publications, to a total of more than 220 million copies. Of one pamphlet alone, *Our Job With W.P.A.*, the Works Progress Administration distributed free two and a half million copies. A dozen publications of the Children's Bureau of the Labor Department were distributed by the hundreds of thousands, some by sale and some by gift. And this does not suggest the whole story. For to the 220 million copies of printed material there must be added uncounted millions of pieces of "processed" work (mimeographing, multigraphing and other forms of near-print).

In spite of the assistance which they give to certain special groups —notably in agriculture, business and technology—government publications are not widely held in high esteem. Generally they are thought to be slovenly, wholly statistical, useless or political. Slovenly they have been and of course they have been useless when sent to people who didn't want them. But of late their quality has been steadily improving: today little government material is published without a potential reading public, most publications are well printed and if there is any general indictment to be drawn up it must be confined to methods of distribution.

Originally there was some doubt as to whether government printing should exist at all except as it provided information in convenient form for government officials; in 1794 the cost of public printing was so inconsiderable that it was put in with such items as firewood and other contingent expenses of Congress. Under the force of 19th century expansion, however, publishing began to flourish and presently grew rank. By the system in use at that time private individuals, often of

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greater political than printing experience, obtained annual publishing contracts from Congress; printing was a political plum, appropriations grew lavish and successful bidders as a matter of pressure contributed large sums to the party in power. Even after the establishment of the Government Printing Office, just previous to the Civil War, waste and inefficiency and petty graft were common. It was not until the reorganization of that Office and the creation of the Office of Documents in 1895 that the foundation was laid upon which the present solid structure could be built.

An examination of the publications of the late 19th century reveals a partial explanation for the poor reputation of the government as publisher. All publications were known as "documents," and under this deadly and often mistaken term they have suffered ever since. Standard productions were the farmer's bulletin and the statistical report. Government could afford neither opinion nor interest. When anything unusual rolled off the presses it was more than likely the result of political dipsy-do or of shady work in the printing office. (Lobbying and skulduggery among the printers was an old tradition.) Through endless repetition there became firmly fixed the cheap print, the low style and a format withering to the eye, but typographical stodginess served at least as a kind of check on printing extravagance.

Evolution in format proceeded slowly until the World War. The army of new officials that came into existence at that time—men with neither experience nor inhibitions in matters of printing—did much to contribute attractiveness and destroy outworn traditions. Not all of their ideas were sound, as witness their increasing use of the mimeograph and similar engines of duplication. But they found to hand a Government Printing Office which over the years had shaken itself down into something like efficiency and they began to take some advantage of the fact.

In the more recent past a still younger official army has descended on Washington. Its ideas, plus the technological changes which have been affecting printing practises generally, have turned evolution into revolution. Again the total effect was not without its darker side. New Deal agencies—particularly the 55 new ones inaugurated between March 1933 and July 1934—issued processed material with increasing irresponsibility; although much of it was important for future reference, none of it was designed to stand up under continued use and small bibliographical trace of it could be found once it had been published. But the New Deal effect on printed material, all of which passed through the Govern-

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ment Printing Office, was all to the good.

In 1934, Morris L. Cooke, in search of new methods for presenting his Mississippi Valley Committee Report, made the exciting discovery of a new type of illustration in the magazine *Aviation*. He brought the young artist, Rudolf Modley, to Washington and possibly for the first time in the history of American printing the government became an innovator. Modley's pictographs —they take inspiration from Chinese and Egyptian hieroglyphics—made pleasant and memorable some of the more terrifying of federal statistics. Today Modley's efforts are incorporated and serve many private individuals and organizations but some of his government work in 1934-35 has never been bettered.

It was in 1934 that President Roosevelt appointed a new Public Printer, A. E. Giegengack, who—strangely enough in the annals of the Government Printing Office—was a man of long and brilliant practical experience. Two of his first moves were in the interests of dramatization and improved eye-appeal: the appointment of a director of typography and the reorganization of the layout section of the planning division. In general he standardized, economized, lifted the ancient type faces. No small mark of his ability has been improved relations with the Printing Office's 5,409 employees, who in themselves compose a small commonwealth with their own health, benefit and recreational activities.

In the early years of this century no one knew exactly where the Government Printing Office fitted into the scheme of federal government. In 1906 a commission appointed by the first Roosevelt called it the "lost child" of our national administration and recommended that it be placed under one of the ten executive departments. For good or ill nothing came of the recommendation and as an organization it can safely be compared today only with the Library of Congress. Administration of both is lodged only in their chief officers, the Librarian of Congress and the Public Printer. Congress, which created both and looks on its creations with a friendly and sometimes sentimental eye, voluntarily limits its control to an occasional law or resolution usually sponsored by well-informed congressional committees. Under such relative freedom the Printing Office in recent years has built its own morale. It is now accustomed to show examples of its work at national expositions as proudly as any large private producer.

The Office, as currently organized, is geared to turn out everything from the *Atlas of American Agriculture*—a volume which no private publisher could sneer at—to postcards. It handles all job

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printing for federal agencies (the total in 1938 ran to more than six and a half billion pieces); it can take care of such standard volumes in boards as the *Code of Laws of the United States of America*; or it can adjust itself to the productions of the National Resources Committee, the finest paper-bound series that has ever appeared in this country.

All of this work revolves more or less around *The Congressional Record*, a daily newspaper with a deadline. *The Record* subscription list is a paltry 41,000 but its issues average more than 75 pages of small print, no photographs. It is somewhat as if the printing department of the New York *Times* not only put out its daily paper but did much of the job work and magazine and book production in New York City.

In the 1880's when Ben Perley Poore directed the one and only attempt at making a complete list of all federal publications, one of the congressional promoters likened the scheme to that of "Christopher Columbus when he steered westward on his voyage of discovery, confident that a new world existed, but having no knowledge of the distance or the direction in which it lay." Bibliography of government publications has advanced tremendously since Poore's day. The nets spread by the Office of Documents, which was created in 1895, eventually catch everything that is printed. Yet so vast is the total production and so cumbersome the procedure that sometimes even those well accustomed to deal with print in other fields throw up their hands in despair over its labyrinthian secrets.

How is one to find his way about among 18,000 annual publications? He will discover none of them noted in the usual reviewing mediums. A number of federal bureaus list their own current publications but the only comprehensive list is the *Monthly Catalog: United States Public Documents*. Alton Tisdel, Superintendent of Documents, whose Office is the compiler, offers assurance that it records completely everything currently published; even the processed material, whose origin has caused the Office's bibliographers no end of grief, is now included. It gives prices and indicates ways of obtaining whatever is not for sale; brief notations explain the contents of obscure pamphlets. Bibliographical accuracy, however, necessitates the appearance of an issue from one to three months after the publication dates of the material which it includes. Publications are listed only once, under the issuing office, but even so few individuals have the temerity to scan the *Catalog's* more than 100 pages. Subscriptions number only 2,751 and many of these must represent institutions.

Closer to the needs of the private citizen is the *Weekly List of*

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Selected United States Government Publications, a four-page pamphlet briefly noting 40 to 50 items under subject headings, and including chiefly those publications for which there is likely to be a special demand. Automatically excluded are any whose distribution is wholly free, most processed pieces, circulars and a number of other publications of such agencies as the Social Security Board, the Works Progress Administration and the Federal Housing Administration. The Office sends the *List* free on request and there are now 45,181 names on the roll to receive it.

To discover older material one has to seek further. A bibliography like the enormous *Documents Catalog* may be dismissed from present consideration, for its bibliographical lag of several years behind current publication makes it of use principally in depository libraries. But material that is still in print may be noted in 48 separate price lists, each of which is frequently brought up to date. Among those of widest appeal are *Government Publications, Handy Books, Health, Maps, Birds, Insects, Publications of Interest to Suburbanites and Home Builders* and *Children's Bureau and Other Publications Relating to Children.*

The process of obtaining one of the publications is a further problem. The simplest but by no means infallible method is a letter to one's congressman, who is probably an affable fellow and only too delighted to perform a favor. Nevertheless, there are times when the congressman fails.

Free distribution, it may be stated parenthetically, has had its abuses both in Congress and in the executive departments. The proportion of copies of government material given away to those sold has been stated as seven to one, an estimate somewhat on the lenient side. Recent criticism has centered largely about the extravagantly free gifts from the newer executive agencies. To answer it the Joint Committee on Printing of Congress is now seeking to force on each government agency a committee whose job it will be to review all manuscripts for publication, decide what shall be processed and what printed, and control methods of distribution. The effectiveness of this device remains to be seen.

Perhaps the most satisfactory method of obtaining government publications is to have an account with the Documents Office. The service is sometimes slow but nearly always sure. This, considering the handicaps, is to its great credit. It has been estimated that the Government spends well over $100,000,000 on research and the gathering of material for publication and that it spends considerably more than $10,000,000 for printing and binding. But it spends less than half a million on sales (not even this much if the receipts

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turned over to the Treasury are checked against that amount) and practically nothing on anything that might be called advertising.

Superintendent Tisdel's Office is a sort of government stepchild, joined to the Government Printing Office but not wholly of it. Congress appropriates for its work separately and inflexibly, allowing no leeway for peak loads of work and over the long run discouraging growth. In addition to selling, the Office cares for the most nearly complete library of United States public documents in existence and answers thousands of questions of a bibliographical nature. As a sales house, of course, it has always competed against the most lavish free hand in our democracy but in spite of such odds it has built up a formidable business. In 1905, ten years after the Office was opened, it sold a bare total of $13,700 worth of documents. In 1937 it rang up more than half a million sales worth $813,000, half of which sum was turned over to the Treasury.

Within the confines of his opportunities Superintendent Tisdel has worked out a variety of schemes for purchase. You may open a deposit account, sending the Office a check or money order for $5 or more and drawing against it till the sum is used up. You may purchase detachable coupons (sets of 20 cost $1), returning the proper number with each order. You may buy C. O. D. You may be put on a mailing list for certain classes of publications, receiving them as issued; or on a list for notification of something not yet issued, in which case the Office sends a quotation card when the publication is ready. You may not receive anything on approval, open an account in the usual sense or use postage stamps for money. It will be noted that this is a mail-order system, familiar chiefly to farmers and others in the outlying sections of the country. To city-dwellers it may seem a needless hardship. Its advantage lies in its reduction of costs.

A survey of its results compels wonder as to why the Government refuses to renovate some of its methods. Two years ago, for example, the National Resources Committee's *Technological Trends and National Policy* was published. As one of its authors says, this "takes up where the Report of President Hoover's Committee on Social Trends left off." No more important work has been published in this country in the past three years—if the problem of leaving our children's children an economy by which they will be able to live is important. At the price of $1 less than 10,000 copies have been sold, and free distribution, so far as one can discover, has been no greater. The most serious stumbling block here was lack of publicity. The report of the Hoover Committee, privately published in 1933, received ex-

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traordinary space in the reviewing journals; *Technological Trends* not a line. If the volume had been in the hands of a private publisher it is hard to see how, even at double the price, the sales could have fallen short of 50,000.

Critics, as they often do in governmental matters, have suggested as model the English system, but the English regional agency would hardly be efficient in the United States. At present Superintendent Tisdel, who may designate his own selling agents, allows some of the regional offices of the Foreign and Domestic Commerce Bureau to sell a few publications. To extend the scheme generally seems too costly.

A more logical suggestion is that of distribution through bookstores. A discount of 25 per cent is already allowed on all publications sold in lots of 100 or more, with the proviso that the re-sale price be no greater than the government list price. Booksellers object that unless the differential is larger or begins with smaller lots they lose money. Fully as serious is an air of distrust which has hovered over the relations between the Documents Office and the retailer. Several years ago the Superintendent discovered that a few booksellers were buying publications at cost (always the original list price without regard to age or rarity) and offering them to the public at four or five times that price. Since then he has often inquired into the purposes of dealers who write in to him. Something had to be done but in the doing confidence and sales were lost. The attitude of the average dealer today may be deduced from an item in a catalog which recently came to my desk. In the midst of carefully edited bibliographical notes was the entry, "Some Government Reports."

Still another scheme, this one more to the liking of the Documents Office, has recently been projected. Order cards for government publications, addressed to Superintendent Tisdel, would be put on sale at all post offices and sold at the cost of the desired publication. It is believed that such a method, though it would not wholly solve the problem of distribution, would triple sales. If such is the truth its consummation should be prayerfully sought. For government publications today are of extraordinary variety and the person who wittingly turns down a chance to know them is dull indeed.

Havelock Ellis, 1859-1939

JOSEPH WORTIS

THE quiet passing of Havelock Ellis in Suffolk on July 8 of this year marked the end of a career of remarkably rich and varied productivity and the close

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of a life of rare quality and charm. From earliest years he maintained a high-minded integrity of purpose, wide breadth of sympathy and close devotion to his chosen work. "I am a student," he once wrote, "and my path has long been marked out. I may be forced to pursue it under unfavorable conditions, but I do not intend that any consideration shall induce me to swerve from it."

The first of five children and the only son of a sea captain, Henry Havelock Ellis was born in a simple but comfortable home in Croydon, Surrey, where his earlier years were spent in close attachment to a pious and devoted mother. He had few of the pleasures, as well as few of the pains and deprivations, of ordinary children of his time. A photograph of him at the age of four shows a healthy self-contained young individual with a clear high forehead, a meditative look, and an attitude and poise mature beyond his years. At the age of six he was taken by his father for a long trip around the world, while his education continued under the tutelage of a nun. Soon after his return he entered the school of a Mr. de Chastelain at Merton, where he soon acquired a knowledge of foreign tongues. While still a boy he formed the habit of keeping full systematic notes on his encyclopedic reading in English, French, German and Italian literature. By his fifteenth year he had written a novel called *The Earnest Life*, in which the hero—described as a lover of nature and solitude and a youth of wide and appreciative tastes—finally decides to fulfill his mission by becoming a clergyman.

The England of that period was a fertile ground for his unusual development and his life encompassed almost exactly the rise and fall of England's greatest empire and power. During the first half of Ellis' life the British colonial empire increased fourfold to cover a fifth of the world. It was in Australia, remotest part of that empire, that young Ellis spent almost four years of fruitful study and seclusion. He secured a teacher's post near Sydney, whence he soon moved to another school far in the interior. A picture of himself at this time is preserved to us in his autobiographical *Kanga Creek*, and in *The Dance of Life* he has described the steps by which he there succeeded in achieving a reconciliation between his religious yearnings and his growing scientific interests. The reconciliation meant in fact an abandonment of all religious dogma and an allegiance to science which absorbed the fervor, the warmth and the ethical bias that were the chief distinguishing characteristics of his evangelical faith. Ellis never, however, fully abandoned the phraseology of his old religion and continued to cherish a "mysticism" which has never seemed more than a mixture of philosophic resigna-

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tion, stubbornly good spirits and broad human warmth.

In Australia, under the inspiration of the writings of James Hinton, he formulated his resolution to become a physician and to devote himself to the study of sex—the one subject still shunned by scientists and darkened to the world. Reared in a conventionally moral atmosphere while exposed to the influence of Darwin, Spencer and Huxley, young Ellis could not fail to be impressed by the enormous discrepancy between the boldness of science and the caution of morality; rightly he felt that many others must share his ignorance and uncertainty. His ethical bias and scientific interests were bound to converge on the scientific aspects of morality, just as his intellectual explorations were bound to lead him to break with orthodox religion and morality. His position as solitary male in a family of women may have contributed to his interest, and no doubt the sexual curiosity of this studious youth was easily diverted into scientific channels. "Now that the problem of religion has practically been settled," he wrote in the preface of the first of his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, "and that the problem of labor has at least been placed on a practical foundation, the question of sex—with the racial questions that rest on it—stands before the coming generations as the chief problem for solution."

Ellis returned to England in 1881 at the age of 21, and after another brief experience as schoolmaster launched into his medical and literary work in the thriving cultural atmosphere of the London of that period. New friendships developed for him, and he enjoyed a particularly close relationship to Olive Schreiner for several years. Soon after his arrival he brought out a critical essay on Hardy and thereafter contributed regularly to the literary journals. While still a medical student he was entrusted with the editorship of the Mermaid Series of Elizabethan dramatists, and in the year of his graduation from medical college brought forth two different books, *The New Spirit* dealing with Diderot, Heine, Whitman, Ibsen and Tolstoy, and *The Criminal* written under the provocative stimulus of Lombroso's anthropological work. In 1892, after a brief experience in medical practise his pioneering book on *The Nationalization of Health* appeared.

Ellis' marriage to Edith M. O. Lees took place in 1891, and from that time on—except for the prosecution of the bookseller of his *Studies* in the famous Bedborough trial in 1898—he devoted himself exclusively to the pursuit of his work in the seclusion of his home or in that imposing monument of empire, the British Museum. In spite of their close devotion to one another he and his wife main-

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tained separate apartments, spending their vacations together, but preserving their economic independence. His wife's illness—she was diabetic—prevented children but the arrangement was altogether to Ellis' taste; he never felt a strong desire for paternity.

His life after his marriage can be read in his writings, for it remained one of books and ideas with little outward conflict or drama. Aside from a transitory interest in the small group later to become the Fabian Society Ellis was content to express his ideas on the social order in such essays as "Individualism and Socialism," never interested himself in practical politics and scarcely ever bothered to vote. Though an ardent champion of women's rights he was never in sympathy with the militancy of the suffragettes. Even in the field of sex reform he was diffident in his support of congresses or legislation. He did not join societies, seldom attended meetings, never made speeches and was usually indifferent to public praise and criticism alike. For the 25 years preceding the World War he lived simply but securely, earning a small but dependable income from his writings and from his editorship of the Contemporary Science Series, traveling abroad from time to time and carrying on a voluminous correspondence.

The War and the death of his wife in 1916 shook him profoundly, but his work went steadily on and new friends helped to fill the void. Those who were privileged to meet him at that time were generally surprised to find him so cheerful and so rustic. His large, finely modelled head and patriarchal beard gave him a striking presence which might easily have been awe-inspiring if his manner had not been so gentle and unassuming. Ellis was a tall man but his frame was loose and his head was bent a little forward. When I first met him in 1927 he appeared at once more robust and more aged than I had expected: there were dark lines beneath his eyes and his complexion seemed rough and weather-beaten. He was a good listener but seldom spoke at length himself. His talk was perhaps somewhat pedantic and professional, yet it was pleasant and humorous and never ponderous. He seemed disinclined to lock horns in discussion and liked to dispose of problems in the simplest possible terms. Of an anti-alcoholic congress in London he would say casually, for example, "I don't believe in that sort of thing. Everybody knows that alcohol in excess is bad, and most people know that in moderation it is good." One usually felt there was not much more to add.

Most of his friends described him as shy, but he also enjoyed an extraordinary serenity and seemed indeed to be fundamentally very solid and thoroughly composed.

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He walked with a steady longish stride, usually self-absorbed, with clear eyes and eyebrows elevated at the outer edge as if he always felt mild interest or surprise. In spite of his bookishness there was an outdoor air about him. "I have spent all my life among books," he once said, "but I have always had a contempt for them."

What does Ellis represent? He himself would have been interested and amused at the question and he no doubt thought himself not typically representative of anything. He belongs to the tradition of the scientific encyclopedist Diderot and of those men of universal talent, Goethe and Leonardo. Perhaps more than any other man he had assimilated the culture of his period and there was scarcely an aspect of the world about him that he left unnoticed or untouched or could not to some degree illuminate. Yet he founded no school and had, in the ordinary sense, no disciples. In spite of his lucid quality of mind he was neither a systematic nor incisive thinker and his life was far removed from the fields of concrete action. Though fully devoted to the democratic ideals of Whitman and Carpenter, he felt no sympathy for crowds and was almost always distrustful of slogans and mass movements. "Christianity used to be a very good idea," he told me once, "until they put it into practice." Taking the long view, he had a placid trust in the processes of nature, as he no doubt had in the veracity of the *London Times*, and toward the march of history he was generally an interested observer. "The world is essentially absurd," he wrote in his "Impressions and Comments," ". . . but it is a part of its absurdity that there should be a little thread of Reason running through the world, and in so far as we discern that thread and hold by it, we have attained the Intuition of the Absurd, we have seen the world with the eyes of God, we have lifted ourselves above the Herd in the Slime."

The first World War proved to be a hard blow. Ellis was not prepared to understand its origin, and the difficult years that followed seemed more absurd than ever to him. "The older I get," he once remarked, "the less sure I am of anything." He had money troubles in his later years, and it seemed ironic that Ellis, who had devoted himself so fully to his youthful ideal of plain living and high thinking, should find himself in his old age earning a precariously plain living by writing for the American Hearst syndicate. After a year his salary was cut, and his articles were at times returned. In July 1935 he wrote in a letter, "The *New York American* recently returned an article of mine on Revolutions—too communistic I suppose. One of my troubles is a new editor who makes impossible demands on me." Soon even

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that source of income was discontinued.

The world situation grew increasingly distressing in his last years. His beloved Spain was invaded and after wavering for a while he finally felt his sympathies were with the Loyalist cause. But in political matters he wrote with less than his usual lucidity and assurance, though his good sense and good will led him sooner or later to the espousal of progressive causes. Always interested in American affairs, he wrote sympathetically in his letters of Roosevelt and even of the C.I.O. "But you have no great men in America," he once remarked, "because you have no leisure. You cannot have greatness without leisure!"

Ellis himself can be regarded as a supreme product of English leisure and culture at its best—a product of the same leisure, broad outlook, good health and spirits that produced the flowering of the ancient Greek culture, though England and Greece were alike nourished by empire or slavery. Without ever fully comprehending the origin of England's dominant position, Ellis belonged to that small group of notable Englishmen of his generation who regarded their position and power as a responsibility and trust and who sought to dissolve English hegemony and provincialism into a liberal internationalism. He had a deep conviction that the common people could be led or misled to freedom or destruction, and felt the closest community of spirit with those he felt deserving to be their leaders. But Ellis himself was never the imperial type, and wrote in a letter in 1936, "At the moment I am overcome by disgust for the British Empire." Rejecting the smugness of the comfortable people and not yet intelligible to the large democratic masses, Ellis suffered, one feels, from isolation between two camps. But his position in the future will be secure, when science, culture and good will have become the heritage of the common people.

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Discussion

AND PERISH THE NON-JEW

To the Editor:

Much as I admire Charles A. Madison's scholarship and knowledge, and although I fully agree with him on the dangers and implications of the Nazi persecution of the Jews, I am afraid that I have to disagree with him on the thesis "that today's pogrom is only the latest manifestation of a persecution that has stretched across the centuries," which he presents in his article "Perish the Jew!" in the Summer 1939 AMERICAN SCHOLAR. Before we accept this thesis, that the present persecution of the Jews in Germany is fundamentally alike to those of the past, we would have to have an explanation of the radically new features of the present Nazi anti-Semitism. In the first place all persecutions of the German past were based on religion and not on race. In other words, any Jew could escape persecution by accepting the Christian religion, whereas today it is just this escape which the Nazis try to prevent—even retroactively by expelling people whose great-grandparents had become Protestants or Catholics. In the second place, anti-Semitism in the past was without exception a movement that started with the people, usually against the opposition of the temporal and spiritual authorities. Mr. Madison himself has given many examples of this. Today, however, it is the State which persecutes the Jews whereas the population never takes the initiative and is largely either silently opposed or indifferent. Finally, anti-Semitism has been made the cornerstone of a whole new racial religion instead of being just a by-product of social or economic upheavals as in the past.

Mr. Madison, I imagine, would dismiss these differences as due to modern conditions which would have made a State-ordered racial creed impossible in the past. It is therefore all the more important for an understanding of the true nature of Nazi anti-Semitism to realize that four hundred years ago—in the closing centuries of medieval Europe—there was a persecution of the Jews which was just as racial, just as governmentally imposed and just as much the foundation of national policy as the German anti-Semitism today. This was the persecution of the Jews by the Spanish Inquisition of the 15th and 16th centuries which, by a coincidence, is discussed in some detail in Dr. Hans Kohn's article on Spanish Imperialism which also appeared in the Summer number. The Inquisition went back four generations just as the Nazis do; the accused was guilty if racial descent from Jews or Moors could be proved, regardless of his religion; the Inquisition was opposed by the Spanish people as well as by the Church but forced by the Crown; and this racial persecution was the cornerstone of the attempt to create a unified imperialist Spain. In other words, the persecution of the Inquisition was as closely alike to that of the Nazis today as both are different from all other outbreaks of anti-Semitism in Europe.

Now, there has never been any doubt what the anti-Semitism of the Spanish Inquisition meant. It was clearly and frankly the instrument by means of which the Spanish Kings destroyed the privileges and liberties of the towns and of the nobility in order to create the first autocratic absolute monarchy in Europe. What Henry VIII achieved in the Reformation, and Louis XIV through the breaking of the Fronde—the destruction of the civil liberties of medieval society—Ferdinand the Catholic, Charles V and Philip II achieved in Spain through the Holy Inquisition. That anti-Semitism could have this effect was not due to the importance of the Jews but to the existence of "Non-Aryans"—baptized Jews and descendants of mixed marriages. Because the Spanish nobility and the upper classes in the towns, especially the rich and powerful intelligentsia, had liberally mixed and intermarried with Jews during the 14th and 15th century, their power and their liberties could be destroyed by racial anti-Semitism; and because these classes were the only ones who had mixed with the Jews socially and in marriage to any considerable extent, their privileges and liberties could be attacked under the guise of attacking Jewry. In other words, the Jew was the victim of an attack which was really aimed at the social and political structure of Spain, his persecution was a pretense for persecuting "Non-Aryans" who were socially and politically far more important. With what success the attack was waged can be seen from the fact that the opposition of the nobility and of the

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provincial bourgeois to absolutism and centralization was broken within a generation, that the provincial nobility and bourgeoisie were almost wiped out, and that the provincial towns lost all political, economic and cultural independence.

The present anti-Semitism in Germany has exactly the same cause and serves exactly the same purpose. It is again directed at the civil liberties and at their representatives: bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Because under the unique Central-European social structure (which I discussed in my recent book, *The End of Economic Man*) it is these classes which alone are mixed socially and merged with the Jews to an extent unimaginable to anyone living in the United States or in western Europe, a racial attack upon the Jews destroys these classes who would have opposed totalitarianism. The Jews are again as in the Spain of the fifteen-hundreds, the victims of an attack directed against the "Non-Aryan" Non-Jews who are both far more numerous and far more important socially. This is the reason why the attack had to be on a racial basis. Otherwise the great bulk of the German upper and upper middle classes would have escaped persecution and most of the German Jews would have escaped also by embracing baptism.

I believe that this explanation, which denies any organic link between the present persecution and those of the past, is the only one which is in agreement with the facts. In addition it is the only explanation which does not logically imply acceptance of the official Nazi thesis, according to which an unbridgeable gulf between the German and the Jewish peoples makes any peaceful co-existence impossible. And in spite of all the facts cited by Mr. Madison I feel inclined to wonder whether it is really true that Germany has been fundamentally anti-Semitic as both Mr. Madison and the Nazis assume. The German Jews never shared this belief; nor did the German people. They both were so convinced that Germany was the least anti-Semitic of all major European countries that nobody, not even the bulk of the Nazis, took Hitler's anti-Semitism seriously until after he had come to power. And no less an authority than Goethe thought that there existed a mysterious, indissoluble bond between Germans and Jews. After all, only in Germany, of all the constituent parts of the West-Roman Empire, did the Jews survive the Middle Ages, whereas they were driven out or destroyed in England, France, Spain and Italy where they had been far more numerous in antiquity.

PETER F. DRUCKER,
New York, N. Y.

PATH FOR A DICTATOR

To the Editor:

Edward A. Fuhlbruegge of Newark, N. J., in the Summer 1939 issue, offers criticism of my article, "More Blessed to Get" (Winter 1939). To begin with, he takes exception to my selection of pressure groups: "He gives greater attention to the World War Veterans, the United Auto Workers and certain agricultural interests . . . He neglects the larger or more powerful groups." Anyone writing a short article upon what Mr. Fuhlbruegge himself calls "a multiplicity of groups" must select from them and in doing so will inevitably draw criticism. Such criticism, however, should take into consideration that the pressure groups named were chosen solely for their fitness as examples of the particular kind of privilege they are there to illustrate—not because of their numbers or their power. Even so I am under the impression that there are few pressure groups larger or more powerful than the American Legion, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the C.I.O. and the United States Chamber of Commerce, all of which were mentioned by name within the article.

Then, in two ways, Mr. Fuhlbruegge minimizes the threat presented by pressure groups. First he says "Some of these groups tend to or try to cancel each other out." This forlorn observation was once made concerning the Chicago gang murders. Law-abiding citizens comforted themselves with the sombre reflection: "After all, they *do* kill each other!" The truth is that pressure groups do not cancel one another out but spur one another on. I scarcely know of a business interest asking for a protective tariff which does not do so on the ground that the demands of organized labor have raised the wages which they must pay far above those which foreign business pays. On the other hand the chief complaint of the farmer these many years has been that he has had to "sell in a world market and buy in a protected market"—protected for the benefit of business. If the farmers eventually succeed in forcing Congress to grant them the so-called "cost-of-production" bill we shall hear once more from organized labor, as we have in the past, that "wages must go up to pay for the increased cost of living." Furthermore, pressure groups hitherto thought to be aiming in completely opposite ways are now coming to disregard their differences temporarily in order to combine toward common satisfaction. I pointed out in my article that "a group of business men, called the

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Illinois Reciprocal Trade Association, . . . has united with the local branch of the United Mine Workers to 'direct the buying power of Illinois into the commodities of . . . Illinois.'" Likewise I note that the Textile Workers Organizing Committee and the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers with one voice demand that Southern freight rates be not lowered, on the ground that the Northern mills could not then compete with the Southern. But do we need examples? Surely Mr. Fuhlbruegge, as an historian, is familiar with the term "log-rolling."

Secondly he comments "It is doubtful if many of them achieve substantial results." On May 9, 1939 the United States Senate, having protested its love of economy, was forced by the pressure of the American Farm Bureau Federation to vote the farmers some $1,218,603,572. It might be pointed out that it does not need many such grants to bankrupt the government and to impoverish the people—toward which dark circumstance the continued government deficits already so ominously point. Besides this, however, many small pressure groups achieve many small results—a trend which, in my opinion, is almost more dangerous than the above since it is not so readily discernible.

Then Mr. Fuhlbruegge goes on to state: "Democracy is not abused when groups are organized and *legitimately* lobby for their ends. . . . We need not fewer groups but stronger ones of the *right* kinds." (Italics mine) And which are the "right" kind? All are staunchly pro-American; all bow to "democracy." All believe in freedom of speech, press and worship. All insist that they are interested only in the welfare of the whole people (attainable, however, only by granting their particular demands). The fondest desire of each is to raise the "American Standard of Living" (possible only by raising their own standard of living). All are "downtrodden," "discriminated against" and the "victim of selfish vested interests." All ask but "justice" and a "fair" wage, price, subsidy or protection, as the case may be. Mr. Fuhlbruegge censured me for having failed to mention "the public utilities." The chairman of even the despised Committee of Utility Executives, Philip H. Gadsden, on May 18, 1938 described the private power industry to a Senate sub-committee on appropriations as "a mighty machine for creating jobs and spreading social benefits to all the people." How then, are we to distinguish "legitimate" interests?

Mr. Fuhlbruegge apparently feels that numbers should decide: "I note that Mr. Harding makes no distinction between a group trying to get benefits for many people and one trying to enrich a few." Of course I make no such distinction! Do numbers constitute legitimacy? Does a privilege demanded by a thousand cease to be a privilege when demanded by a million? Is it a sin for 50 people to ask to have something done for them, be they ever so bedraggled; and a virtue for 50,000 to ask to have the same thing done for them, be they ever so prosperous? Why should a distinction be drawn between two parts of the population, each asking to have something done *for* instead of *by* themselves on the ground of numbers? Indeed is not that pressure group which makes demand on behalf of the more people apt to be the greater burden upon those who bear it? And who does bear this burden?

Mr. Fuhlbruegge correctly says: "Possibly the best example of what happens to unorganized interests is the position of the consumer. Not only is the interest of the consumer neglected by the production of goods of inferior quality but his very ability to consume is nullified because of the lack of sufficient purchasing power adequately to exercise that consuming ability." Bravo! But he fails to mention what should be screeched from the high hills: that every living person in the world without even one exception is a consumer. Who does not have needs to be fulfilled, from birth to death and in all the stretches of the seas and continents? If the consumer is the "Forgotten Man," as Mr. Fuhlbruegge very clearly indicates that he is, then humanity is the "Forgotten Man," since they are one and the same thing. If labor, encouraged by the example of business or agriculture, organizes itself to make demands upon the consumer or the representatives of the consumer (and they can petition no other), then who but humanity must bear the burden of those demands? What matters it whether the privileges granted be few and substantial or many and small, since humanity bears the cost?

The offense to humanity is not mitigated by the identity of the person (or persons) who receives a privilege or by the grounds whereon it is received. Only that petition is just which asks permission to fulfil humanity's need. All others should be rejected with utter scorn by government, whether free or dictatorial. I do not advocate a dictator; I predict a dictator. I pray God only that he be that which is most rare in history —a man who shall hold the welfare of humanity in his heart, who shall protect humanity from the many groups which beset it, who shall do these things which our government today so signally fails to do!

FRANCIS APPLETON HARDING,
Bedham, Mass.

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About Our Authors

Quotation marks usually indicate passages taken directly from autobiographical letters requested from the authors themselves.

For years, as evidenced by the titles of the books appearing over his name (*The Problem of Sovereignty, Authority in the Modern State, Liberty in the Modern State, The Dangers of Obedience, Democracy in Crisis, Parliamentary Government in England, The Rise of European Liberalism*, to select a few of the more than dozen books published since 1919), HAROLD J. LASKI has examined modern man's relationship to freedom in the light of economic forms and the state. His shorter studies are familiar to readers of *The New Republic, The Harvard Law Review, The Nation*. . . . Americans, *qua* Americans, are not free to reject his writing as without validity for this country. For one thing, Mr. Laski knows us well. From 1916 to 1920 he was a member of the teaching staff at Harvard; during 1931 he was visiting professor at Yale; during the winter of 1938-39 he lectured to numerous groups across the country from coast to coast; he has often, in the intervening years, been invited here to deliver a special series of lectures. . . . For another thing, Mr. Laski has selected his illustrative material from the history and court decisions of both Great Britain and the United States.

For some time JUSTUS BUCHLER taught at Columbia University and since 1938 has been a member of the department of philosophy at Brooklyn College. On philosophical subjects he has contributed to *Mind, Journal of Philosophy, Psyche, Philosophical Review and Analysis*; on literary subjects to the *Virginia Quarterly Review, New England Quarterly* and the *New York Times Book Review*. . . . "It seems to me that the principal desideratum of present-day philosophical thought (if I may be permitted to sermonize) is the combination of strong imagination and analytical power. To strive to combine the virtues of Santayana and Peirce would be a worthy ideal in any age. . . . A few years ago a friend and I dug up some scattered essays which Santayana himself had forgotten, and edited them in the volume *Obiter Scripta*. This October Harcourt, Brace is publishing my own volume, *Charles Peirce's Empiricism*. At present I am engaged in the business of making my statement (in the article of this issue) come true—that Peirce will not remain a philosopher's philosopher. I am, that is, preparing a volume of selected writings from Peirce, with a view to his reaching a public to which he has thus far been inaccessible."

ARTHUR LIVINGSTON has been immersed in Italian literature ever since he was old enough to chart his own course. His college and university affiliations have changed and been interrupted but not his field of work. After nine or ten years as an instructor and professor of Italian he organized, with Ernest Poole and Paul Kennaday, Foreign Press Service (later Kennaday and Livingston) which introduced and translated such writers from abroad as Blasco Ibanez, Luigi Pirandello, Claude Farrère, Giuseppe Prezzolini, Giovanni Papini and Guglielmo Ferrero. In 1925 he resumed his professorship at Columbia and is still a member of its faculty. His worldly as well as his academic interest in Italian has borne fruit in his *Sonetti di G. F. Busenello, Vita veneziana del' 600, Memoirs of Lorenzo Da Ponte*, his 30 translations and his numerous articles and reviews on Italian literature and civilization. The *New York Herald* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Nation*, the *Encyclopedia Italiana* and the *International Encyclopedia* have called upon his services; and in 1935 he acted as editor and translator of Pareto's *The Mind and Society*.

This is the third time that EDWIN R. EMBREE has used these pages to challenge a group or an attitude of mind (see Vol. 1, No. 4 and Vol. 5, No. 3). For years he was associated, in a variety of capacities, with Yale; in 1927 he was vice-president of the Rockefeller Foundation; since 1927 he has been president of the Julius Rosenwald Fund. . . . One of his books bears the title, *Prospecting for Heaven—Science and the Good Life*. In his own prospecting, which has borne good fruit for all the many aided by the Rosenwald Fund, he shows himself true lineal descendant of a family which has included James Embree, publisher of the first abolition paper in America, and the crusading Scotch-Irish Kentucky preacher, John G. Fee.

HENRY SEIDEL CANBY, who is the author of innumerable books squeezed out of busy days, says: "Put me down as a more or less ex-professor [his association with Yale, which has covered the years since 1900, will be continued on a part-time basis in 1939-40]; ex-editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature* [he still serves as contributing editor]; active chairman of the Book of the Month Club judges; active writer and critic, verging toward history." He has been reading,

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and writing upon, Thoreau since the 1910's, but he qualifies any conclusions one might hastily draw from that concentration by saying: "My earlier interest was chiefly due to a congenial love of nature and particularly the woods. I really knew very little about Thoreau's life—except in the woods—until about three years ago when, getting time free at last for a major enterprise, I began to study his biography. Then, without altering my central judgments of his work, I found him to be a very different man from my conception of him—much more emotional, much more human and a far better subject for a biography than I had supposed from his cold exterior."

E. WILSON LYON, Rhodes Scholar from Mississippi in 1925, took the opportunity to combine work in modern history with extensive travel through most of Europe west of Budapest and south of the Scandinavian countries. For the past five years he has been professor of history and chairman of the department at Colgate University. Within the field of history his chief interest has centered on England and France and on Franco-American relations (see his book, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804*, and articles published in *The American Historical Review*, *La Révolution Française*, *The Franco-American Review* and other periodicals). But officially he gives courses not only in English history but "in most varieties of European history since 1500."

JOHN T. RULE escaped the restricting dimensions of life as consulting engineer in an office by getting a part-time teaching job. For ten years he remained "in business"; since 1936 he has been on the teaching staff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is now an associate professor there and head of the department of drawing. Fortunately he finds time to do research work in all phases of three-dimensional vision, "with special reference to stereoscopic drawings and the educational uses of the stereoscope." . . . "I got," he writes, "into the three-dimensional field in 1932 because my wife bought a stereoscope with a set of pictures of a trip around the world from a salesman at the door. I immediately decided such a beautiful Christmas present should be put to some practical account and started developing the theory of three-dimensional drawings for use in a course in solid geometry I was then teaching."

A friend of JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL'S has written: "Few American educators have enjoyed as active, serviceable and distinguished a career"—a career that was not terminated by his resignation from the presidency of Yale in 1937, for he immediately became educational counselor of the National Broadcasting Company. It is common knowledge that he has had an astonishing number of honorary degrees conferred upon him; that he has been decorated by several foreign governments; that his presidency of the National Research Council (1919-20) and of the Carnegie Corporation (1920-21) are illustrative. It has been less bruited about that "he was the first president of Yale for nearly two centuries who was not an alumnus of that university; and that while president of Yale he almost completely rebuilt the campus, established several new schools, inaugurated the undergraduate residential college system and more than quadrupled Yale's endowments." It is also relevant to remember, in thinking of his discussion in the current number, that his years of teaching were increasingly devoted to psychology.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN is assistant professor of Biblical history at Wellesley College. His father was a professor of Old Testament in Marash Theological Seminary, Turkey; and "as a devout Christian, a devoted minister and a tireless student" the father had a profound influence upon the son. . . . "After four years in the American University of Beirut, Syria, I came to the United States and in 1924 entered Columbia College, New York City, where my work in the sciences and in philosophy contributed greatly to a naturalistic streak in thought and feeling. In Union Theological Seminary I acquired a new respect for Christian thought through the study of the Bible and Calvin's *Institutes*. My study of Jonathan Edwards, in connection with doctoral work, confirmed a conviction that historic Protestantism and contemporary naturalism are honest witnesses to man's true place in nature and to his consequent need for the Word of God."

PAUL BIXLER, at one time college instructor in English and at still another time newspaper reporter, is now librarian at Antioch College. He is also no stranger to these pages (see Vol. 7, No. 1; Vol. 8, No. 1). Here, as usual, he is concerned to see that interesting things are not prematurely buried through a failure to get their interest across to the public.

JOSEPH WORTIS, M.D., a research psychiatrist at Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital, New York City, worked for several years under the guidance of Havelock Ellis.

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